Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted after jury trial of robbery (enhanced), for stealing a woman's purse. During a foot chase by police 11 days after robbery, Defendant tripped and fell, and a handgun fell from his pants. A struggle with police ensued, and Defendant sustained an eye injury. Court erred in allowing State to introduce evidence of Defendant's possession of a gun at the time of his arrest, in order to explain why policy used force during arrest. Testimony of Defendant's possession of a gun 11 days after incident had no probative value to the charges, which did not include any element of the possession or use of a weapon, and there was no evidence of presence or use of weapon during incident. Defendant's resistance alone, without evidence of the presence of gun, was sufficient to explain his minimal eye injury. (HUTCHINSON, concurring; JORGENSEN, dissenting).

(Modified opinion filed 11/24/10.) Defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and home invasion, and armed robbery, and sentenced to a total of 80 years imprisonment. No plain error in jury instruction as to elements of sexual assault; Defendant admitted forcing victim, while he wielded a knife, and error was not so fundamental to have severely threatened fairness of trial. Evidence was sufficient to establish home invasion, when Defendant held a knife to victim's throat while she was locking her apartment door and forced her into the apartment. (GARCIA, concurring; R.E. GORDON, dissenting in part.)

Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and failing to report an accident involving injury or death, from accident during which he was estimated to have been driving 91-95 mph in 30 mph zone, killing other driver and injuring three passengers. Defendant was indicted for violation of Section 11-401(b) of Vehicle Code, and State failed to present any evidence that Defendant failed to report the accident within 30 minutes, which was a required element; thus, convictions for that offense are vacated, and instead convictions for Section 401(a) violations (duty to stop, and to remain at accident scene), a lesser included offense, are entered. As there was only one accident scene from which Defendant left, despite the number of injured or dead, multiple counts for violation of Section 403 violate the one-act, one-crime rule. Court was required to at least inquire into Defendant's pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, including that counsel failed to object to a sleeping juror. (BURKE and HUDSON, concurring.)

Court properly denied Defendant's request to file a successive postconviction petition and the dismissed his petition for writ of mandamus. Defendant, then age 18, was found guilty of first-degree murder and concealment of homicidal death; he was held accountable for the shooting death of 17-year-old victim; shooter was then age 15. Defendant, convicted on accountability theory, is subject to registration under the Violent Offender Act, even though shooter himself is not, given his age. Act requires registration for conviction of violent offenses against youth under age 18, where the defendant was at least 17 at time of offense. Act provides no exception for defendants convicted under accountability theory. (BOWMAN and O'MALLEY, concurring.)

Defendant's probation was revoked, and he was resentenced to six years' imprisonment for burglary, as he failed to complete condition of probation that he complete 90-day residency in halfway house. Defendant claimed that he missed 6 p.m. curfew and was not allowed to return late, and he did not return until several days later to retrieve his belongings. Court was within its discretion in revoking probation, as obtaining treatment was crucial to his rehabilitation, and his failure to observe the halfway house's curfew caused his discharge from facilitation. The existence of a probation violation does not depend on the character of the condition violated. (ZENOFF and BOWMAN, concurring.)