Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion under 18 USC section 3582(c)(2) for reduction of his crack cocaine drug conspiracy sentence based upon 2008 Amendment to sentencing guidelines that lowered offense levels for crack cocaine offenses. While defendant was entitled to seek reduction in sentence, any application would not result in any change of sentence since defendant also qualified as career offender, which, at level 37, had same sentencing range of 360 months to life as his 38 offense level to which he had originally been sentenced.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's habeas petition asserting that his attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge or appeal defendant's 180-month sentence on ground that counsel failed to challenge defendant's designation as Armed Career Criminal (ACC) where defendant claimed that his three prior convictions did not count toward his ACC status because his civil rights had been restored as to all three convictions. Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that defendant produced inauthentic letter to establish his alleged restoration of his civil rights status as to said convictions. Moreover, Ct. rejected defendant's claim that he had actually instructed counsel to file direct appeal of his sentence.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as untimely petitioner's habeas petition challenging his involuntary civil commitment following his conviction on charge of second degree assault where civil commitment was based on finding that petitioner continued to be sexually violent person. Instant petition was filed within one year from final order stemming from 2005 proceeding in which court made finding that there was no change in petitioner's condition to warrant new hearing on issue as to whether petitioner was sexually violent person. Moreover, while Dist. Ct. believed that instant petition essentially challenged original civil confinement order, which was beyond applicable one-year limitation period, instant petition challenged only most recent finding stemming from 2005 proceeding.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress drugs seized from defendant's car after defendant's car was stopped for traffic offense. While defendant argued that seizure was illegal since he did not actually commit lane violation, Dist. Ct. could properly credit testimony of arresting officer as to existence of traffic violation. Moreover, collective knowledge of law enforcement was sufficient to supply probable cause to arrest defendant for drug offense even though arresting officer may not have known of previous controlled drug purchase involving defendant. Also, officers could properly search defendant's vehicle following his stop on traffic violation since law enforcement could properly have believed that vehicle contained evidence of criminal activity where they had kept defendant under surveillance on day of arrest and had seen defendant accept $5,000 drug payment. Fact that arresting officer relied on other justification to conduct search of vehicle is irrelevant.

Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 292-month term of incarceration on drug conspiracy charge where said sentence was premised in part on finding that defendant was career offender based in part on prior Minnesota conviction on charge of intra-familial sexual abuse. Minnesota conviction was not crime of violence for purposes of satisfying career offender guidelines since Minnesota statute covered sexual activity that could be consensual and non-violent as contemplated under standards of Beguy and McDonald.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 20-year term of incarceration on charge of distributing divers amounts of fentanyl under 21 USC section 841(b)(1)(C) after finding under preponderance of the evidence standard during sentence phase of trial that defendant’s conduct resulted in death of individual to whom defendant had given said drug. While defendant argued that instant sentence violated Apprendi since fact that death resulted from distribution of fentanyl was element of offense that required jury finding under reasonable doubt standard, Ct. observed that instant sentence was proper since: (1) “death resulting” language was contained in penalties (as opposed to elements) section of section 841(b); and (2) prior case law defined considerations contained in section 841(b) as sentencing factors where, as here, instant 20-year sentence was not beyond statutory maximum for charged offense.