Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of domestic battery after jury trial, during which he did not testify. Court erred in not instructing jury as to fourth Zehr principle, that a Defendant's failure to testify should not be considered. However, error did not prejudice Defendant, as the evidence was overwhelming against him. Defendant's wife and 14-year-old daughter both had given prior statements to police confirming that Defendant had grabbed his wife's face and scratched it, and struck her head against the front door; their testimony recanting the statements was not credible. Defendant rejected court's offer to give jury instruction as to the subject matter of the fourth Zehr principle, and no evidence was presented that showed jury was biased. (KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)

Defendant, convicted of forgery, appealed from sentence, claiming that he was shorted five days of credit against his five-year prison term, and that court failed to give him monetary credit against his fines. Per official DOC website, DOC is giving Defendant credit for eight days, and there is no reason to believe that Defendant has been denied the days of credit he seeks. Defendant is entitled to monetary credit against his fines, for the period of time prior to sentencing; monetary credit for time spent in custody after finding of guilt is limited to the period between verdict and sentencing. (MYERSCOUGH and POPE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged in 1996 with aggravated criminal sexual abuse and four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, for acts which allegedly occurred between June 1995 and September 1996. Court mistakenly interpreted statute as mandating that Defendant be sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment. Amended sentencing statute does not apply because the acts included in the information were committed prior to the effective date of the amendment; and pre-amendment statute mandated consecutive sentences only if the acts were committed in a single course of conduct, which the State did not prove. Claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, for failing to object to this error, has arguable basis in facts and law. (ZENOFF and McLAREN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of involuntary manslaughter and concealment of a homicidal death; Defendant had confessed to police officer that he pushed his girlfriend during an argument, causing her to strike her head on furniture, and he then dismembered and disposed of her body. Autopsy report was a business record; thus, introduction of reports of two forensic examiners through the testimony of county medical examiner's summary of them did not violate Defendant's right of confrontation. Neither of the reports of nontestifying experts went to the identity of the victim per se. Court properly admitted testimony of Defendant's former wife that he came to her apartment and threatened to kill her and would hide her in garage where her family would neither see the car nor find her, while pointing a gun at her, was properly admitted as modus operandi for his manner of responding to stressful or upsetting situations, or absence of mistake. (FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)

Defendant was stopped for traffic violation, then found to be driving on revoked license and with no insurance. After Defendant was handcuffed and in squad car, police performed inventory search of vehicle prior to having it towed, per their procedure of inventorying and towing any vehicles lacking insurance. Court improperly granted Defendant's motion to suppress plastic bag containing cocaine which inventorying officer viewed in driver's side door, as it was in course of reasonable police procedure. Supreme Court's Arizona v. Gant decision did not expressly overrule cases in which courts have sanctioned inventory searches pursuant to proper impoundment of vehicle. (HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of resisting a peace officer resulting in injury to the officer. Modified version of IPI jury instruction for resisting a police officer was an accurate statement of the law; it described the additional element that the State was required to prove as "That the defendant's act of resisting was a proximate cause of an injury to [the officer]." In the modified instruction, "the proximate cause" is not the same as "sole proximate cause." (HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted after jury trial of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Prosecutor's comments on witness' status as police officers and the repercussions to officers if they were lying are impermissible as they seek to bolster the officers' credibility as witnesses solely because they are police officers; such statements wrongly suggest that officers are incapable, because of their profession, from lying. Prosecutor erred by referring to police report, when no evidence was presented that such a report was ever written. Defendant was prejudiced by both errors, as case hinged on officers' credibility. (LYTTON and O'BRIEN, concurring.)