Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s habeas petition challenging his capital murder conviction on grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to object to govt. insistence that he wear stun belt under his clothing. Record failed to show that but for trial counsel’s failure to raise objection, result of trial would have been different where: (1) affidavits from four jurors showed only that they were aware of stun belt; (2) defendant failed to show likelihood that jury considered stun belt to be evidence of defendant’s guilt; (3) defendant’s trial counsel otherwise provided vigorous defense during eight month trial; and (4) alternatives to stun belt, such as more security guards, might have been more prejudicial to defendant. Ct. emphasized that while govt. would have been required to show that presence of stun belt did not influence guilty verdict had issue been raised on direct appeal, burden was on defendant to show prejudice in instant habeas proceeding.

In prosecution on bank robbery charge, defendant waived appeal of his sentence pursuant to terms of plea agreement even though defendant alleged that govt. breached plea agreement by failing to recommend reduction in his sentence for acceptance of responsibility and by recommending two point enhancement to account for defendant's obstruction of justice based on defendant's giving false testimony in co-defendant's trial on same charges. Plain language of plea agreement provided for waiver of any appeal of defendant's sentence, and record showed that defendant initially breached terms of agreement by giving false testimony in co-defendant's trial, thereby relieving govt. of any obligation to recommend reduction in sentence.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants' motion to suppress evidence associated with conversations contained on disks generated pursuant to wiretaps placed on defendants' telephones, even though defendants asserted that govt. violated immediate sealing requirements set forth in 18 USC section 2518(8), where certain initially sealed disks contained blank segments, and where govt.'s reconstituted copies of said disks had not been sealed immediately after conclusion of wiretaps. No evidence was excludable where: (1) govt. provided satisfactory explanation (i.e., probable operator error) to explain existence of blank segments on disks; (2) govt. immediately attempted to rectify problem once it came to its attention; and (3) although govt. used information in subject sealed disks to support additional requests for wiretaps, said information was not crucial to obtaining said wiretaps. Also, while Dist. Ct. erred in limiting defendants' ability to cross-examine govt.'s witness regarding any deal witness made with govt. to refrain from charging witness with unrelated murder in exchange for his favorable testimony (since witness's mere denial of any deal is insufficient to block any additional inquiry), any error was harmless where other witnesses provided similar testimony against defendants, and record of defendants' guilt was otherwise overwhelming.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant's habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on grounds that his inculpatory statement made to police that was used at trial was involuntary where defendant, who was 15 years old at time of statement, asserted that he lacked sufficient intellectual capacity to understand concept of waiver, and where defendant lacked any experience with criminal justice system. State court, however, could properly find that defendant's statement was voluntary under totality of circumstances test where: (1) youth officer was present at time defendant gave statement: (2) expert gave opinion that defendant understood that he was not required to talk to police; (3) record contained no evidence of physical or psychological coercion on part of police; and (4) defendant was given multiple Miranda warnings prior to giving inculpatory statement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 72-month term of incarceration on illegal possession of firearm charge based in part on fact that defendant had prior conviction on Indiana charge of dealing in substance represented to be controlled substance. Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that said look-alike drug offense qualified as controlled-substance offense for purpose of sentencing defendant on instant firearms conviction.