Criminal Law

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction on charge of intentional interception of electronic communication under Wiretap Act stemming from defendant's act of altering program on his supervisor's computer to allow defendant to receive copy of all emails sent to supervisor's computer. Ct. rejected defendant's claim that Wiretap Act did not apply since, according to defendant, his copy of supervisor's emails came to his computer only after emails had been transmitted to supervisor's computer. Ct. also rejected defendant's contention that device used to intercept instant emails could not be same device used to receive said emails and noted that defendant used at least three devices (i.e., his supervisor's computer, as well as remote server and his computer) to obtain instant emails.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as untimely defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction after defendant had filed his habeas petition within 90-day extension of time for filing said petition that had been granted by different Dist. Ct. Judge in miscellaneous action filed by defendant. One-year jurisdictional period for filing habeas petitions is subject to equitable tolling, and Dist. Ct. placed too much weight on fact that defendant’s initial request for extension of time was filed before defendant had completed any sort of habeas petition. Thus, remand was required for determination as to whether equitable tolling applied where defendant asserted that: (1) pro bono group, which had originally indicated that it would file habeas petition on behalf od defendant, had only recently told him that it would not file said habeas petition; and (2) defendant’s placement in segregation unit at prison, with its limitations on use of prison library, prevented him from filing timely petition within original jurisdictional period.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of conducting criminal enterprise involving sale of drugs where record showed that defendant controlled or managed more than five individuals with respect to his methamphetamine operation. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting out-of-court statements identifying defendant as drug source where said individuals qualified as co-conspirators who assisted defendant in preparation and delivery of drugs, and where statements were made in furtherance of conspiracy.

In prosecution on charge under 18 USC section 922(g)(3) that defendant possessed firearm while he was unlawful user of controlled substance, Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s claim that said statute was unconstitutional since it violated his Second Amendment right to possess firearm for purposes of self-defense. Instant statute is constitutional since there is valid connection between drug use and violent crime, and instant prohibition is substantially related to governmental interest in preventing violent crime.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his state-court murder conviction on ground that trial court improperly precluded defendant from impeaching key govt. witness (who had previously indicated that defendant had confessed to crime) with recorded telephone conversation between witness and defendant, which, according to defendant, would demonstrate that he had not previously confessed to said crime. Trial court permitted defendant to explore any potential bias of witness, as well as question witness with fact that witness in recorded conversation failed to confront defendant about purported prior confession. Moreover, exclusion of defendant’s hearsay exculpatory statements contained in recorded conversation did not violate Confrontation Clause where recorded telephone conversation was ambiguous as to whether both men were talking about purported prior confession. Ct. further suggested that result might have been different had review standard under AEDPA not applied.

Defendants were entitled to new trial on drug conspiracy charge where whole venire had been exposed to discussions regarding fear for jurors’ personal safety due to fact that jurors’ background information had been given to defense counsel, and where Dist. Ct. neither requested new venire in light of said discussions or individually question existing jurors regarding any fear for their personal safety. Defendants had expressed concern that they would not receive fair trial if jury actually feared for their personal safety, and any concern by Dist. Ct. over delay caused by questioning jurors about any safety concerns was insufficient reason not to conduct individual voir dire. Moreover, Dist. Ct.’s directive to jury at end of trial to continue their deliberations at time when jury had previously been given permission to go home for day, and at time when it was apparent that there was only single juror holdout for conviction was coercive.