Criminal Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree murder. The State filed a motion in limine seeking to admit, through the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, statements made by the victim. The trial court denied the motion and the State appealed. The trial court found that although the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant killed the victim, it failed to prove that the murder was intended to prevent the victim’s testimony in a future child support case. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court’s denial of the motion was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the opposite conclusion was clear from the record. (SCHOSTOK and MULLEN, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty after a bench trial of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to six years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial judge improperly dominated the witnesses and the proceedings in a manner that rendered the verdict fundamentally unfair. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that while a rational trier of fact could have reasonably concluded that defendant was guilty, the trial court judge acted arbitrarily and capriciously, resulting in a fundamentally unfair verdict. The appellate court noted that the judge sat in the jury box throughout the trial, posed hundreds of questions to the witnesses, stood close to the witnesses while they were testifying, and suggested that key defense witnesses were lying. (C.A. WALKER and GAMRATH, concurring)

The State appealed from an order of the circuit court releasing defendant, arguing that the trial court erred when it revisited another judge’s detention findings absent a motion for relief and in releasing the defendant. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err and that the conditions placed on defendant’s release were sufficient to avoid any threat that he posed so that continued detention was not necessary. (PETERSON and DAVENPORT, concurring)

The Illinois Supreme Court considered the question of whether an appellate court can sua sponte order that a case be re-assigned to a new circuit judge on remand for reasons other than bias, potential bias, or prejudice. The supreme court found that it cannot and reversed the portion of the appellate court’s judgment directing the presiding judge to assign the case to a new judge finding that there was no basis in the record to conclude that the circuit court would not be able to correct its legal analysis and apply the correct legal standard on remand. (THEIS, OVERSTREET, and HOLDER WHITE, concurring; CUNNINGHAM and O’BRIEN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. NEVILLE took no part in the decision)

Petitioner appealed from the circuit court’s denial of his petition for issuance of a certificate of innocence, which he sought after his conviction for being an armed habitual criminal was reversed because it was predicated on a void prior conviction. The circuit court denied the petition by finding that the petitioner could have been found guilty of the lesser-included offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. The appellate court reversed, finding that the petitioner had satisfied all four statutory prerequisites to receive a certificate of innocence. (CATES and MOORE, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of being an armed habitual criminal and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements, admitting evidence of recovered ammunition, and failing to account for mitigating factors during his sentencing. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that defendant’s statements should have been suppressed because they were obtained during a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings and were not admissible under the public safety exception. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring)

Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated driving under the influence and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to reconsider sentence in which he alleged that the trial court improperly considered the victim’s death in aggravation and improperly considered the existence of a 28-year extended term as a sentencing factor despite defendant not being eligible for the extended term. The State argued that defendant’s claims were barred because he failed to file a motion to withdraw the negotiated plea and defendant responded that the State’s mistaken belief that it could seek an extended term converted the negotiated plea into an open plea. The appellate court held that the effect of the mistake as to eligibility for an extended term did not convert the negotiated plea into an open plea, but that trial counsel failed to strictly comply with Rule 604(d) when it filed a motion to reconsider sentence instead of a motion to withdraw the plea and reversed and remanded for strict compliance with Rule 604(d). (STEIGMANN and CAVANAGH, concurring)