Education Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-University and University officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-student’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants denied him due process, when it suspended him for two semesters, after finding that he had hosted party at fraternity house during COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant-University was properly dismissed because it is not “person” for purposes of section 1983 action. Moreover, plaintiff failed to adequately plead that he had requisite property interest, where: (1) plaintiff merely pleaded that he had property interest in his continued education because he had “paid tuition;” (2) attending university, by itself, does not automatically create constitutional property right because law does not entitle each person to education at public university; and (3) plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead that defendants violated specific contractual right between parties. Dist. Ct. also did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s claim that defendants deprived him of constitutionally protected liberty interest in pursuing his chosen field of healthcare consultant, where plaintiff’s allegations of reputational harm associated with instant suspension were too speculative to plausibly suggest that it would be virtually impossible for him to pursue career as healthcare consultant.

Dist. Courts did not err in granting plaintiffs-three transgender boys’ request for entry of preliminary injunction in their actions, alleging that defendants-school districts violated Title IX and Equal Protection Clause, where defendants committed sex discrimination when they denied their requests to use boys’ bathroom and locker room. Ct. of Appeals, in relying on Whitacker, 858 F.3d 1034, affirmed entry of preliminary injunctions, after finding likelihood of success and noting their similar factual record with Whitacker. Record also showed that: (1) all three plaintiffs had received amended birth certificates and legal name changes to reflect that they were boys; (2) plaintiffs demonstrated that their new gender identities were enduring; (3) injunction permitting defendants ability to monitor bathrooms and locker room to curb any potential misconduct; (4) plaintiffs demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable harm if injunction were denied; and (5) defendants could only articulate speculative harms if injunction were granted.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s Monell claim in her section 1983 action against defendant-school district, alleging that several school staff members violated plaintiff’s daughter’s Fourth Amendment rights when disciplining her. Plaintiff alleged that: (1) plaintiff’s daughter, who attended sixth grade, had multiple developmental and cognitive disabilities and had operative I.E.P. plan; (2) daughter attempted to use school’s elevator, but was told not to do so by special education teacher; (3) when daughter persisted, special education teacher pushed daughter into wall and held her there for several minutes, with assistance by another school official; (4) after school resource officer arrived, officer grabbed daughter by arm, forced her onto floor and pinned her face down while handcuffing daughter’s hands behind her back; (5) when two other officers arrived several minutes later, they lifted daughter into wheelchair while daughter was still handcuffed, took daughter to different floor, took daughter out of wheelchair and bound her legs, and then placed daughter back in wheelchair until her mother came; and (6) entire incident lasted 34 minutes. While plaintiff asserted for Monell purposes that defendant had practice or protocol of utilizing excessive punitive and retaliatory force or threats of force to punish disabled students, plaintiff could cite to only two isolated incidents where arguable excessive force was used, which was insufficient to establish “widespread” practice required for establishing Monell liability.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state viable claim plaintiffs-students’ action, alleging that defendant breached implied-contract to conduct in-person instruction and to allow use of its campus facilities, when defendant shut-down in-person instruction and switched to remote learning for its students following full onset of COVID-19 pandemic in spring of 2020. While plaintiff could not rely solely on defendant’s marketing statements in its website to demonstrate existence of implied contract to provide its students with in-person instruction and use of its facilities, statements made in defendant’s catalog and student handbook, that differentiated between University’s on-campus and online programs and described services offered at its on-campus facilities were enough for court to make reasonable inference that defendant’s students were promised in-person instruction, even though defendant did not charge difference price for in-person, as opposed to remote programs. Also, plaintiff’s allegation that prior to pandemic, it was typical for defendant to provide in-person instruction and on-campus services supported finding of existence of implied contract to provide in-person instruction.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-University’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-student’s action, alleging that defendant breached implied contract to provide in-person, on-campus instruction, when in March of 2020, as part of its response to COVID-19 pandemic, defendant moved all classes to online instruction, restricted plaintiff and other students from access to campus facilities and failed to give plaintiff and others refund for tuition and mandatory fees. Ct. of Appeals, in relying on Gociman, 41 F.4th 873, found that plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts that plausibly suggested existence of implied contract for in-person education and access to defendant’s physical facilities and resources, where plaintiff alleged that: (1) defendant had long-standing practice of providing in-person instruction and on-campus resources to its students; and (2) defendant consistently indicated through its website, course catalogs and other official materials that service it was selling was one that involved in-person, on-campus experience. Fact that plaintiff did not allege that students enrolled in traditional on-campus programs paid higher tuition and fees than students enrolled in defendant’s online program did not require different result. Ct. further rejected defendant’s contention that plaintiff essentially alleged educational malpractice claim that improperly involved plaintiff’s second-guessing of defendant’s academic judgment.

Dist. Ct, did not err in denying plaintiff-student’s request for issuance of preliminary injunction in plaintiff’s action, alleging that defendant-University violated Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972 by discriminating against him on basis of his gender, when it suspended him for three semesters after it had sustained female student’s complaint that accused plaintiff of sexual assault. Plaintiff failed to present any direct evidence of sex discrimination, and Ct. of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s claim that: (1) defendant had anti-male bias against him due to public pressure to find in favor of female student, where defendant took significant steps to insulate itself from public pressure by using independent contractors to investigate and generate findings on said charge; and (2) certain procedural irregularities produced flawed grievance process, where plaintiff’s alleged irregularities either were non-errors, or errors that benefited both plaintiff and female student, or errors that were invited by plaintiff or did not demonstrate anti-male bias. Also, committee’s suspension decision was supported by preponderance of evidence, where plaintiff’s version of facts contained significant inconsistency, while female student’s version of facts contain corroboration in two significant ways. As such, failure to issue preliminary injunction was appropriate, where plaintiff could not show likelihood of success on merits of his claim.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-University’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs-students’ class action, alleging that defendant breached contract by shutting down its campus and its in-person instruction, as well as deprived them of access to on-campus facilities during 2020 pandemic and shifted all coursework to online instruction only, where defendant had promised them in-person instruction and access to on-campus facilities in exchange for tuition and fees. While Dist. Ct. based dismissal, in part, on holding that plaintiffs had essentially pleaded educational malpractice action, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiffs could proceed on instant action, where: (1) instant case was not educational malpractice claim, since plaintiffs’ lawsuit did not require analysis of quality of their education; and (2) lawsuit alleged existence of implied contract that was formed by defendant’s publications that promised in-person instruction and access to on-campus facilities in exchange for tuition and fees. Ct. further noted that plaintiffs, who sought refund of tuition and fees, had enrolled in on-campus program and had paid higher tuition and fees than students enrolled in defendant’s online program. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim, where plaintiff had improperly alleged existence of contract between parties. Plaintiff, though, will be permitted on remand to file amended complaint on their unjust enrichment claim that omits allegations of existence of contract. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-school district’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-student’s Title IX action, alleging that she was victim of discrimination based on her gender when school security assistant repeatedly sexually abused her during her 8th grade. Under Title IX, plaintiff was required to show that individual of school district, who had authority to institute corrective action on behalf of district, had actual notice of and was deliberately indifferent to teacher’s misconduct. Moreover, plaintiff failed to establish such actual knowledge with respect to alleged misconduct during plaintiff’s 8th grade, where relevant principal had no knowledge, either actual or otherwise, of security assistant’s alleged misconduct. Plaintiff, though, argued that school principal was aware of security assistant conduct during plaintiff’s 7th grade, where principal received reports that security assistant was rubbing backs/shoulders of students from both genders, and that plaintiff had frequently asked security assistant for hugs and had attempted to kiss him on more than one occasion. However, plaintiff could not base Title IX claim on 7th grade conduct, where record showed that principal was not deliberately indifferent to reports of misconduct, where principal told security assistant during plaintiff’s 7th grade to limit his physical contact with plaintiff, to avoid interacting with plaintiff in private settings and to set strong boundaries, and principal neither subsequently observed nor received reports of further concerns about plaintiff’s relationship with security assistant for duration of plaintiff’s 7th grade. Ct. emphasized that school official acquires notice of misconduct only upon learning that misconduct arose to level of sexual harassment.