Parents filed suit against high school and district officials and basketball coaches for injuries their 2 daughters allegedly sustained as result of school bullying. Court properly granted Defendants' motion for judgment on pleadings as to counts for breach of contract, and dismissed count for willful and wanton conduct. Student handbooks, as to anti-bullying policy, do not create offer sufficient to support valid contract between the parties. Implementation of disciplinary policy involves more than a ministerial task. Discretionary activity provision of Tort Immunity Act bars claim.(HOFFMAN and ROCHFORD, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-University officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-student’s section 1983 action, alleging that his suspension and later expulsion from school violated his due process rights, where defendants provided him with insufficient opportunity to provide his side of story prior to his suspension. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff had been arrested on aggravated battery charge arising out of incident during which victim had been stabbed; and (2) prior to defendants suspending him, plaintiff had been given letter by defendants alleging that plaintiff had violated various provisions of School Code arising out of said incident. Defendants were entitled to remove plaintiff from campus without any prehearing procedures where: (1) instant suspension was less than 10 days; (2) allegations against plaintiff concerned claims of physical violence; and (3) defendants gave plaintiff subsequent hearing in which he was represented by counsel and presented arguments on his behalf. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s claims that presiding officer at hearing had already predetermined instant expulsion, and that presiding officer could not have appropriately heard case, since he had also gathered evidence used against plaintiff. Ct. further noted that claim that presiding officer was biased was precluded by fact that expulsion decision was reviewed by three-member appeals panel.
Petitioner appeals from final administrative decision of Chicago Board of Education, which resulted in termination of his employment as a tenured teacher at elementary school, based on 8 "specifications" of allegations of fact. Several students and their parents testified at hearing as to teacher using physical force against students, such as slapping them, slamming them into lockers and grabbing their neck and hair. Accusing witnesses testified and were cross-examined by Petitioner's counsel, and no out-of-court nontestifying students' statements were admitted. Petitioner's use of unreasonable force resulted in corporal punishment and was the irremediable cause for dismissal. Petitioner was not faced with emergency situations that would allow for physical intervention. Board did not act arbitrarily in its decision.(FITZGERALD SMITH, concurring; MASON, specially concurring.)l
Charter Schools Law treats initial approval of a charter differently than renewal of a charter. Trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with review of Commission's decision under Administrative Review Law. Local school board lacks standing to seek review of Illinois State Charter School Commission's decision to renew charter school's charter; and lacks standing to seek mandamus or declaratory judgment concerning Commission's decision. (ELLIS and COBBS, concurring.)
(Correction to modified opinion 8/1/16.) Plaintiff requested data from Defendant Community College pursuant to FOIA, seeking "raw inputs" for fields on College's student registration forms, and zip codes of students in certain classes and total numbers of students in certain classes. College responded that it did not have documents responsive to requests. Nine of Plaintiff's 13 requests were for public records under FOIA. The data in College's computer databases are "public records" under FOIA, so long as data pertain to "transaction of public business" and were prepared by or for, or were used by, received by, in possession or under control of any public body. FOIA comprehends that records will be stored and reproduced electronically. Court properly dismissed 6 requests which sought total numbers of students, because those requests would require that College create new records.(HUTCHINSON and ZENOFF, concurring.)
(McGuire, D-Crest Hill; Fortner, R-West Chicago) allows a board of review to serve by electronic means if the taxing district consents to electronic service and provides the board of review with a valid e-mail address for this purpose if a change in assessed valuation of $100,000 or more is sought. Effective July 15, 2016.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-school officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants denied plaintiff-student his due process rights when defendants suspended plaintiff from school for 10-day period after concluding that plaintiff had possessed drugs at school. Record showed that after another student told principal that he had sold/given plaintiff and others Lorazepam at school, principal confronted plaintiff with accusation of drug activity and told him that he had choice between 10-day suspension for admitting to taking drugs or expulsion if he denied it, and then suspended plaintiff for 10 days after bringing up issue during meeting with plaintiff and his parents. Suspensions of 10 days or less only require that student be given oral or written notice of charge and opportunity to give his side of story, and instant record established that these minimal due process requirements were met. Fact that plaintiff tested negative for drugs on day of incident, that defendants changed date of incident during subsequent hearing before school board in which plaintiff was represented by counsel, that defendant threatened plaintiff with expulsion if he did not admit to use/possession of drugs, or that school board did not believe plaintiff’s story did not require different result.
(Court opinion corrected 6/24/16.) After administrative hearing, Plaintiff, a tenured teacher, was dismissed from employment for allowing her Illinois teaching certificate to lapse and failing to promptly reinstate it. School Code provides mechanism for reinstatement of lapsed teaching certificate that does not contemplate finding by Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) that expiration was due to any error, mistake or act of negligence on part of affected teacher. Board was aware of this mechanism and allowed similarly situated teachers to continue employment upon successful reinstatement. Termination was an arbitrary decision, as Section 21-14(a) gives ISBE authority to reinstate a lapsed certificate regardless of duration of lapse or reason for expiration. Remedial provision in Section 21-14(a) of School Code cannot be overcome by negligence finding pursuant to Section 34-85 of Code. Remanded for court to determine amount of damages owed to Plaintiff. (NEVILLE and SIMON, concurring.)
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Tenured teacher was terminated for violating Board of Education's rules and policy in that he failed to immediately report that his principal asked him to cheat on ISAT, and for falsifying his employment application by omitting his prior employment discharge with Chicago police department. Court held that Board's termination was against manifest weight of evidence, and reversed Board's order and reinstated teacher with back pay and benefits. Board failed to establish that teacher's omission of his previous employment and discharge was intentional, as application did not require clearly disclosure of such information. Board failed to show any established rules for reporting test irregularities, and failed to show that teacher was aware of anything improper as to students' test notes that would give rise to a duty to report. (PIERCE and NEVILLE, concurring.)