Education Law

M.B. v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools

Federal 7th Circuit Court
M.B. v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools
Civil Court
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 10-3096
Decision Date: 
December 22, 2011
Federal District: 
S.D. Ind., Indianapolis Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-School District's motion for summary judgment in IDEA action alleging that defendant denied plaintiff (special education student) free appropriate public education by refusing plaintiff's request for, among other things, placement in full-day kindergarten program, even though plaintiff's expert testified that said placement was necessary due to plaintiff's neurocognitive impairments. Defendant, as well as administrative tribunals, could properly conclude that plaintiff did not require double-session kindergarten placement where plaintiff was making progress towards his IEP goals (which plaintiff's parents helped to develop) while plaintiff was placed in single-session kindergarten program, and where IEP, with said goals, was reasonably calculated to confer educational benefit on plaintiff.

Hlavacek v. Boyle

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Hlavacek v. Boyle
Civil Court
Due Process
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 11-1100
Decision Date: 
December 6, 2011
Federal District: 
S.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-University officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-student's due process rights when defendants dismissed plaintiff from its dental school on account of his poor academic record. Record showed that plaintiff had failed certain required courses and had been placed on academic probation at time of dismissal. Moreover, it is enough where, as here, plaintiff was informed of nature of faculty's dissatisfaction, and that faculty made careful and deliberate decision to dismiss him. Also, plaintiff was provided with procedure consisting of seven layers of appeals, which was sufficient to satisfy any due process rights.

Young-Gibson v. The Board of Education of the City of Chicago

Young-Gibson v. The Board of Education of the City of Chicago
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
School Law
Citation
Case Number: 
2011 IL App (1st) 103804
Decision Date: 
Friday, September 30, 2011
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 6th Div.
Holding: 
Confirmed; motion denied.
Justice: 
CAHILL
(Modified upon rehearing 11/23/11.) Board of Education removed Plaintiff from her position as a high school principal prior to expiration of her four-year contract, based on Plaintiff's failure to lead school toward progress to remove it from probation status due to poor student performance and attendance. Evidence was presented as to Plaintiff's unwillingness and inability to focus school on instruction and to collaborate with staff. Court erred in holding that Board was required to comply with section 34-85 of School Code in removing Plaintiff as principal. Board properly followed procedural requirements of Sections 34-8.3(a), (b), and (c) of School Code, which apply to removal of principals for schools on probation, and Board's decision to remove Plaintiff as principal was not against manifest weight of evidence. (McBRIDE and GARCIA, concurring.)

Carr v. Koch

Carr v. Koch
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
School Districts
Citation
Case Number: 
2011 IL App (4th) 110117
Decision Date: 
Friday, October 28, 2011
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
Sangamon Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
TURNER
Plaintiffs filed suit to declare Illinois education funding system in Section 18-8.05 of School Code in violation of equal-proteciton clause. Tax rates imposed were not obligated by state funding scheme. State neither rewarded nor punished school districts for exceeding statutory tax rates, and thus State did not induce school district's decision as to tax rates. Plaintiffs lack standing, as they have not alleged actual or threatened injury, and their claim of higher tax rates cannot be fairly traceable to Defendants' actions. (APPLETON and COOK, concurring.)

Doe-3 v. White

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
Doe-3 v. White
Civil Court
School Law
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
September 28, 2011
Docket Number: 
Nos. 112479 and 112501 Cons.
District: 
4th Dist.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed for failure to state cause of action plaintiffs’ complaint alleging that defendants-school district and administrators willfully violated Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act by failing to inform another school district about sexual harassment of its students by one of defendants’ teachers, and that plaintiffs-students at other school district experienced same kind of sexual harassment and abuse by same teacher? Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that: (1) plaintiffs alleged sufficient cause of action based on defendants’ voluntary undertaking and their provision of information (that did not disclose said sexual harassment) regarding said teacher; (2) defendants displayed intentional disregard for plaintiffs’ welfare in light of foreseeable intervening criminal acts that were likely to cause plaintiffs physical harm; and (3) defendants could not look to section 2-204 of Tort Immunity Act to bar instant cause of action. In their petitions for leave to appeal, defendants argued among other things that they did not owe any duty to plaintiffs who were never enrolled in their schools.

Public Act 97-294

Topic: 
Students, schools, and the courts
(Eddy, R-Hutsonville; Righter, R-Mattoon) makes several changes affecting students who are respondents under the Stalking No Contact Order Act, the Civil No Contact Order Act, and the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986. (1) Provides that the court may order that the respondent accept a change of educational placement or program, as determined by the school. (2) The respondent bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence that the educational transfer, change of placement, or change of program of the respondent is not available. The respondent’s agreement is irrelevant to whether a remedy is “not available.” (3) The respondent must also share the burden for the expense, difficulty, and educational disruption caused by a transfer of the respondent to another school. (4) Provides that the court may make the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the respondent responsible for costs associated with the respondent's placement under the order. (5) Prohibits a court in the enforcement of an order from holding a school district or private or non-public school or any of its employees in civil or criminal contempt unless the school district or private or non-public school has been allowed to intervene. (6) Allows a court to hold the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of the minor respondent in civil or criminal contempt for a violation of an order for conduct of the minor in violation of the Act if the parents, guardian, or legal custodian directed, encouraged, or assisted the minor in the conduct. Effective Januar 1, 2012.
View Full Text of Legislation

Jackson v. Indian Prairie School Dist. 204

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Jackson v. Indian Prairie School Dist. 204
Civil Court
School Law
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 10-2290
Decision Date: 
August 11, 2011
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-school district's motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiff-special ed. teacher, alleging that defendant violated her substantive due process where: (1) school principal directed her to tend to autistic student, who had long history of verbal and physical outbursts and who subsequently injured plaintiff during violent outburst; and (2) prior to incident, defendant repeatedly failed to transfer student to alternative school in spite of complaints registered by other teachers, who had witnessed student's outbursts, as well as parents of classmates of student. While defendant's conduct might have been negligent, it did not rise to "shock the conscious" level required to impose liability for substantive due process violation where student appeared to be calm just prior to instant incident and where, prior to incident, student's behavior had generally improved in terms of fewer number of incidents.

Representing Students and Parents in School Residency Challenges

By Matt Keenan & Eleonora di Liscia
January
2011
Article
, Page 40
With public schools under increasing financial pressure, legitimate district residents are sometimes presented with a tuition bill. Here's what to do when it happens to your client.

Goldberg v. Brooks

Goldberg v. Brooks
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Defamation
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 1-09-2578
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, April 20, 2011
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 3d Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
STEELE
Court properly dismissed defamation complaint filed against teacher's assistant, school principal, and school district; Plaintiff had been employed as bus driver for bus company, and transported students for the district, and sued for complaints Defendants made about his conduct and statements made on the job . Defendants' styatements were absolutely privileged under Tort Immunity Act, as they were made per their duty to report and address misconduct. No error in denying motion for leave to amend; if teacher's assistant and principal are not liable, then school district cannot be liable. (QUINN and MURPHY, concurring.)

Innovative Modular Solutions v. Hazel Crest School District 152.5

Innovative Modular Solutions v. Hazel Crest School District 152.5
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
School Districts
Citation
Case Number: 
Nos. 1-10-0212, 1-10-0554, 1-10-0642 Con
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 3d Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed (No. 1-10-0212); appeal dismissed (No. 1-10-0554); judgment vacated (No. 1-10-0642).
Justice: 
NEVILLE
School District leased portable classrooms from Plaintiff corporation, and agreed to pay cancellation fee if it cancelled leases before termination of lease terms. School District's Financial Authority cancelled leases, but District did not pay cancellation fees. Once the State invoked the School Finance Law, the District was divested of control ov er its finances and had no statutory authority to pay its debts, making District's performance of contract legally impossible. (QUINN and STEELE, concurring.)