Federal Civil Practice

In a collective action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, explaining that the appellate court had no jurisdiction because the appeal was brought by non-parties. The appellate court noted that the Act requires that each plaintiff in a collective action to consent in writing to join the suit and file the consent in the court in which the action was brought, but that the “named plaintiffs” in the appeal did not satisfy either of those requirements because they had entered their consent in a separate lawsuit. (ROVNER and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, concurring)

Plaintiff, a former county sheriff’s department employee, filed a lawsuit alleging that he was fired for supporting the former sheriff in disputes between the sheriff and the county chair, and for reporting misbehavior by two correctional officers under his supervision. The district court dismissed the lawsuit and plaintiff appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that plaintiff’s argument failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief and, as a result, his claims were waived. (BRENNAN and KIRSCH, concurring)

Plaintiffs, a group of Illinois voters and political candidates, filed a lawsuit challenging the provision of Illinois law that allows voters to cast their votes by mail and for election officials to receive and count these ballots for up to two weeks after the date of the election so long as they are postmarked or certified by the date of the election. Plaintiffs argued that the law impermissibly expands the time in which residents can vote. The district court found that plaintiffs lacked standing and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appealed and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege an adequate injury. (BRENNAN, concurring, and SCUDDER, concurring in part and dissenting in part)

In a successive appeal in a matter where an employee filed a lawsuit against his employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Seventh Circuit considered two issues: 1) do FLSA collective actions require personal jurisdiction only over their representative plaintiffs, and 2) does FRCP 4 create a “backdoor” way to exercise nationwide personal jurisdiction in FLSA cases. The Seventh Circuit answered both questions in the negative, finding that a court overseeing a collective action must secure personal jurisdiction over each plaintiff’s claim, whether representative or opt-in, individually. (PRYOR, concurring and ROVNER, dissenting)

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against a sheriff’s deputy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the deputy violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by using unreasonable and excessive force during an arrest. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that his actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, finding that it did not have jurisdiction over the question of qualified immunity because it could not consider that issue until factual disputes were resolved by the factfinder. (LEE, concurring)

The State of Illinois filed a lawsuit against defendant, which operates manufacturing facilities in the state, alleging violations of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, Illinois Fish and Aquatic Life Code, and the Illinois Wildlife Code. The State also brought claims under several common law theories. Defendant removed the action to federal district court citing the federal officer removal statute and the plainitiff moved to remand the case back to state court. The district granted the plaintiff’s motion and defendant appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the defendant could not satisfy the fourth element of the four-factor test for removal under the federal officer removal statute where it could not present a colorable federal government contractor defense because that defense was irrelevant under the plaintiff’s theory of recovery. (ST. EVE And KOLAR, concurring)

Plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit alleging violations under the Fourteenth Amendment after the State found that he was eligible for supervised release after being civilly committed as a sexual violent person, but failed to find him suitable housing so that he could actually be released. The district court abstained from exercising jurisdiction to avoid interfering with ongoing state court proceedings intended to identify a suitable housing arrangement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds, finding that the federal court lacked jurisdiction because the defendant, the Secretary of the Department of Health Services, could not provide plaintiff with the relief he sought. (SYKES and BRENNAN, concurring)

A group of employees filed a lawsuit against their employer for failing to pay them for time spent working just before or after their shifts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant after finding that the lawsuits were based on “vague recollections” and “fragmentary evidence.” Defendant then moved for sanctions by arguing that the lawsuit was frivolous. The district court denied the motion for sanctions and defendant appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that there was "just" enough factual and legal to support the plaintiffs’ claims and that the defendant’s characterization of the conduct of plaintiffs’ counsel was not supported by the record. (SCUDDER, concurring and KIRSCH, dissenting)

Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against medical providers in Illinois state court alleging medical malpractice and ultimately settled with all but one of the defendants. After the settlement, the plaintiff’s medical insurance company asserted a reimbursement lien under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act, which states that insurance carriers are entitled to full reimbursement for benefits paid to an enrollee to treat an injury if the enrollee receives a monetary recovery from a third party. The plaintiffs filed a motion for lien adjudication that asserted the Illinois common fund doctrine and the health insurance carrier removed the case to federal court. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand that was initially denied by the district court but later granted pursuant to a motion to reconsider. The carrier appealed the remand order, arguing that the federal court had federal question jurisdiction over the entire case and that the motion for adjudication was removable under the federal officer removal statute. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the case did not involve a uniquely federal interest that supported federal question jurisdiction and that the district court properly held that it did not have jurisdiction on that basis. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court order regarding federal officer removal finding that removal was proper because the carrier had satisfied all four elements for federal officer removal and that the district court should exercise its jurisdiction over the motion for lien adjudication. (ST. EVE and KOLAR, concurring)

Plaintiff, after losing custody of her daughter in a state court child-protection case and then regaining custody a year later, filed a federal lawsuit alleging that various officials involved in the state court proceedings violated her federal constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants, finding that some of the claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that all other claims failed on the merits. A majority of the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint as well as the order granting summary judgment based on the merits of plaintiff’s claims. A majority of the justices also rejected plaintiff’s argument that she lacked a reasonable opportunity to litigate her claims in state court and eliminated the “fraud exception” of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; however, a different majority of the court held that jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims was not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they did not seek a federal district court’s review and rejection of the state court’s judgments. Additionally, all of the Seventh Circuit judges agreed that the court should no longer rely on the “inextricably intertwined” language in applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (BRENNAN, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and PRYOR, concurring and KIRSCH, concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by SYKES, SCUDDER, ST. EVE and LEE and joined as to Part I by EASTERBROOK.)