Federal Civil Practice

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination against the corporation’s majority owner when the defendants declined to pay broadcast fees for the rights to carry the plaintiff’s two Indianapolis-based television stations. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant, concluding that plaintiff failed to identify evidence permitting a jury to find that the decisions not to pay the broadcast fees reflected anything other than lawful business choices and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. (WOOD and LEE, concurring)

In a case where plaintiffs brought claims alleging unlawful pretrial detention, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not err when it concluded that the plaintiffs’ pre-trial detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment where there was probable cause for their detention. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the trial court did not err when it concluded that plaintiffs could not maintain an action for malicious prosecution where there was probable cause to detain them. (ROVNER and WOOD, concurring)

Dist. Ct. did not err in remanding to state court plaintiffs’ multi-consolidated lawsuit, seeking recovery against defendants-shooter, shooter’s father and gun manufacturer of gun used by shooter in Highland Park parade event. Plaintiffs alleged actions under Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act and Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Record showed that only three defendants moved for removal, and basis for remand order was provision in 28 USC section 1446(b)(B)(A),which requires consent of all defendants for removal, which did not occur here. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendants' arguments that necessity that all defendants agree to remove case did not apply, since: (1) defendant gun manufacturer qualified as entity acting under federal officer for purposes 28 USC section 1442(a)(1); or (2) instant removal was exempt from all-defendant consent under 28 USC section1441(c)(2) because federal issue was imbedded in underlying state-law claims.

Dist. Ct. did nor err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiffs’ action, alleging economic harm stemming from voluntary recall of defendant’s infant formula that plaintiffs claimed exposed them to potential risk of injury due to fact that formula was produced at defendant’s plant under unclean conditions. Record showed that defendant announced voluntary recall of formula and offered full refund to those who possessed formula. Ct. of Appeals observed that plaintiff’s risk-of-harm theory does not support Article III standing, and further observed that plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were hypothetical and conjectural. Ct. of Appeals also noted that plaintiffs did not allege that formula they purchased was contaminated or that they were subject to risk of harm in personal or individual way.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant subjected him to false arrest, in incident during which defendant arrived at accident scene where defendant arrested plaintiff after three witnesses accused plaintiff of being involved in hit-and-run accident and of physically battering another individual. Plaintiff could not prevail in his false arrest claim because defendant had probable cause to arrest plaintiff based on three witnesses’ statements that defendant was culprit. Defendant could believe said witnesses, and was not required to exhaust all other investigative avenues in hopes of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence.

Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue instant action under Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA), alleging that defendant’s practice of serving plaintiff with requests to admit facts in underlying state-court action seeking recovery of educational debt without warning plaintiff of ramifications for failing to serve timely responses violated FDCPA. In order to establish standing, plaintiff must establish concrete injury, and plaintiff in this regard stated that his standing was satisfied where: (1) he would have denied said requests if he had been apprised of time span in which to make said denials; and (2) resultant admissions caused him to lose leverage in settlement of debt collection lawsuit. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that neither theory of injury was sufficient to establish standing in this case, where: (1) plaintiff failed to show that he suffered any injury with respect to request to admit admissions, where record showed that defendant never indicated that he would use said admissions against him in debt collection lawsuit; and (2) standing must be established at time instant lawsuit was filed, and plaintiff’s leverage argument arose out of settlement of debt collection lawsuit, which did not occur until four months after filing of instant lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiff-association’s lawsuit, alleging that defendant-school district’s policy that provided direction and resources to schools encountering students with questions about their gender identity violated their Due Process and Free Exercise Rights by interfering with its members' exclusive rights as parents to make decisions with and on behalf of their school children on issues of gender identity. Parents' concerns about possible applications of defendant’s policy that may or may not come to pass were insufficient to confer standing to bring instant lawsuit. Moreover, defendant conceded that instant action was filed as facial pre-enforcement challenge, and Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff-association lacked standing, where no parent had experienced any actual injury or faced any imminent harm attributable to defendant’s policy.