Federal Civil Practice

11th Amendment did not bar plaintiff-state agency from suing other state officials in action under Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI) to obtain access to certain peer review records of two mentally ill patients as part of probe of alleged incidents of abuse. While 11th Amendment precluded plaintiff from proceeding against State of Indiana, Ex Parte Young doctrine authorized instant lawsuit against state officials in their official capacities where lawsuit was seeking only prospective relief. Moreover, Ct. rejected defendants' claim that any violation of PAIMI can only be remedied by federal cut off of funds. Ct. also held that peer review records were covered documents under PAIMI. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims alleging that defendants-lawyers representing debtor in bankruptcy proceeding had collaborated with certain shareholders in debtor corporation to use debtor's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case to enrich themselves, tortiously interfered with debtor's loan contract with plaintiff and abused bankruptcy process, even though underlying bankruptcy claim had been dismissed and Bankruptcy Ct. had made observation in bankruptcy proceeding that debtor had not filed bankruptcy proceeding in bad faith. While Dist. Ct. had general discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367(c) after federal action had concluded, Dist. Ct. should not have remanded state claims back to state court where state claims were entangled with bankruptcy case, and where Dist. Ct. had already invested considerable time on state claims.

Dist. Ct. erred in certifying class in action alleging that defendant's motorcycle had defective steering assembly design where certification question was made without prior finding that expert opinion supporting plaintiffs' claim was reliable, and where challenged opinion was integral to satisfaction of Rule 23's class certification requirements. Moreover, plaintiff's expert opinion was not reliable where methodology underlying expert's opinion concerned testing of single motorcycle, and where expert's proposed safety standard had not been accepted by any other expert or governmental entity.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as moot plaintiff's action under Tennessee Consumer Protection Act alleging that defendant had misrepresented its stainless steel clothes dryers where defendant made a $20,000 inclusive of attorney fees offer of judgment under Rule 68, and where maximum judgment that plaintiff could have received under TCPA was $3,000. While plaintiff argued that said offer was insufficient where he had incurred $246,000 in attorney fees generated in part on failed attempt to obtain class action certification, Dist. Ct. could properly have concluded that case was now moot because defendant's offer was far in excess of plaintiff's maximum entitlement where: (1) Ct. of Appeal had previously rejected plaintif's attempt to certify class: (2) Dist. Ct. was within its discretion in finding that plaintiff was not entitled to any attorney fees due to weakness of his case; and (3) $20,000 offer was intended to get rid of instant nuisance claim.