Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant-assistant state's attorney's appeal of Dist. Ct.'s denial of his motion for summary judgment alleging both absolute and qualified immunity in plaintiff's lawsuit asserting that defendant, as well as others, coerced plaintiff into falsely confessing to crimes in violation of plaintiff's 5th Amendment rights. Dist. Ct. properly find that defendant was not entitled at this juncture to either absolute or qualified immunity based on his status as assistant state's attorney due to existence of factual disputes as to whether defendant was present at time of alleged coerced confession, and as to amount of defendant's personal involvement in alleged coerced confession. Moreover, said factual disputes deprived Ct. of Appeals of jurisdiction over defendant's appeal.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants used excessive force in effectuating plaintiff's arrest where record showed that plaintiff, who suffered from bi-polar disorder and schizophrenia, died shortly after defendant officer, who was aware of plaintiff's disability, used Taser gun multiple times on plaintiff. While Dist. Ct. found that officer's use of Taser gun was reasonable, Dist. Ct. could not grant summary judgment motion where record contained factual conflicts as to amount of times officer used Taser gun and as to extent that plaintiff resisted arrest. Moreover, medical testimony was not required to establish that officer's use of Taser gun caused his death where record showed close proximity of time between use of Taser gun and plaintiff's death.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion under All Writs Act to enjoin plaintiff from prosecuting virtually identical class action lawsuit in other courts where: (1) plaintiff’s class action alleging deceptive advertising with respect to defendant’s clothes dryer had been previously decertified; (2) record showed that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in abuse of litigation by making voluminous discovery requests in order to generate settlement value in similar subsequent class action lawsuit that otherwise had little merit; and (3) Dist. Ct. erroneously believed that other courts would apply doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent plaintiff from prosecuting similar lawsuits. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals found that all members of original class that were decertified, as well as their lawyers, should be part of said injunction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable claim, plaintiff’s cause of action seeking attorney fees and costs associated with defending against defendant’s lawsuit in underlying Carriage by Goods at Sea Act action that had been dismissed due to defendant’s failure to file said action in proper forum. American Rule barred plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees and costs where record failed to contain any contractual provision or relevant statute calling for payment of said expenses by non-prevailing party. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s contention that exception to American Rule applied after finding that plaintiff had failed to show that any wrongful conduct on part of defendant involved plaintiff in litigation with third-party.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by searching plaintiff’s home and seizing marijuana plants without probable cause. While plaintiff argued that defendant misled magistrate into issuing search warrant by misstating plaintiff’s criminal history in warrant application, other information contained in warrant application established probable cause to search plaintiff’s home where: (1) plaintiff received tip from DEA that plaintiff had received shipments of marijuana cultivation products; and (2) defendant reported that he found remnants of marijuana cigarettes in plaintiff’s trash in proximity to mail addressed to plaintiff.

In class action alleging that defendant's ticket-distribution system, which retained handling charge for unsuccessful ticket applications to championship sporting events, constituted unlawful lottery under Indiana law, Ct. of Appeals granted defendant's petition for rehearing and certified three questions for resolution by Indiana Supreme Ct. Said questions concerned: (1) whether defendant's method for allocating scarce tickets to championship events described unlawful lottery under Indiana law; (2) whether defendant's method for allocating tickets fell within exception to Indiana's Code for bona fide business transactions that are valid under contract law; and (3) whether plaintiff's allegations were subject to in pari delecto defense.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff-prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and in dismissing without prejudice plaintiff's section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials retaliated against him for previously filing litigation regarding his conditions of confinement. While Dist. Ct. based its denial on belief that plaintiff had three prior strikes under Prison Litigation Reform Act due to fact that plaintiff had at least one claim dismissed for failure to state cause of action in each of three prior lawsuits, none of prior lawsuits constituted strike where other claims within each lawsuit were allowed to proceed to merits.

Ct. of Appeals denied plaintiff-prisoner's request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in appeal of Dist. Ct. order that denied similar request to proceed IFP in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials violated his civil rights by, among other things, contaminating his food and assaulting him. Denial of IFP was proper where plaintiff already had three strikes for purposes of 28 USC section 1915A in which Dist. Ct. had dismissed three prior lawsuits as being frivolous or failing to state valid cause of action. Moreover, while exception to three strike rule potentially existed for plaintiff who, as in this case, contended that he was in imminent danger of serious physical harm, Dist. Ct. could properly conduct hearing to find that plaintiff was not in imminent danger of serious physical harm once instant defendants had disputed plaintiff's contention.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-County Deputy Sheriff's section 1983 action alleging that defendants-City and County officials denied him procedural and substantive due process by forcing his resignation when it suspended him with pay pending investigation of complaint made by co-worker that plaintiff had harassed him after co-worker had terminated plaintiff's son from police academy. Plaintiff could not bring due process action against City or its officials since plaintiff was employee of County. Moreover, plaintiff's suspension with pay was insufficient to trigger any due process violation where plaintiff did not allege any indirect economic consequence arising out of suspension. Additionally, plaintiff's voluntary resignation precluded any due process action, and fact that plaintiff risked loss of pension benefits if complaint was sustained did not render said resignation involuntary.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff's action alleging violation of federal anti-cybersquatting statute when defendant registered domain name that was confusingly similar to plaintiff's registered trademark. Defendant did not purposefully direct its activities at Illinois so as to subject it to specific personal jurisdiction of Illinois courts where defendant had no physical presence in Illinois and marketed its services only to Houston, Texas area physicians. Fact that defendant's website was accessible in Illinois and/or that plaintiff sent defendant cease-and-desist letter were insufficient by themselves to establish specific personal jurisdiction.