Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as just compensation against various current and former Indiana state officials in their individual and official capacities, when they took plaintiff’s unclaimed property and failed to pay her interest during time state held said property when she attempted to reclaim said property. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s request for prospective relief is moot, since Indiana passed statute that now requires payment of interest on property held by State. Dist. Ct. could also properly find that Eleventh Amendment precluded plaintiff from proceeding against individual defendants in their individual capacities because her claim was really against State, since Indiana alone benefited from unpaid interest and must pay any compensation owed. Plaintiff also could not use section 1983 to bring instant action, since claim was really against State, and State is not “person” who can be sued under section 1983. Ct. of Appeals also found that there is no recognized direct cause of action for compensation under Takings Clause.

In section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner, alleging that defendant-prison officials wrongfully disciplined him for theft in retaliation for registering administrative complaints against them, Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, and thus dismissed plaintiff’s case as time-barred because: (1) it was filed beyond applicable six-year limitation period; and (2) Wisconsin statute that would have tolled instant limitation period for time spent by plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies did not apply. Ct. of Appeals, though, in remanding matter to Dist. Ct., noted that defendants have now abandoned claim that case was time-barred because plaintiff had improperly exhausted his administrative remedies. Moreover, while defendant asserted different statute of limitations defense, they waived said claim because they had failed to raise it in Dist. Ct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action claim, alleging that State of Illinois OEIG report that concluded that plaintiff and her elevator service and repair business engaged in kickback scheme with University of Illinois Chicago employee and recommended that State and City of Chicago terminate all business with plaintiff and bar any future business with her and her company constituted due process deprivation of her occupational liberty. Record showed that State and City ceased doing business with plaintiff in response to report, but that federal jury acquitted plaintiff of bribery charges and OEIG never rescinded its report. However, to support instant “stigma-plus” due process claim, plaintiff needed to plead that she suffered tangible loss, which plaintiff did not do, where she did not plead loss of occupation, where record showed that she was always operator in her occupation of her business in servicing and repairing elevators through relevant time period, and where plaintiff maintained and expanded her 20 percent business in private clients and expanded her out-of-state business. Moreover, OEIG report did not preclude plaintiff from obtaining other public contracts, and record showed that she has obtained some federal government work. Thus, without liberty deprivation with respect to her occupation, plaintiff cannot sustain stigma-plus claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant-debt collector violated Fair Debt Collector Practices Act (FDCPA), where defendant attempted to collect $5,246.21 debt without announcing that creditor had not verified said debt balance. Plaintiff did not allege that she had incurred any concrete injury arising out of actions taken by defendant other than bare claim that defendant had “interrupted” her “self-employment.” However, plaintiff failed to provide any other details as to how defendant’s actions led to any loss of income when directed to do so by Dist. Ct. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss instant case for lack of standing due to lack of evidence that plaintiff suffered any concrete loss.

Dist. Ct. did not err in excluding plaintiff’s proposed lay witness from rendering opinion on plaintiff’s lost profits arising out of defendant’s denial of plaintiff application for special use permit to operate adult entertainment club that served liquor, where plaintiff’s business never opened for business, and where State of Illinois enacted legislation that made it impossible for plaintiff to operate said business some three months after plaintiff filed instant lawsuit. Opinion of said witness stemmed from his operation of different adult entertainment and fell within realm of expert witness testimony, and plaintiff had failed to disclose said witness as expert witness. Moreover, extensive differences between existing adult entertainment business and plaintiff’s business precluded apt comparison and witness lacked personal knowledge to support key aspects of his opinion, Too, Dist. Ct. could also base instant exclusion on differences in locations of plaintiff’s proposed business and location of comparative business. Dist. Ct. also did not abuse its discretion in either: (1) excluding different expert report, where said report was disclosed six years after 2015 close of discovery deadline; or (2) entering order that precluded plaintiff from introducing evidence of any damages figure that had not been properly disclosed under Rule 26, under circumstances where plaintiff had not updated any damages calculation under Rule 26 since December of 2012.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest and detain him on murder and attempted murder charges. While plaintiff claimed that police coached and otherwise falsified several identifications of him as culprit, Ct. of Appeals found that police had probable cause to arrest defendant on said charges, where: (1) seven individuals independently identified plaintiff as culprit; and (2) defendant did not allege that the identifications from these individuals were falsified or coached. Ct. of Appeals further noted that plaintiff had failed to point to any evidence to establish that said identifications were so incredible such that no officer could believe that said witnesses were telling truth.

Four groups of over 170 different plaintiffs brought similar claims alleging that they were allegedly harmed by presence of lead in paint generated by defendants. Dist. Ct. entered into case management order that essentially broke plaintiffs up into said groups that allowed two groups of plaintiffs to proceed to trial. Dist. Ct. granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on issue of negligent failure to warn, and, on appeal, Ct. of Appeals, held that defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ strict liability, failure to warn about dangers of lead claims, based on plaintiffs existing knowledge of said dangers. Accordingly, Dist. Ct. could properly grant defendants’ summary judgment motion on duty to warn issue with respect to second group of plaintiffs, where: (1) said group had conceded their negligence claims during initial round of summary judgment motions; and (2) Dist. Ct. could deny said group’s motion to reconsider based on “new” claim of presence of lead dust, where said claim could have been brought in first round of summary judgment motions. Also, third group of plaintiffs could be bound under law of the case doctrine with respect to prior duty to warn summary judgment rulings, since claims by instant group were part of the same case as second group of plaintiffs, and since once a court decides upon rule of law, that decision should govern same issues in same case. However, with respect to fourth group of plaintiffs who filed individual cases, Dist. Ct. erred in applying issue preclusion doctrine to preclude them from litigating duty to warn issue, where there was no privity between said plaintiffs and prior groups of plaintiffs, and where there was no agreement to be bound by prior rulings and where said group lacked control over litigation decisions made by prior groups of plaintiffs.

After granting defendants’-operators of women’s volleyball club motion for summary judgment in class action, alleging that defendants fraudulently concealed prior claims of sexual abuse against one defendant-owner of club, Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing sanctions of $20,998.10 in plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and $5,000 for in civil penalties for two defendants for attempting to coerce potential class action members to opt out of case during certification period. Record supported Dist. Ct.’s finding that defendants sent emails with intent to encourage potential class action members to opt out of class and to have instant class action dismissed Moreover, record showed that defendant’s counsel had received one such email and misrepresented to Dist. Ct. that defendants had not done so. Also record showed that Dist. Ct.’s calculation of attorney’s fees was not improper and was based on defendants' misconduct, where said calculation need only be based on “rough justice”, and where Dist. Ct. attempted to arrive at figure for charges only relating to fees generated by defendant’s misconduct by going over proposed fees on line-by-line basis. Dist. Ct. could also properly impose instant civil penalties to address unacceptable litigation conduct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his 1st , 8th and 14th Amendment rights by: (1) filing false assault charge against him (that was eventually dismissed) in retaliation for complaining against one defendant’s removal of plaintiff from kitchen assignment; (2) not allowing him to present live testimony in his disciplinary hearings involving assault charge; (3) imposing unequal punishment on assault charge; and (4) imposing cruel and inhumane conditions on his restrictive housing assignment. Ct. of Appeals found no 1st Amendment violation or discrimination based on his race, where plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant-officer who generated assault charge knew that plaintiff was innocent of said charge or treated other inmates more favorably. With respect to plaintiff’s 8th Amendment claim, Ct. of Appeals found no violation, where defendant failed to present evidence that any defendant had control over plaintiff’s housing conditions. With respect to plaintiff’s due process claim, Ct. of Appeals found no violation since plaintiff was entitled to only informal due process with respect to instant disciplinary hearings, which was satisfied, where plaintiff was allowed to present written statements from his witnesses and was allowed to present his own oral testimony.