Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that defendant’s policy that required strip search of every arrestee before said arrestee entered general population of jail did not violate plaintiffs-arrestees’ rights, where Dist. Ct. had certified class as all those persons held in custody who, following warrantless arrest, were strip searched in advance of judicial determination of probable cause. While Dist. Ct.’s decision was consistent with holding in Florence, 132 S.Ct. 1510, to extent defendant placed said arrestees in jail’s general population after their strip searches, certain members of instant class were never placed in general population after their strip searches and were instead immediately released from custody. As such, those class members who were never placed in general population but still endured strip search had much stronger claim that their rights were violated, and thus remand was required for Dist. Ct. to re-define or create sub-class so as to preserve right of said class members to file their own lawsuits. Also, record contained triable issue to extent that prison guards deviated from defendant’s written policy with respect to frequency/circumstances that they engaged in strip searches.

Attorney had standing to appeal Dist. Ct.’s order directing her to pay plaintiffs $35,522.94 in fees and costs as sanction for misleading plaintiffs as to non-existence of documents held by Cook County State’s Attorney Office that were sought by plaintiffs as part of their discovery requests, even though State’s Attorney had paid said fees and costs prior to oral argument on appeal. While attorney had no standing to challenge monetary sanction contained in Dist. Ct.’s order, attorney could appeal Dist. Ct.’s detailed findings of attorney misconduct that were ultimately referred to ARDC. In doing so, Ct. overruled portion of its prior decision in Clark, 972 F.2d 817, to extent Clark held that formal, but non-monetary sanction against attorney was not appealable. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in sanctioning attorney, where attorney: (1) without factual basis, represented for over one year that certain criminal case files did not exist, when in fact such files did exist; (2) threatened to seek sanctions against plaintiffs if they persisted in seeking said files; and (3) filed frivolous objections to turning said files over to plaintiffs.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant used excessive force when arresting plaintiff pursuant to arrest warrant where, after plaintiff had surrendered, defendant pulled plaintiff down three steps and placed knee in plaintiff’s back while allowing police dog to continue to bite plaintiff. Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity, where, although record was unclear as to whether police dog presented substantial risk of serious bodily injury, jury could still find that such force was excessive, where plaintiff was either non-resisting or only passively resisting defendant at time of arrest.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-Clerk of Circuit Court of Cook County and others’ motion for summary judgment alleging that they were entitled to immunity from plaintiff-attorney’s section 1983 action alleging violation of his 1^st Amendment rights, as well as from state law defamation action arising out of statements Clerk made to public and private parties that accused plaintiff of being unscrupulous attorney. Clerk was entitled to immunity on defamation action, where instant communications, which took form of ARDC complaint filed by Clerk against plaintiff, either pertained to Clerk’s official duties or responded to litigation that had been filed against Clerk’s office. Moreover, same ruling applied to Clerk’s press release regarding filing of ARDC complaint. Fact that Clerk made alleged statements asserting that plaintiff was guilty of racial animosity towards her did not disqualify her from obtaining instant immunity. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that Clerk was not entitled to immunity because purpose of press release was for personal or nefarious reasons. Ct. further found that Clerk was entitled to similar immunity with respect to: (1) Clerk’s letter to Jessie Jackson Sr. regarding lawsuit that had been brought against her; (2) Clerk’s letter to BGA, which concerned summary of 23 legal actions filed by plaintiff against Clerk; and (3) Clerk’s letter to Cook County Bd. Of Commissioners concerning internal investigation, even though in all three communications Clerk made disparaging comments about plaintiff. Plaintiff also failed to establish with respect to his First Amendment claim that Clerk engaged in threats, coercion, or intimidation so as to qualify as retaliatory speech.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants displayed deliberate indifference to plaintiff-prisoner’s medical diagnosis of arthritis and high cholesterol by decreasing frequency of outdoor recreation for inmates to two days per week, where plaintiff failed to present any evidence that physician had specified minimum level of outdoor recreation to treat his medical condition. However, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s similar claim that defendants were indifferent to his medical condition by eliminating plaintiff’s special diet, where: (1) elimination of plaintiff’s special diet was not decision made by medical professional; (2) plaintiff testified without rebuttal that his current level of cholesterol, after being taken off special diet, was too high; and (3) plaintiff testified that combination of medication, special diet and exercise was medically accepted method of lowering high cholesterol.

In prosecution on section 1983 claim alleging that defendants-police officials subjected plaintiff to false arrest on drug possession charge and used excessive force in effectuating his arrest, Dist. Ct. did not err in overruling plaintiff’s objection to defendants’ use of two preemptory challenges on African-American jurors. Jury included two African-American jurors, and defendants’ counsel provided race-neutral explanation that said jurors were excused because they lived near or had contacts with area where plaintiff had been arrested. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that said explanation was genuine, even though: (1) Dist. Ct. had failed to sua sponte hold separate evidentiary hearing on issue of defendants’ counsel’s credibility, since plaintiff did not take advantage of opportunity to present additional evidence to dispute counsel’s explanation; and (2) Dist. Ct. did not provide detailed rationale for finding that explanation for strikes was genuine until plaintiff had filed post-trial motion. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s claim that familiarity with location of his arrest had sufficient racially discriminatory impact to support any finding of purposeful discrimination and further found that plaintiff failed to show that rationale for use of instant strikes was not equally applied to non-African-Americans jurors.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action arising out of arrests/failed criminal prosecution of plaintiffs on robbery charges, where plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated their due process rights by: (1) fabricating one plaintiff’s alleged confession to robbery charges; (2) failing to disclose potential alibi witness; and (3) coercing false confession from other plaintiff. Record showed that plaintiffs were bailed out of jail shortly after their arrests, and thus plaintiffs could not show that they were deprived of substantial liberty so as to support instant due process claim. Also, plaintiffs could not establish that defendants concealed any unknown witness that would have supported their alibi claim. Moreover, plaintiffs failed to show that interrogation tactics used by defendants to generate instant false confession “shocked the conscience,” in spite of allegation that instant plaintiff had learning disability, since instant plaintiff fully participated in interrogation, corrected errors in written confession and stated that he had been treated well.

Ct. of Appeals remanded plaintiff-detainee’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-treatment facility for sexually dangerous persons violated plaintiff’s due process rights by confining him in secure room for eight days without any clothes. Record showed that plaintiff missed by one day filing timely motion to reconsider under Rule 59(e) that would have tolled period for filing timely notice of appeal of said dismissal, and while plaintiff could only appeal merits of Dist. Ct.’s denial of instant motion to reconsider under present posture of case, Dist. Ct. could have treated plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion as motion under Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(i) for extension of time to file notice of appeal from dismissal order, where plaintiff’s pleading was filed within 30 days of expiration of time to file timely notice of appeal from dismissal order. As such, Ct. of Appeals remanded matter back to Dist. Ct. for determination as to whether it would allow plaintiff more time to file notice of appeal from dismissal order.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting portion of defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants deprived plaintiff-pre-trial detainee of his due process rights under 14^th Amendment by being deliberately indifference to his acute medical need by refusing to assign him lower bunk in prison cell that resulted in plaintiff having to sleep on cell floor for remainder of his incarceration and aggravating his injuries. Record showed that plaintiff had obtained lower bunk assignment from doctor, and record contained question of material fact as to whether instant defendants had knowledge of said assignment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in directing defendant to pay plaintiff $118,925 in attorneys’ fees and $16,498.01 in costs associated with plaintiff’s efforts to obtain discovery from defendant, after granting plaintiff’s motion for sanctions that alleged that defendant had engaged in pattern of obstreperous discovery behavior that included testifying falsely about its documents and discovery efforts, failing to correct false representations regarding its discovery efforts and impeding depositions. Fact that defendant had ultimately prevailed in its summary judgment motion against plaintiff or that plaintiff’s counsel had not engaged in second discovery conference prior to her second motion for sanctions did not require different result, where plaintiff’s counsel had engaged in initial discovery conference and had satisfied and meet-and-confer requirement prior to seeking instant sanctions through participating in various email exchanges and attempts to call defendant’s counsel to resolve discovery disputes. Record also supported Dist. Ct.’s finding of discovery abuse, where defendant: (1) delayed by four months its initial attempt to comply with plaintiff’s discovery attempts; (2) provided defendant with continually different answers about defendant's personnel, which formed key issue in plaintiff’s claim against defendant; and (3) provided either false or evasive testimony through its president about its discovery-related conduct.