Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials failed to protect him from other inmates who threw feces at him. Although state’s grievance policy required plaintiff to seek informal resolution of his complaints, and if dissatisfied submit formal grievance prior to filing lawsuit, record showed with respect to first grievance that plaintiff had satisfied all informal and written prerequisites of grievance process prior to filing instant lawsuit, and that defendant’s staff merely returned grievance unprocessed and had failed to inform him that he could appeal defendant’s refusal to process grievance. Moreover, record showed that defendant’s staff refused to give plaintiff grievance form with respect to two other incidents at issue in instant lawsuit, and that said failure was sufficient reason to excuse any exhaustion requirement for these incidents.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on 11^th Amendment immunity grounds plaintiffs-employees’ lawsuit alleging that defendant-state agency violated overtime provisions of federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by requiring that plaintiffs work through lunch and remain on call despite being paid only 40 hours per week. Under Alden, 527 US 700, enactment of federal FSLA did not abrogate state’s 11^th Amendment immunity to instant action, and plaintiffs failed to show that Indiana had given consent to being sued on instant action in federal court. Ct. also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that Indiana’s statutes providing for statute of limitations in contract claims or its Torts Claim Act contained sufficient language that evidenced waiver of 11^th Amendment immunity for FSLA claims. Moreover, fact that Indiana incorporated FSLA’s requirements into employment contracts was not tantamount to waiver of 11^th Amendment immunity.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss instant section 1983 action on absolute and qualified immunity grounds, where plaintiffs-state’s attorney and others alleged that defendants-asst. special prosecutor and investigators violated plaintiffs’ due process, 1^st and 4^th Amendment rights by fabricating evidence and withholding exculpatory evidence, where defendants ultimately obtained indictment against plaintiffs on charge that plaintiffs had improperly politicked while on county time. Defendant-asst. special prosecutor was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, where he was appointed asst. special prosecutor under 55 ILCS section 5/3-9008, and where large portion of complaint pertained to his alleged actions in presenting false evidence to grand jury. Moreover, while asst. special prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity with respect to his investigation activities, all defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their investigation activities, where: (1) defendants’ alleged fabricated evidence did not result in plaintiffs being deprived of liberty for purposes of their due process claim; (2) plaintiffs’ alleged violation of Brady duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence did not result in prejudice to plaintiffs, since plaintiffs were acquitted of all charges; (3) plaintiffs failed to adequately allege causal connection between any alleged retaliatory animosity against plaintiff-state’s attorney for holding office and instant false indictment; and (4) plaintiffs failed to state adequate false arrest claim, where plaintiffs’ arrests came only after they were indicted, and where plaintiffs’ claim was actually claim for malicious prosecution.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement of class action against manufacturer of hair-smoothing product that allegedly destroyed users’ hair and burned their scalps, where said settlement created three funds awarding consumers either: (1) sum up to $40 per person for cost of hair kit depending on whether consumer had receipt; (2) sum up to $800 per person if consumer had incurred hairdresser costs or certain medical bills arising out of use of hair kit; or (3) sum up to $25,000 per person, if consumer incurred significant bodily injuries. While class member objected to said settlement by arguing that $10,250,000 that was set aside for class compensation was inadequate and lacked reasonably accurate quantitative analysis of benefits provided, as compared with risks and benefits of litigation, Dist. Ct. could properly overrule instant objection, where objector could only speculate that settlement amount was inadequate or that many unanticipated claims will be filed. Fact that individual class members had different injuries that were potentially calculated under different state laws did not require different result because settlement agreement contained choice of law clause specifying that injuries were to be calculated under Illinois law.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state valid cause of action plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants (officials at state treatment and detention facility for sexually violent individuals) violated plaintiff’s (resident of said facility) First Amendment rights by ignoring his grievances regarding his dental care and harassing him for making said complaints. Plaintiff had First Amendment right to make such grievances, and defendants could not simply ignore them, where alleged neglect of dental care could have serious consequence. Moreover, plaintiff's allegations, that defendants called him “ignorant,” “stupid,” and “moron,” and that one defendant indicated that plaintiff’s life would be better had he not complained, were sufficient to establish potential retaliation claim. Ct. rejected defendants’ contention that they could ignore grievance procedure set forth under Ill. Administrative Code, where, according to defendants, plaintiff always had ability to bring instant lawsuit to raise similar claims that were contained in his grievances.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of certain class members in plaintiff’s class action against defendant for violating Telephone Consumer Protection Act by authorizing unsolicited fax ads to be sent to class members within 20-mile radius of subject of ad, and then finding in bench trial that defendant was not liable for fax ads sent to class members located more than 20 miles from subject of ad. Record showed that defendant verbally instructed third-party to send about 100 fax ads to businesses within 20 miles of subject of Terre Haute, Ind. and did not realize that third-party sent 4,849 fax ads to businesses in three state area. Moreover, plaintiffs failed to show that third-party had either express actual authority, implied actual authority, or apparent authority to send fax ads beyond 20-mile limitation set forth by defendant. Also, Ct. rejected defendant’s arguments that: (1) class members within 20-mile radius should have been classified as separate sub-class under Rule 23(c)(5); and (2) fact that class representative did not prevail in instant action because it was located beyond 20-mile award radius did not require vacatur of $16,000 award to those class members inside said radius.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiff-government’s motion for summary judgment in civil action seeking forfeiture of $271,080 in currency that police discovered in safe in one defendant’s van, after police had obtained search warrant based upon drug dog’s alert to presence of drugs in safe. Search of safe/van did not reveal presence of drugs, and record contained genuine issue of material fact as to whether govt. met its burden to prove that instant money was connected to drug trafficking, where, although both defendants initially indicated during police investigation that they did not own such large sum of money, both defendants presented subsequent affidavits that contained plausible explanations for earning such money legally. Government also failed to present any evidence indicating that defendants were involved in drug trafficking.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs-land developers’ action alleging that defendants-members of County Commission delayed approval of their plans to develop subdivision in retaliation for plaintiffs’ support in 1996 of political opponent of one member of Commission. Nine-year gap between 1996 election and instant approval of subdivision plans was too long to support any causal connection between protected conduct and alleged retaliatory act. Moreover, plaintiff failed to establish that relevant County Commissioner was even aware of plaintiffs. Also, instant delay in approval of plaintiffs’ plans was attributable to environmental and zoning concerns contained in plans. Fact that approval process took over two years did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on claim preclusion grounds plaintiff’s lawsuit alleging that defendant’s refusal to put plaintiff’s name on general election ballot due to plaintiff’s failure to meet statutory 4% signature requirement for aldermanic elections violated various constitutional provisions, where state court, in affirming defendant’s decision not to place plaintiff’s name on ballot, had previously rejected plaintiff’s identical claims. Defendant established all three elements for claim preclusion, and fact that instant lawsuit included section 1983 claim that was not present in state court lawsuit did not require different result since section 1983 action presented only different theory of recovery that arose for same facts and circumstances that gave rise to state court action. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s contention that instant action should have been allowed to proceed since he had inadequate opportunity to litigate his claims in state court.

In plaintiffs’ malpractice actions against defendants-plaintiffs’ former attorneys and accountants, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ motion for extension of time to identify their expert witness, and then granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment, because: (1) plaintiffs required expert witness to establish their legal and accounting malpractice claims that concerned allegations of whether defendants rendered professionally competent services within applicable standard of care; and (2) common-knowledge exception to need for expert witness testimony did not apply. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that 90-day deadline to name expert as set forth in Rule 26(a)(2)(D) applied to instant case, where: (1) plaintiffs acknowledged that local rule setting forth 115-day deadline for naming expert witness applied and that their attempt to name expert witness was untimely under said rule; (2) plaintiffs made instant extension request after deadline for close of discovery had passed; and (3) discovery deadline set by Dist. Ct. controlled over default deadline set under Rule 26(a)(2)(D). Also, Dist. Ct. could properly find that reopening of discovery could cause further delay in case.