Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-prison official violated his First Amendment rights by placing him in non-wheelchair-accessible cell and refusing to provide him with mobility assistance within said cell as penalty for plaintiff filing prior grievances about his treatment in prison, where rationale for said dismissal, i.e., plaintiff’s failure to attach said grievances to his complaint, was not requirement in order for plaintiff to state viable cause of action. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s summary judgment motion in plaintiff’s 8^th Amendment claim on grounds of qualified immunity, where: (1) plaintiff alleged that defendant’s decision to move him to non-wheelchair accessible cell was made with knowledge and hope that plaintiff would injure himself; (2) plaintiff actually injured himself while attempting to maneuver in his cell; and (3) clearly established case law indicated that defendant could not administer his own personal brand of punishment based on plaintiff’s prior complaints.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated their 14^th Amendment rights by depriving them of their property, where: (1) defendant-officer phoned them and threatening to arrest them if they did not return disputed motorcycle to third-party; and (2) plaintiffs returned said motorcycle because of said phone call. Defendant had probable cause to believe that plaintiffs’ possession of motorcycle was unlawful, where prior to said phone call, officer visited third-party, who claimed that plaintiffs had driven off with disputed motorcycle, while paying for other, lower-priced motorcycle, and that all information on relevant paperwork indicated that plaintiffs did not have correct motorcycle. Fact that plaintiffs claimed that dispute with third-party concerned only mistaken delivery of motorcycle did not undermine fact that officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs when instant phone call was made.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on lack of standing grounds plaintiffs-customers’ lawsuit seeking damages arising out of third-party hack of defendant-restaurant’s computer system, where plaintiffs asserted that their debit-and credit-card data had been stolen. Several injuries alleged by plaintiffs fit within categories of damages set forth in Remijas, 794 F.3d 688, that were sufficient to support Article III standing in form of increased risk of future fraudulent charges and identity theft caused by instant computer hack. Moreover, one plaintiff alleged that he incurred credit monitoring expenses to combat fraudulent charges that he claimed incurred shortly after instant computer hack had occurred. Fact that defendant contested plaintiffs’ claim that their financial data was exposed by instant computer hack did not require different result. Ct., though, expressed skepticism as to whether plaintiffs could recover in instant lawsuit costs of their meals at defendant’s restaurant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid cause of action plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials denied him equal protection rights by not affording him same extra privileges as other inmates participating in prison’s “Honor Program.” Record showed that defendants denied plaintiff admission into said program because all slots and waiting list for said program were full at time plaintiff inquired into said program. Moreover, defendants could otherwise treat inmates differently where conferring greater benefits was based upon history of inmate’s good behavior. Also, while plaintiff claimed that he should receive same benefits as those inmates who were accepted into program because he had demonstrated same good behavior, Ct. found that defendants could properly require that plaintiff undergo same application process as those who had been accepted into program to allow defendants opportunity to evaluate plaintiff before awarding benefits.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendants’ appeal of Dist. Ct. order denying their request for qualified immunity in plaintiff’s section 1983 claim, alleging that defendants violated his 1^st Amendment Free Exercise rights by arresting him on trespassing charges on account of his Moorish Science Temple beliefs. Under Johnson, 515 U.S. 304, defendants cannot appeal denial of motion seeking qualified immunity, where basis of denial was finding of existence of material question of fact, and instant Dist. Ct. found that there was factual dispute as to whether: (1) property-owner demanded that defendants arrest plaintiff; (2) reasonable jury could find that plaintiff's arrest was based on his religion; or (3) police force had policy that granted defendants discretion to arrest plaintiff under circumstances where plaintiff asserted that he had reasonable belief that third-party gave him valid permission to stay in owner’s home.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing portion of plaintiffs' challenge to Wisconsin’s statute requiring voters to produce photographic ID when attempting to vote, even though Ct. of Appeals had previously reversed Dist. Ct.’s finding that said statute violated U.S. Constitution and Voting Rights Act. While Dist. Ct. found on remand that dismissal was required since claims made by certain plaintiffs (that they were entitled to relief because they faced daunting obstacles to obtaining acceptable photo ID) were previously resolved in Ct. of Appeals’ prior opinion, Ct. of Appeals found that another remand was required since issue presented by said plaintiffs needed to be resolved by Dist. Ct., where original Dist. Ct.’s decision and prior Ct. of Appeals opinion did not address said issue and dealt only with now-rejected allegation that mere inconvenience of some voters in obtaining suitable ID meant that no one was required to obtain photo ID.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action, alleging that defendant-arresting officer used excessive force when arresting plaintiff on drug charges, when arresting officer shot plaintiff in plaintiff’s vehicle prior to his arrest. Record showed that plaintiff had pleaded guilty to charge of aggravated battery of police officer arising out of said incident. Accordingly, plaintiff could not proceed on his excessive force claim under Heck, 512 US 477, since plaintiff’s allegations in instant section 1983 claim would undermine factual basis of his aggravated battery of police officer conviction, where plaintiff admitted in plea colloquy that he drive his car towards arresting officer, under circumstances where arresting officer injured his ankle when trying to get out of the way from plaintiff’s car, and where arresting officer was in fear of his safety prior to firing shots at plaintiff.

Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff could properly file under collateral order doctrine interlocutory appeal of Dist. Ct.’s order denying his motion for leave to appear anonymously, where: (1) denial of said motion was conclusive on said issue; (2) question of anonymity was separate from merits of instant section 1983 action; and (3) ruling on said motion would be unreviewable from final decision of case. However, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion, since: (1) plaintiff was required to demonstrate exceptional circumstances that outweighed both public policy in favor of identified parties and prejudice to opposing party; and (2) plaintiff’s stated reason that having to proceed under his true name would defeat purpose of his underlying criminal expungement of his arrest at issue in instant section 1983 action and would result in his embarrassment was insufficient to support instant request.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request to admit deposition testimonies of his wife and his physician in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-police officer used excessive force when arresting plaintiff on charge of resisting arrest. Rule 32(a)(4) allows parties to use deposition testimony in lieu of live testimony, where said witness is “unavailable.” However, plaintiff failed to establish that his wife, who claimed she had difficulties with her feet and legs, was unavailable for trial, given wife’s lack of truthfulness in instant proceedings, which indicated she gave false address for purposes of being served with subpoena, and given critical nature of her testimony that would have unfairly prejudiced defendant due to his inability to rebut her deposition testimony. Also, plaintiff failed to show that physician was unavailable, where plaintiff merely failed to secure physician’s work schedule to determine whether physician could appear at trial. Ct. further noted plaintiff had failed to preserve three other evidentiary issues by neglecting to submit relevant portions of trial transcript that addressed said issues.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action as to some defendants (prison officials) and granting motion for summary judgment by defendant (County) in section 1983 action by plaintiff-pre-trial detainee, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by waiting up to 26 days to provide him with palliative care for his cancerous tumor that eventually resulted in his death. Record contained genuine issue of material fact with respect to plaintiff’s claim against defendant-County, where: (1) basis of claim was that County had medical records policy that created barriers to individuals obtaining information about inmate patients from paper and electronic medical records; (2) prior Dept. of Justice report indicated that Cook County medical care policies for detainees were inadequate and were likely to cause serious injuries to inmates; and (3) high level official had not implemented policy changes to correct such inadequacies by time of plaintiff’s death. Also, plaintiff stated viable cause of action against individual defendants, where amended complaint alleged that said individuals essentially were aware of defendant’s serious condition and either provided no follow-up care or offered only non-prescription pain medication.