Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants-Mexican hotel and Spanish corporation in action by plaintiff-Illinois decedent alleging that defendants’ actions caused decedent’s death in accident involving all-terrain vehicle while decedent was visiting Mexican hotel. Record showed that neither defendant conducted business in Illinois, and that neither defendant was subject to Illinois’ general jurisdiction. Fact that decedent booked her trip to Mexico through Orbitz’s website and paid for said trip through use of computer located in Illinois did not require different result, since activity that, according to plaintiff, formed basis of personal jurisdiction was done by decedent and not by either defendant.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding as unconstitutional Wisconsin statute that required plaintiff to wear GPS monitoring ankle bracelet upon his release from civil commitment that was imposed after completion of his sentences on two sexual assault of child convictions. While Dist. Ct. found that statute, which subjected plaintiff to 24-hour monitoring, violated 4^th Amendment as unreasonable invasion of plaintiff’s privacy, Ct. of Appeals found that instant monitoring of plaintiff was reasonable, where expert indicated that plaintiff had between 8 and 16 percent chance of committing another sexual assault of child, and where plaintiff was pedophile who was predisposed to committing sexually violent acts. Fact that plaintiff was no longer on any form of probation or supervised release at time ankle bracelet was attached, or that he was 73 years old did not render instant monitoring unreasonable. Moreover, fact that public could occasionally view plaintiff wearing ankle bracelet constituted only slight increase in loss of plaintiff’s privacy, which otherwise had been appropriately curtailed as result of his convictions. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claim that statute, which was enacted after he had been civilly committed, violated ex post facto clause, where Ct. found that statute did not impose “punishment” on plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s re-filed complaint alleging violation of Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act arising out of parties' use of defendant’s trademarks and business methods, where defendant had previously obtained favorable judgment against plaintiff on its Lanham Act claim against plaintiff seeking damages and injunctive relief arising out of plaintiff’s use/future use of defendant’s trademarks and business methods. Fact that both parties’ claims eventually were administratively consolidated did not require different result, even though plaintiff argued that res judicata could not apply to actions contained in consolidated lawsuit, where Ct. found that claims in administratively consolidated lawsuit remain essentially separate lawsuits. Moreover, dismissal of plaintiff’s claim would have been proper in fully consolidated action, since law of case doctrine would have applied to preclude plaintiff’s claim since injunctive relief that defendant obtained in its lawsuit against plaintiff would be inconsistent with relief plaintiff sought in its lawsuit against defendant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss instant breach of contract claim based on defendant’s contention that plaintiff lacked personal jurisdiction over it, where instant action was filed in Wisconsin and defendant’s controlling shareholder was native of Australia, who had never visited Wisconsin. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s motion was untimely under Rules 12(a), 12(h), where Ct. found that although 21-day rule contained in Rule 12 applied to responsive pleadings to complaints that assert affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, it did not apply to instant motion to dismiss.

Dist. Ct. erred in admitting evidence of plaintiff’s arrest record in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated his 4^th Amendment rights by stopping his vehicle for no apparent reason and threatening him at gunpoint. While jury eventually found in defendants’ favor after defendants claimed that plaintiff’s allegations were untrue, admission of plaintiff’s arrest record constituted reversible error, where: (1) such evidence is generally inadmissible due to its tendency to inflame jury; and (2) contrary to Dist. Ct.’s belief, such evidence was inadmissible for impeachment purposes where plaintiff made no factual claims regarding said arrests and was irrelevant as to whether plaintiff was law-abiding citizen. Dist. Ct. also erred in: (1) admitting evidence that plaintiff had filed two prior lawsuits against City of Chicago since such evidence was admitted only to establish litigious nature of plaintiff; and (2) admitting background testimony from police officer as to circumstances that would prompt him to pull gun on member of public, where such testimony was speculative and was contradictory to stipulated facts.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-hospital and its administrators’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants deprived plaintiff-radiologist his due process rights when it cancelled both his medical privileges and his corporation’s exclusive contract to practice radiology at defendant-hospital. Plaintiff failed to show that cancellation of hospital privileges was property interest protected by Constitution, where plaintiffs failed to show that said cancellation seriously harmed his medical practice, especially where plaintiff was on physician list for different hospital. Fact that instant hospital had established procedure for terminating medical privileges did not require different result, since such procedures by themselves did not create property interest. Moreover, instant defendants from private hospital were not state actors for purposes of pursuing section 1983 action.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action filed by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendant violated his 8^th Amendment rights by delaying surgery on his injured hernia. While Dist. Ct. believed that language in 2012 settlement that released instant defendants from “any and all actions” resulting from incidents involving plaintiff while he was incarcerated precluded plaintiff from bringing instant claim that arose out of 2013 delayed surgery on his hernia, instant settlement contained references to plaintiff’s 2006 and 2009 lawsuits against defendants that effectively limited scope of release so as to not preclude plaintiff from bringing instant lawsuit. Moreover, while plaintiff may have known by date of 2012 settlement about need for surgery that formed basis of instant 2013 lawsuit, record did not indicate that both plaintiff and defendants had anticipated by date of settlement that defendant would intentionally delay surgery so as to bring instant lawsuit within scope of settlement. Ct. also rejected defendants' contention that instant lawsuit was barred under either res judicata or collateral estoppel doctrines arising out of 2012 settlement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-City officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-police officer’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated her 1^st Amendment rights by transferring her to undesirable position in retaliation for making internal complaint about fellow police officer, who had verbally assaulted and physically intimidated her over work-related report plaintiff had drafted. Plaintiff’s internal complaint did not qualify as protected speech because plaintiff did not speak on matter of public concern, but rather spoke as employee over matter that was intimately connected to her job. Moreover, Ct. noted that internal complaint focused on her personal interest in protecting herself from harassment from co-worker and found that making internal complaint about co-worker misconduct was part of her employee duties.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff to false arrest on charges of improper lane usage and resisting arrest, as well as used excessive force when arresting plaintiff. Videotape of incident, as well as plaintiff’s concession that he could not recall whether he had used turn signal, were sufficient to create probable cause to arrest plaintiff on improper lane usage charge given officer’s statement that plaintiff had not done so. Moreover, videotape supported officer’s testimony that plaintiff failed to follow officer’s directives to return to his car and failed to cooperate while officer was attempting to pat down plaintiff, which in turn gave officer probable cause to arrest plaintiff on resisting arrest charge. Also, officer’s push of plaintiff on side of car did not amount to excessive force, where: (1) officer could use some amount of force when faced with safety issues; and (2) plaintiff posed safety risk to officer where plaintiff refused multiple commands to return to his car and acted strangely during instant pat down session. Fact that state court dismissed resisting arrest charge did not create triable issue in instant action, where record otherwise showed that officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on both charges.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-prisoner’s 1^st Amendment rights by preventing him for fasting properly during Ramadan. Record contained dispute as to why defendant did not receive appropriate “meal bags” for two days during Ramadan, which precluded issuance of summary judgment in defendants’ favor, and Ct. rejected defendants’ claim that denial of said meal bags did not constitute substantial burden on plaintiff’s free exercise of religion rights, since jury could find that defendants effectively forced plaintiff to choose between his religions practices and daily nutrition. Moreover, jury could find that all named defendants were personally involved in denying instant meal bags, and that plaintiff was eligible to receive nominal and punitive damages.