Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on lack of personal jurisdiction grounds plaintiff's lawsuit alleging that defendant violated Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act by intentionally registering domain names that were confusingly similar to plaintiff's trademarks and domain names. Although defendant was physically located in Arizona, defendant's contacts with Illinois were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction where defendant conducted national advertising campaign targeted to Illinois consumers that generated hundreds of thousands of Illinois customers and millions of dollars in revenue. Moreover, plaintiff's claim against defendant was sufficiently related to its Illinois contacts where plaintiff's claim arose directly out of defendant's registration of alleged infringing domain names purchased by customers it solicited in Illinois.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff's Lanham Act action alleging trademark infringement with respect to plaintiff's name when plaintiff conduct Internet search of her name and discovered results on defendant's search engine that linked plaintiff's name to undesirable websites and advertisements. While plaintiff argued that instant search results improperly gave her endorsement to pornography and online pharmaceuticals, plaintiff lacked standing under Lanham Act to sue for trademark infringement because plaintiff did not have commercial interest in her name.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiffs’ request for permanent injunction requiring State of Illinois to hold special election for remaining two months of President Obama’s U.S. Senate seat currently held by Sen. Burris, who was appointed to serve as Obama’s temporary replacement, and limiting candidates for special election to same candidates running for position in general election. Ct. held that Dist. Ct. took sound and practical approach to preserving plaintiffs’ 17th Amendment rights, even though permanent injunction effectively precluded Sen. Burris from being candidate in special election. Ct. also rejected Burris’ contention that permanent injunction improperly: (1) concerned nonjusticiable political question; (2) invaded exclusive province of Ill. state legislature to establish procedure for conducting special elections; and (3) interfered with his constitutional right of access to ballot.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-City officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 class action alleging that notice given by defendants in inventory receipt to plaintiffs-arrestees violated their due process rights because it was misleading as to how plaintiffs could seek return of money seized at time of their arrests. Record contained evidence that said notice was inadequate where: (1) notice gave improper impression that defendant-City would send additional notice as to when plaintiffs' money would be available for release; and (2) defendants failed to properly publicize additional procedures necessary for return of money. Dist. Ct. also erred in finding that Pollard notice required for return of money to plaintiffs charged with narcotics offenses was adequate for due process purposes where defendants sent said notice to home address listed in inventory receipt under circumstances where defendants were also aware that said defendants were still incarcerated. Finally, Dist. Ct. erred in entering judgment in favor of defendants where defendants provided insufficient justification for instant procedure that shifted burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate entitlement to money at conclusion of their criminal cases.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction action by State of Illinois seeking to enforce certain state and federal laws requiring defendant to report its Internet cigarette sales to Illinois residents. Defendant’s on-line contacts with Illinois residents were sufficient to satisfy due process concerns where defendant conducted near nationwide sales program that indicated willingness to do business with Illinois residents, and where defendant’s exclusion of only New York residents from its sales program indicated that defendant knew how to protect itself from involuntary lawsuits in state courts. Moreover, instant claims arose out of defendant’s acts of selling and shipping of cigarettes to Illinois residents, and fact that instant sales technically occurred in New Mexico, where defendant was located, or fact that defendant had no physical presence in Illinois, was not dispositive on personal jurisdiction issue.

In action alleging violation of Wiretap Act, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants' (hospital and hospital official) motion for summary judgment in action alleging that said defendants used transcriptions of illegally recorded conversation between plaintiffs that were critical of defendants when terminating plaintiffs. Summary judgment was improper since Dist. Ct.'s ruling was based on credibility findings culled from two different but plausible explanations as to how said conversation was recorded. However, Dist. Ct. properly granted summary judgment as to other defendants/hospital officials, who may have seen said transcripts, but who did not have any reason to know that said transcripts came from recording that violated Wiretap Act.

Dist. Ct. erred under 28 USC section 455(a) in ruling on motion to add three additional defendants to trademark infringement lawsuit where Dist. Ct. owned stock in one of said defendants, and where Dist. Ct.'s wife was on said defendant's board of directors since Dist. Ct.'s denial of said motion gave appearance of impropriety. Instead, Dist. Ct. should have referred motion to another Dist. Ct. Judge for ruling. However, mandamus relief was not required to remand matter for new ruling on motion to add defendants where said motion was clearly without merit given fact that plaintiff, if successful in underlying claim, would obtain any relief from different defendant(s).

Dist. Ct. erred in holding individual and entity in contempt for failing to adequately respond to two subpoenas served on them by SEC in connection with litigation between SEC and another party. While said individuals failed to appear at initial hearing when contempt sanction was imposed, instant contempt order was improper where SEC notice and motion for rule to show cause did not provide individual and entity with sufficient notice that Dist. Ct. would decide contempt issue at initial hearing, given fact that said notice only sought issuance of show cause order and asked Dist. Ct. to set future hearing on merits of contempt issue. Fact that entity had argued merits of contempt issue at initial hearing in different case pursuant to similar notice given by SEC did not require different result.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals filed by plaintiff and by non-litigant deponent, who appeared at parties’ deposition and initially refused to answer certain questions by invoking attorney-work product, but eventually answered said questions after Dist. Ct. directed him to do so. Non-litigant’s appeal was moot once he complied with Dist. Ct.’s directive, and privilege, if there is one, belonged to plaintiff under circumstances of case. Moreover, under Mohawk Industries, 130 S.Ct. 599, collateral-order doctrine does not support any interlocutory appeal by plaintiff to resolve instant evidentiary privilege issue since Sup. Ct. found that said issue can be resolved in appeal from final order in case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in FELA action after striking opinions of plaintiff's expert witnesses, who failed to comply with Rule 26(a)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by making opinions regarding causation of plaintiff's alleged work-related injury without setting forth any detailed support for how experts arrived at their opinions. Said conclusions as to causation failed to meet standards for disclosure under Rule 26(a)(2), and said Rule applied to opinions of instant experts, even though said experts were plaintiff's treating physicians, where said opinions as to causation of injury were not generated at time treatment was rendered.