Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff's copyright infringement action due to plaintiff's repeated failure to submit appropriate pretrial order as required by Northern Dist. of Ill. Local Rule 16.1 Appendix Instruction 6. Record showed that plaintiff's proposed submissions were woefully inadequate and plaintiff refused to consider defendants' proposed order. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding defendants $750,000 in attorney fees under 17 USC section 505 where defendants were prevailing parties in instant copyright infringement claim, although it erred in assessing fee award under 18 USC section 1927 against non-attorney specialist who assisted plaintiff in instant claim since record did not indicate that specialist had engaged in any conduct, such as making outlandish statutory damages claims, that had vexatiously prolonged instant proceedings.

Ct. of Appeals denied State's petition for rehearing after noting that Dist. Ct. has power on remand to order State to bring its election procedures for U.S. Senator into compliance with 17th Amendment's requirement that state governor issue writ of election to guarantee that vacancy in U.S. Senator position is filled by election as soon as possible.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-agency's motion to dismiss plaintiff-nursing home's claim that Medicare underpaid it for certain services provided to Medicare beneficiaries even though defendant decided to reopen administrative proceedings to reconsider plaintiff's claim. Ct. rejected Dist. Ct.'s belief that defendant's reopening of plaintiff's claim stripped it of jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's appeal since, for cases filed under 42 USC section 405(g), agency may not divest federal court of jurisdiction by unilaterally reopening its administrative proceeding. However, Dist. Ct. may consider remanding case to agency if defendant files appropriate motion in Dist. Ct. seeking said relief.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on abstention grounds defendant's habeas petition alleging that state's promised use of defendant's third-degree sexual assault convictions to support pending state-court petition to civilly commitment defendant as sexually violent person violated Ex Post Facto Clause. Record showed that no commitment order had been entered at time of habeas petition, and abstention was required under Younger, 401 US 37, to preclude Dist. Ct. from interfering with instant important state-court civil commitment proceeding.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's section 1983 action alleging that defendant-as guardian ad litem representing plaintiff's child in underlying state-court divorce proceedings violated plaintiff's constitutional rights by damaging his relationship with his child and impugned his reputation during underlying divorce proceedings. Defendant was entitled to absolute immunity with respect to any false statements made while carrying out her responsibilities as child representative, and Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied as to any actions taken while being advocate of child since plaintiff's claims of biased advocacy can only be remedied through direct appeal of state-court adverse custody order.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's lawsuit alleging that defendants infringed on plaintiff's copyrighted material where original lawsuit had been dismissed on res judicata grounds, and where plaintiff twice failed to file amended complaint within deadlines set forth by Dist. Ct. Plaintiff failed to establish excusable neglect in failing to timely file amended complaint since: (1) plaintiff had been aware of operative facts regarding amended complaint for over three years; (2) defendant never identified valid reason for failing to file amended complaint within roughly seven-month time frame provided by Dist. Ct.; and (3) record suggested that plaintiff would have been unable to establish alleged fraud as alleged in original complaint.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing action seeking recovery based on alleged breach of series of agreements/mortgages where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff, as mortgage servicer, lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit. Record showed that plaintiff had standing to bring instant lawsuit where trust that held legal title to underlying mortgages had delegated to plaintiff right to sue on behalf of trust, and where plaintiff could sue in its own name without violating Rule 17(a). Moreover, applicable pooling and servicing agreement required trustee to confer on plaintiff whatever authority plaintiff needed to perform its servicing duties. However, as to merits of claim, plaintiff was not entitled to recovery of settlement proceeds that defendant-landlord had obtained from lessee of subject property, which represented fraction of rent owed on said property, even though agreement potentially required defendant to do so, where defendant continued to make full and timely mortgage payments, and where plaintiff neglected to show that defendant's failure to tender settlement proceeds impaired value of property that was subject to mortgage.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner-insurance company's petition for leave to appeal challenging Dist. Ct.'s remand of state-court lawsuit that had been removed under Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) where underlying lawsuit alleged that petitioner breached terms of variable life insurance policies, and where Dist. Ct.'s remand was based on its finding that instant variable life policies were covered under CAFA's exception to federal jurisdiction for lawsuits that solely relate to obligations created by securities covered by Securities Act of 1933. Ct. rejected petitioner's claim that instant policies were not securities due to their hybrid nature after Ct. observed that: (1) every holder of instant policies had right to purchase securities; and (2) instant lawsuit pertained to funds placed into variable life policy account containing securities.

Ct. of Appeals denied defendant's motion to stay mandate pending filing and disposition of its petition for writ of certiorari that concerned Dist. Ct.'s issuance of certain jury instructions in FELA action. While defendant noted that instant 7th Circuit opinion conflicted with certain state court opinions, defendant still did not show likelihood that four Supreme Court Justices would grant certiorari where instant decision was consistent with every other federal circuit court that had addressed same issue. Moreover, defendant failed to establish that it was unlikely that plaintiff would be able to repay judgment if it was reversed.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss instant RICO action alleging that defendants, who were connected to either law firm or bank, formed RICO enterprise beginning in 1985 for purpose of defrauding plaintiffs out of their assets by forging endorsements and signatures on checks and funneling money through bank to entities controlled by defendants. Instant fraudulent acts occurred between 1985 and 1994, and instant 2008 action was untimely since it had been filed more than four years after start of limitations period. Moreover, while plaintiffs alleged that defendants engaged in obstructive behavior that prevented them from timely discovering fraudulent acts, plaintiff knew by 2003 that individual defendants had stolen money and that others were trying to prevent further investigation. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ contention that limitations period does not start until pre-complaint investigation is complete, as opposed to earlier date when plaintiffs discovered both injury and identity of individuals causing injury.