Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable cause of action plaintiff's lawsuit alleging that defendant's inclusion of plaintiff's credit card expiration date in plaintiff's purchase order that was sent to plaintiff via e-mail violated section 1681(c)(g) of Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act. Language and context of section 1681(c)(g) indicates that instant truncation requirement applies only to receipts physically printed by vendor at point of sale or transaction and not to receipts e-mailed to consumers.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as untimely plaintiffs-independent truck drivers’ lawsuit alleging that defendant’s practice of imposing chargeback on per mile fee paid to plaintiffs to account for defendant’s purchase of insurance for plaintiffs’ trucks violated 49 CFR section 376.12(i). Residual four-year limitation period applied to instant claim under 49 USC section 14704(a)(2) instead of two-year period mentioned in 49 USC section 14705(c). However, dismissal was appropriate on merits of claim since: (1) instant chargeback is not sale of insurance by defendant; and (2) defendant is always free to reduce per mile fee without mentioning price of insurance.

Dist. Ct. erred in awarding plaintiff $277,462 in supplemental attorney fees as prevailing party in section 1983 action against defendant-City alleging that one of defendant's police officers shot plaintiff without good reason and attempted to frame him for possessing gun. While Dist. Ct. appropriately granted plaintiff's initial request for fees, instant supplemental request was filed 1,250 days after entry of judgment, which was beyond potential 90-day time frame for filing supplemental request for fees as contemplated under Local Rule 54.3(b) of N.D. of Ill. Ct. also noted that plaintiff had represented in initial appeal that Dist. Ct. judgment that contained original fee award was final order.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-school and police officials' motion for summary judgment alleging that they were entitled to qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that defendants denied plaintiff-teacher due process and subjected her to false arrest by investigating rumors that plaintiff had sexual affair with male student. While one defendant-school official had conflict of interest in investigating plaintiff where said official had earlier been accused of sexually harassing student, all defendants, who were school officials, were entitled to qualified immunity where said officials forwarded allegations of plaintiff's conduct to other entity that would perform independent investigation before effecting any deprivation of plaintiff's rights. Moreover, defendant-police official had probable cause to arrest plaintiff where alleged victim eventually admitted to sexual affair, and where certain elements of victim's story were corroborated by third-party.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-state officials' motion for summary judgment alleging qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that defendants terminated plaintiff due to his affiliation with Republican Party. Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that defendants reasonably believed that discharge of plaintiff was lawful where: (1) CMS designated plaintiff's position in 1992 as being Rutan exempt; (2) plaintiff's job description was inconclusive as to whether it qualified for protection under Rutan; and (3) plaintiff failed to show any analogous case law to establish that plaintiff's job was covered under Rutan rule banning politically-based firings.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's request for class certification in action seeking relief under Ill. Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act where plaintiff alleged that defendants engaged in unfair conduct by manipulating gasoline supplies, which caused plaintiff to purchase gas at artificially inflated prices. Class certification request was properly denied where Dist. Ct. would be required to ask each class member to identify motivation for purchasing gas from particular supplier. Moreover, Dist. Ct. properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's individual claim where plaintiff's admission that he could and did purchase gas from non-defendants undercut his contention that he had no meaningful opportunity to avoid paying higher retail prices.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff's Fair Housing Act claim against defendants-bank and appraisers alleging that defendants intentionally lowered appraisal value of her home in order to deny on account of her race plaintiff's application for home-equity loan. Instant complaint was sufficient to state cause of action where complaint identified type of discrimination, alleged culprits, and time frame of loan application. Fact that complaint alleged other extraneous facts regarding source of loan proceeds or that loan officer had mixed-race family did not serve to plead plaintiff out of her claim. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in dismissing plaintiff's related fraud claim in absence of allegation that plaintiff relied on defendants' appraisal or that plaintiff incurred monetary loss because of said appraisal.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-debtor's action alleging that letter by defendant-servicer of mortgage offering to discuss ways plaintiff could avoid foreclosure on her home and asking her for financial information violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, where Dist. Ct. found that said letter did not fall within scope of FDCPA because it did not contain specific demand for payment. Instant letter was covered under FDCPA in spite of lack of specific demand for payment where plaintiff was in default status at time letter was sent and text of letter constituted inducement for plaintiff to settle her mortgage-loan debt in order to avoid foreclosure.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely plaintiff's action arising out of defendant's alleged fraudulent assessment that plaintiff's steel mill had bad design flaws, where applicable Indiana statute of limitations for fraud action is six years, and where instant lawsuit was filed approximately 10 years after plaintiff's president wrote letter to plaintiff's Bd. of Directors that disagreed with defendant's assessment. President's knowledge that defendant's assessment was false was imputed to plaintiff for purposes of starting limitations period. Fact that Bd. had lost confidence in president at time letter was written did not provide exception to general rule that employee's knowledge of matter within scope of his duties is imputed to employer.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs' request for finding that defendants-police officials had two-hour time limit to perform necessary steps to issue CB number and obtain plaintiff's release following their arrests for offenses that are punishable by fines but not imprisonment in instant class action seeking damages for detentions taking longer than two hours. Under Gerstein, 420 US 103, Dist. Ct. could not establish blanket rule that set maximum amount of allowable delay and must instead consider each case on its own facts to determine if individual delays were unreasonable. Moreover, class action had to be decertified due to fact that each case required individual consideration.