Insurance Law

Court dismissed 2 counts of Plaintiff's amended complaint for declaratory judgment to construe the rights of the parties as to Plaintiff's underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under her auto insurance policy. Policy required Plaintiff to make a written demand for arbitration within 2 years of the collision to become entitled to payment of UIM benefits under the policy.  This requirement applies when the insurer and insured have not reached agreement on amount of damages regardless of whether the other driver is uninsured or underinsured.Letter from Plaintiff's counsel to insurer, to secure his payment for legal services, is not a "claim" for UIM benefits, as it makes not reference to whether Plaintiff was making a claim for UIM benefits. Section 143.1 of Insurance Code tolls policy's limitations provision only once a proof of loss is filed. (McDADE, concurring; O'BRIEN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Declaratory judgment action filed by insurer of owner of vehicle driven by permissive user in multi-vehicle collision. Insurer sought declaration that it did not owe obligation to defend or indemnify driver's estate under a $1 million umbrella policy issued to vehicle owner that was effective at time of accident. Driver was not an insured under the umbrella policy, and thus insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify driver's estate.  Vehicle owner's use of vehicle, as a passenger, is not sufficient to trigger coverage for driver.(HUTCHINSON and SPENCE, concurring.)

Under Insurance Claims Fraud Protection Act, the State need not have suffered monetary damages to confer standing on a relator. In the qui tam context, a whistleblower employee who has personal, nonpublic information of possible wrongdoing is an "interested person" under the Act and need not have a personal injury to have standing. Separation agreement does not prevent relator from pursuing qui tam action, as a qui tam claim alleging insurance fraud is not a claim arising out of or in connection with employment. (MASON and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Plaintiffs filed complaint for deaths of 2 persons and serious injuries to 1 person in car accident with another vehicle whose driver was also killed, and who Plaintiffs allege proximately caused deaths and injuries by his negligence. Three counts of complaint requested declaratory judgments as to coverage on policy issued on car driven by Defendant. Court entered judgment order finding coverage limits to be stacked at $400,000 per person and $1.2 million per accident. Antistacking provision in policy limits liability to that shown on the declarations pages. Relevant limits of liability, for bodily injury at $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident, are listed twice on the 3 pages of declarations. Thus, limits are to be stacked twice, for total limits of $200,000 per person and $600,000 per accident. (WELCH and CHAPMAN, concurring.)

Court erred in dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs' 2nd amended complaint, in concluding that insurance policies issued by Defendants did not provide coverage for Plaintiff's underlying claim of malicious prosecution against City. Language of policies, when read in context, is plain in providing that coverage is triggered by the "offense" of malicious prosecution "happening" within the policy period and the offense of malicious prosecution only happens once all elements of the tort are met. Coverage trigger was Plaintiff's exoneration in 2014, which was within effective policy periods. (HYMAN, concurring; MASON, dissenting.)