LMP Services, Inc. v. The City of Chicago
Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
Civil Court
Equal Protection
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted defendant-City’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-mobile food truck’s challenge to two ordinances requiring plaintiff to locate itself beyond 200 feet of principal customer entrance of any “brick and mortar” restaurant located at street level and be equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) device that sends real-time data to any service that had publicly accessible application programming interface. While plaintiff asserted that 200-foot rule violated notions of due process and equal protection and improperly promoted monopoly, Ct. of Appeals, in affirming trial court, found that 200-foot requirement set forth in ordinance was rational since defendant had critical interest in maintaining thriving food service industry of which brick-and-mortar restaurants are essential part. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s claim that GPA device requirement constituted impermissible search under 4th Amendment, since attachment of GPS device to food truck did not constitute search pursuant to Jones, 565 U.S. 400. Moreover, requirement that entity maintain electronic records as to its operational location was proper condition of doing business from city street.
Chicago Title Land Trust Company v. County of Will
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Annexation
Plaintiff filed quo warranto action against village, alleging that village entered into sham voluntary annexation agreement with an adjacent property owner (Com Ed) to create contiguous boundaries to reach his property. ComEd annexation was a sham transaction, created exclusively for purpose of allowing Village to reach Plaintiff’s property. Thus, this annexation is a nullity and cannot be used to create continuous boundaries with Plaintiff’s property. The annexation of the ComEd property was premature and ineffective, and thus a nullity, because conditions precedent to ComEd annexation agreement had not occurred or been fulfilled. Thus, Plaintiff’s property was not “wholly bounded” by one or more municipalities, as required by Section 7-1-13 of Municipal Code, at time of passage of ordinance attempting to involuntarily annex Plaintiff’s property. (O’BRIEN, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, dissenting.)
Paul v. County of Ogle
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Standing
County granted Defendants a special-use permit to operate a "motor carrier facility" to store garbage trucks and dumpsters on Defendants' property, located adjacent to and 1250 feet away from Plaintiffs' property. Complaint contains allegations of harm specific to Plaintiffs' properties, and thus adequately pleads that Plaintiffs will suffer damages different from those of the public generally. As the ordinance itself is fact-specific, Plaintiffs' challenge to it is properly fact-specific. Plaintiffs' allegations include ultimate facts, including that value of Plaintiffs' property will be diinshed by proposed use, in specific ways. Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint.(ZENOFF and BURKE, concurring.)
HH-Indianapolis, LLC v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis
Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
First Amendment
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion for issuance of preliminary injunction in action alleging that defendant’s zoning ordinance, which precluded plaintiff from operating “adult entertainment business” within zone, violated its 1st and 14th Amendment rights as applied to it, where plaintiff had previously signed 10-year lease on building within said zone. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff proposed to sell variety of merchandise, including, among other things, instructional DVDs containing sexual material, marital aids and sexual devices such as dildos and vibrators; and (2) plaintiff’s projected sales of said merchandise exceeded 25 percent threshold necessary to qualify plaintiff’s business as either adult bookstore or adult service establishment for purposes of imposing instant ban under said ordinance. Moreover, plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on its 1st Amendment claim, where: (1) instant ordinance constituted content neutral time, place and manner regulation of adult entertainment businesses that was subject to intermediate scrutiny; (2) defendant provided plaintiff with reasonable alternatives in terms of number of other commercial zones that would allow plaintiff to operate adult entertainment business as matter of right; (3) defendant had legitimate interest in reducing secondary effects of adult entertainment businesses; and (4) instant ordinance resulted in only incidental restriction of plaintiff’s speech.
House Bill 5201
Topic:
Mechanics Lien Act
(Ford, D-Chicago; Castro, D-Chicago) amends the Counties Code to create a mechanics lien demand and referral pilot program. Provides that in counties with a code hearing unit, a recorder may adopt rules establishing a mechanics lien demand and referral process for residential property after a public hearing. Provides that if a recorder determines that a mechanics lien recorded in the grantor's index or the grantee's index is a defective lien, the recorder shall serve a Notice of Defective Lien by certified mail to the last known address of the owner.
Provides that if the owner or legal representative of the owner of the residential property confirms in writing that the lien is not involved in pending litigation, the owner may request that the recorder refer the defective mechanics lien to the county's code hearing department for adjudication or serve a Demand to Commence Suit forcing the lienholder to either file suit, respond to the Demand, or forfeit the lien. Provides how the recorder is to serve a Demand to Commence Suit or file a Notice of Referral with the code hearing unit.
Provides that if the mechanics lien is referred to the code hearing unit, the code hearing unit will set a hearing and notify the applicable parties. Provides if the recorder shows by clear and convincing evidence that the lien in question is a defective lien, the administrative law judge shall rule the lien is forfeited and that the lien no longer affects the chain of title of the property in any way.
Repeals the provisions on January 1, 2022. Further amends the Counties Code making conforming changes in county code hearing unit provisions. Amends the Mechanics Lien Act making conforming changes. Scheduled for hearing Tuesday in Senate Judiciary Committee.
City of Danville v. Madigan
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
FOIA
City denied Defendant’s FOIA request for documents pertaining to City Housing Task Force, and Defendant sought administrative review with AG office. AG found that City’s denial of request was improper. City required to comply with FOIA request, as documents responsive to Defendant’s FOIA request concern a matter of public business, as they appear to concern business or community interests and not private affairs. Parties do not dispute that City is a “public body”. (HOLDER WHITE and DeARMOND, concurring.)
City of Danville v. Madigan
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
FOIA
City denied Defendant’s FOIA request for documents pertaining to City Housing Task Force, and Defendant sought administrative review with AG office. AG found that City’s denial of request was improper. City required to comply with FOIA request, as documents responsive to Defendant’s FOIA request concern a matter of public business, as they appear to concern business or community interests and not private affairs. Parties do not dispute that City is a “public body”. (HOLDER WHITE and DeARMOND, concurring.)
In re Application of the Will County Collector
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Tax Deeds
Court properly held that tax deed is void under section 22-85 of Property Tax Code, without right of reimbursement, and that tax sale notices were insufficient. Only the certificate holder (i.e., the purchaser of the property at the tax sale or the assignee of the purchaser) may extend the redemption period. Unless tax deed is recorded within one year of expiration of governing redemption period, “the certificate or deed, and the sale on which it is based, shall, after the expiration of the one year period, be absolutely void with no right to reimbursement.” Party objecting to tax deed as void was not required to comply with requirements of section 2-1401 or section 22-45 of Property Tax Code.(McDADE and WRIGHT, concurring.)