Local Government Law

Court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff and against City, and found that Plaintiff had no obligation to defend or indemnify it against claims asserted in declaratory judgment action filed against city regarding enforcement of a local ordinance requiring persons whose vehicles had been towed and impounded as to certain criminal offenses to pay $500 administrative fee to City prior to obtaining release of vehicle. Under language used in coverage grants provided by Plaintiff to City, coverage is provided under the "loss of use" prong of the property damage provision as applied to part 1 only where damages sought related to impermanent nature of injury sustained. Plaintiffs in underlying complaint alleged a "loss of use" of their property. City is not entitled to coverage, as Plaintiffs have not alleged a "loss of use" as defined by "loss of use" prong of property damage provision.(HOLDER WHITE and DeARMOND, concurring.)

Plaintiff, while a pretrial detainee at Adult Detention Facility, requested numerous records from Facility through Illinois FOIA. Facility did not comply with Plaintiff's requests, and Plaintiff filed 3 separate suits against County Sheriff, now consolidated on appeal. Court erred in dismissing complaint seeking production of records relating to Facility's sale of stamps, to show which detainees had purchased stamps in a certain time period (after the time that USPS lowered price of stamps from 49 cents to 47 cents).(HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)

Court affirmed order of Zoning Board of Appeals, which reversed zoning administrator's decision to deny application of Defendant for zoning variations under Chicago Municipal Code. Board's decision to grant height and setback variations was not against manifest weight of evidence.Trust presented evidence that strict compliance with zoning ordinance would cause practical difficulties and particular hardships.Plaintiffs' evidence that with renovations allowed by variations, residence would become larger and taller than neighboring houses and interfere with their light, air, and privacy, does not render trust's hardship evidence incompetent.(CUNNINGHAM and CONORS, concurring.)

Court affirmed decision of Village Electoral Board sustaining objection to referendum petition to place public question as to video gaming on ballot to be voted on by voters of Village.The 270 sheets of Referendum Petition which share common headings comply with requirements of section 70 of Video Gaming Act and substantially comply with requirements of Section 28-3 of Election Code. Those 270 sheets contain more than statutory minimum number of signatures necessary to place before voters of Village the question of whether video gaming should be prohibited. The inclusion within Referendum Petition of 6 sheets which do not contain same headings was a technical deficiency which is insufficient to render all 276 sheets of Petition invalid.(CUNNINGHAM, concurring; DELORT, specially concurring.)

Court properly dismissed Village's declaratory judgment action requesting judgment declaring that ordinance created a perpetual easement in favor of village over railroad tracks on certain streets and that railroad must maintain the bridges at those locations at its sole expense. Ordinance is void, as subject matter of ordiancne is subject to plenary and exclusive jurisdiction of Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC). When Public Utilities Act became effective, muncipalities ceased to have power to pass new ordinances or to enforce existing ordinances as to matters that the Act placed within exclusive jurisdiction of ICC.(WELCH and GOLDENHERSH, concurring.)

Plaintiffs filed action alleging that Defendants' use of property, where abortions and other health care services are provided, constitutes an ongoing violation of city zoning ordinance. Court properly dismissed complaint pursuant to Section 2-615 of Code of Civil Procedure. In city zoning ordinance, medical clinics are designated as permitted uses in district where subject property is located, and there is no discernible intent to distinguish between for-profit and nonprofit uses of such facilities. (McLAREN and HUTCHINSON, concurring.) 

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 12/29/17.) Village council had authority to remove Plaintiff from board of trustees for Village's public library prior to expiration of his 6-year term. Section 2.53.1(d) of Village code, as applied to Village library trustees, is a valid exercise of the Village's home-rule powers. As Plaintiff did not show likelihood of success on the merits, court properly denied his request for a preliminary injunction barring Village from removing Plaintiff.(HUTCHINSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed complaint for writ of mandamus, and sought to become write-in candidate for Commissioner of Water Reclamation District in Democratic primary election on 3/20/18. To satisfy requirements of Section 17-16.1 of Election Code to allow Board to count his write-in votes, Plaintiff was required to file a notarized declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate with the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners because Board is an election authority for the office Plaintiff seeks. Because Plaintiff failed to file such statement with the Board, Board is not authorized to count any votes for Plaintiff. (COBBS and FITZGERALD SMITH, concurring).