(Martwick, D-Chicago) allows a taxing body or its representative to file a vacancy-fraud complaint with the county board of review if the property is receiving vacancy relief and the property owner is not actively attempting to lease, sell, or alter the property. It sets forth factors in determining whether vacancy fraud has occurred and its penalties. House Bill 832 was just introduced.
Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing as moot plaintiff-church’s action under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) alleging that defendant-City’s zoning ordinance improperly treats religious uses of property on unequal terms with analogous secular uses, where defendant denied plaintiff conditional use permit to operate church in zoned residential area, under circumstances where plaintiff claimed it did not need conditional use permit to operate church in residential home. While Dist. Ct. dismissed case as moot because plaintiff had obtained parking variances that were consistent with use of home as church, plaintiff’s obtaining of said variances was only tangentially related to plaintiff’s main claim that concerned zoning use classifications and not parking variances. Moreover, plaintiff RLUIPA lawsuit was not moot, where lawsuit concerned issue as to whether operating church on subject property was either permitted or conditional use, which remained open question in spite of defendant’s grant of parking variances. Also, Dist. Ct. could not find as merely speculative plaintiff’s claim for damages, since plaintiff could establish at least nominal damages arising out of defendant’s initial efforts to preclude plaintiff from operating church.
(Wehrli, R-Naperville) amends the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act to make the following changes. (1) Modifies the term "representation case" to include matters before a unit of local government. (Now, it applies to professional representation before a state agency.) (2) Provides that, among other restrictions, no legislator may accept or participate in any way in any representation case before the State of Illinois or any unit of local government that involves a challenge to any tax or proposed assessment of any tax or fee. Provides that the prohibition against participation in such a representation case does not apply to a person with whom the legislator maintains a close economic association, unless a fee or compensation received regarding any matter that involves a challenge to any tax or proposed assessment of any tax or fee is received by the legislator directly or indirectly through any interest in a partnership, limited liability corporation, or other business entity. House Bill 332 was just introduced.
(Lilly, D-Chicago) amends the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to provide that grand jury proceedings involving the investigation of the excessive use of force by a peace officer and the discharge of a firearm by a peace officer that result in death or any bodily harm are open to the public. House Bill 172 was just introduced.
(McDermed, R-Frankfort) amends the Firearm Concealed Carry Act to permit certain judicial officers to carry a concealed firearm in areas in which it is currently prohibited. The prohibited areas include any building, parking area, or portion of a building under the control of an officer of the executive or legislative branch of government; any building designated for matters before a circuit court, appellate court, or the Supreme Court; any building or portion of a building under the control of the Supreme Court; and any building or portion of a building under the control of a unit of local government. The judicial officers who would be covered includes judges (with the consent of the chief judge of the circuit) and assistant attorney generals and assistant state’s attorneys (with the consent of the attorney general and state’s attorney). House Bill 248 was just introduced.
(Reick, R-Woodstock) amends the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to provide that a county with a population of less than three million does not have to comply with the changes made by Public Act 100-1 (the Bail Reform Act of 2017) if the county board adopts a resolution for that purpose. House Bill 221 was just introduced.
Dispute over the amount of control and oversight the County Board has over County Veterans Assistance Commission (VAC) operations under Military Veterans Act. Plaintiff, as VAC superintendent, reviewed and approved his attorney's unredacted itemized invoice, and when he presented Warrant No. 16-4 demanding payment of invoice, there were sufficient funds in 2016 Administrative Fund to pay those expense, and thus Warrant should have been processed and paid shortly after it was submitted. Plaintiff established that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus, directing Defendants to pay remaining balance due, plus interest due, from unreserved fund account. Superintendent of VAC has authority for approval of itemized statements. Defendants failed to show that any policies prohibited them from paying any unredacted invoices. Plaintiff failed to establish a clear right to payment of Warrant No. 16-5; at presentment of invoice, fiscal year 2016 had closed, and VAC had exhausted its 2016 Administrative Fund. (GOLDENHERSH and CHAPMAN, concurring.)
Plaintiffs, residents of village, filed suit alleging that village ordinance adopted a few days prior, permitting large-scale horse boarding operations on residential property throughout the village, violated substantive due process because it was passed for the benefit of one resident only (who had been cited for violation of previous ordinance which prohibited such operations) and was not rationally related to public health, safety, or welfare of village. Court erred in dismissing substantive due process challenge at the pleading stage. Parties should have opportunity to put forward their respective positions on justifications for ordinances, or lack thereof, in trial court. Allegations are appropriately suited to a facial challenge. If Plaintiffs can show that ordinance was not rationally related to public welfare, then ordinance was void from the outset.Court properly sustained intervenors' objection to agreed settlement order, as village has no authority to declare any ordinance unconstitutional.(FITZGERALD SMITH and COBBS, concurring.)
Section 10-8-505(a) of Municipal Code of Chicago, prohibiting the sale of tickets near a stadium or playing field, is rationally related to the City's interests in public safety and welfare. That Section does not violate the first amendment's overbreadth doctrine on its face. It is within powers of City to regulate use of streets and other municipal property and to regulate traffic and sales on the street. (ROCHFORD and LAMPKIN, concurring.)
Court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs, which operated to strike down City of Chicago Other Tobacco Products Tax Ordinance. Court found that City's home rule authority to enact ordinance was preempted by Section 8-11-6a(2) of Illinois Municipal Code. Because City had enacted a tax on cigarettes prior to July 1, 1993, it fulfilled the condition of the statute that "a tax" exist on either the number of units of cigarettes or tobacco products. Thus, City is not preempted from now enacting a tax on other tobacco products. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)