Local Government Law

Dispute over the amount of control and oversight the County Board has over County Veterans Assistance Commission (VAC) operations under Military Veterans Act. Plaintiff, as VAC superintendent, reviewed and approved his attorney's unredacted itemized invoice, and when he presented Warrant No. 16-4 demanding payment of invoice, there were sufficient funds in 2016 Administrative Fund to pay those expense, and thus Warrant should have been processed and paid shortly after it was submitted. Plaintiff established that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus, directing Defendants to pay remaining balance due, plus interest due, from unreserved fund account. Superintendent of VAC has authority for approval of itemized statements. Defendants failed to show that any policies prohibited them from paying any unredacted invoices. Plaintiff failed to establish a clear right to payment of Warrant No. 16-5; at presentment of invoice, fiscal year 2016 had closed, and VAC had exhausted its 2016 Administrative Fund. (GOLDENHERSH and CHAPMAN, concurring.)

Plaintiffs, residents of village, filed suit alleging that village ordinance adopted a few days prior, permitting large-scale horse boarding operations on residential property throughout the village, violated substantive due process because it was passed for the benefit of one resident only (who had been cited for violation of previous ordinance which prohibited such operations) and was not rationally related to public health, safety, or welfare of village.  Court erred in dismissing substantive due process challenge at the pleading stage. Parties should have opportunity to put forward their respective positions on justifications for ordinances, or lack thereof, in trial court. Allegations are appropriately suited to a facial challenge. If Plaintiffs can show that ordinance was not rationally related to public welfare, then ordinance was void from the outset.Court properly sustained intervenors' objection to agreed settlement order, as village has no authority to declare any ordinance unconstitutional.(FITZGERALD SMITH and COBBS, concurring.)

Section 10-8-505(a) of Municipal Code of Chicago, prohibiting the sale of tickets near a stadium or playing field, is rationally related to the City's interests in public safety and welfare. That Section does not violate the first amendment's overbreadth doctrine on its face. It is within powers of City to regulate use of streets and other municipal property and to regulate traffic and sales on the street. (ROCHFORD and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs, which operated to strike down City of Chicago Other Tobacco Products Tax Ordinance. Court found that City's home rule authority to enact ordinance was preempted by Section 8-11-6a(2) of Illinois Municipal Code.  Because City had enacted a tax on cigarettes prior to July 1, 1993, it fulfilled the condition of the statute that "a tax" exist on either the number of units of cigarettes or tobacco products. Thus, City is not preempted from now enacting a tax on other tobacco products. (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Defendant, a former employee, breached restrictive covenant by opening a dance studio within 25 miles of Plaintiff's facility and soliciting students and/or teachers via customer list. Employment-based restrictive covenants lasting "not less than" 5 and "not less than" 3 years mean 5 and 3 years (and not a day less) respectively. Court is unable to determine whether employment-based restrictive covenants lasting 3 and 5 years are reasonable in their temporal scope. (CARTER and HOLDRIDGE, concurring.)