Local Government Law

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-City’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-adult bookstores’ challenge to defendant’s ordinance that required plaintiffs to remain closed between midnight and 10:00 am every day and all day Sunday. Defendant’s sole justification for ordinance (i.e. instant closings fostered fewer armed robberies at or near adult bookstores) was weak, where change in number of armed robberies was small, and defendant’s submitted data did not show that robberies were more likely at adult bookstores than other late-night retail outlets that were not subject to ordinance’s closing hours. Moreover, ordinance could not regulate secondary effects of speech by closing down adult bookstores altogether. Fact that adult store customers are free to patronize adult bookstores during hours they were allowed to be open did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying EEOC’s motion for summary judgment that challenged defendant-employer’s affirmative defense, where defendant sought dismissal of underlying discrimination claim on ground that EEOC failed to satisfy mandate under 42 USC section 2000e-5(b) to make good faith effort to settle underlying claim prior to filing lawsuit in court. Any alleged failure to conciliate underlying discrimination claim is not affirmative defense to merits of underlying claim since: (1) conciliation, as set forth in section 2000e-5(b), is informal process entrusted solely to EEOC’s expert judgment; and (2) any meaningful review regarding whether EEOC negotiated in good faith would require prohibited inquiry into substantive reasonableness of particular settlement offers.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs-bar owners’ motions for preliminary and permanent injunction in action alleging that defendants’ ordinance prohibiting smoking in most public places violated their due process and equal protection rights, as well as violated plaintiffs’ freedom of association rights under federal and Indiana constitutions. Because smoking is not fundamental right, applicable standard for upholding ordinance is rational basis, and plaintiffs did not satisfy said standard, where plaintiffs did not negate every conceivable basis that might support instant ordinance, since Dist. Ct. could properly credit defendants' expert opinion regarding health concerns associated with secondhand smoke, and since defendants could have believed that instant ordinance would encourage more smokers to quit. Fact that defendants exempted tobacco specialty bars from ordinance did not require different result, where patrons in said specialty bars were not being involuntarily subjected to secondhand smoke, and where said specialty bars depended on tobacco sales. Ct further rejected plaintiffs’ claim that instant ordinance violated their freedom of association rights since socializing with friends at neighborhood bar did not qualify as either intimate or expressive association.