Local Government Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion by defendants-City alderman and City to dismiss instant section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights when alderman assaulted plaintiff after plaintiff had refused alderman’s directive to remove illegally parked car in front of plaintiff’s auto repair shop after alderman had received complaints about said cars. Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that alderman was acting under color of law during altercation since alderman had no authority to undertake any sort of enforcement action in response to complaints he had received about illegally parked cars.

In action challenging defendant's ordinance that required adult bookstores to be closed all day Sunday and between midnight and 10 a.m. on other days, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of said ordinance where defendant supported ordinance with only one study that concluded that dispersing adult stores reduced crime in different city. Instant study was inadequate to support instant ordinance under intermediate scrutiny standard since study did not pertain to restrictions imposed by instant ordinance and did not account for other variables that could have supported ordinance's goal of reducing crime. Moreover, plaintiffs' submission of arrest data showed that number of arrests near plaintiffs' stores did not go down when applicable ordinance took effect.

Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Chicago disorderly conduct ordinance that made it crime for individuals to fail to disburse from group when ordered to do so by police where at same time three or more other individuals in group were engaging in disorderly conduct. Although plaintiffs had been charged with violation of said ordinance, plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge facial constitutionality of said ordinance where record showed that plaintiffs had not actually violated said ordinance, and where police otherwise had no reason to arrest and charge plaintiffs with violation of instant ordinance.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in action alleging that plaintiff-City employee was terminated from his position on Bd. of Fire and Police Commission in retaliation for speaking to mayor about sexual harassment concerns raised by his daughter who was member of police force and/or for encouraging his daughter to file EEOC charge. Plaintiff's speech concerned only private matter, and plaintiff otherwise failed to inform mayor that daughter's concerns pertained to sexual harassment or that he had encouraged daughter to file EEOC charge. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim, alleging that plaintiff breached fiduciary duty under Bd. of Fire and Police Commissioners' statutes (BFPC) by hiring police officers recommended by mayor where plaintiff knew that said officers were not qualified. BFPC statutes do not provide for liability for BFPC commissioners such as plaintiff, and Dist. Ct. improperly inferred existence of fiduciary duty under BFPC statutes. Moreover, record failed to contain evidence of any quid pro quo arrangement between plaintiff and mayor to constitute conflict of interest..

Dist Ct. did not err in dismissing on lack of ripeness grounds, plaintiff's lawsuit seeking declaration that defendant-Village did not have proper authority to either purchase certain utility company assets through memorandum of understanding between parties or to condemn said assets, even though voters had previously passed referendum allowing defendant to pay up to certain amount for said assets. Plaintiff's lawsuit was not ripe where: (1) plaintiff failed to show that defendant had actually contemplated use of eminent domain powers to obtain said assets in five years since referendum had passed; and (2) plaintiff would be able to raise merits of instant lawsuit in any future condemnation proceeding. Ct further found that plaintiff could not rely on existence of MOU to support ability of Dist. Ct. to resolve instant dispute where MOU listed state circuit court in its forum selection clause.