Local Government Law

Court properly granted summary judgment to People on its quo warranto complaint, ousting Defendant from three public offices (park district commissioner, alderman, and school board member). Conflicting statutory duties of three offices rendered offices incompatible, and Defendant's service of more than three years in the three offices, and election to offices by voters, did not prevent ouster on basis of incompatibility. Although individual taxpayer originally filed suit, court properly allowed State to intervene as matter of right, and to file amended complaint to correct deficiencies in initial complaint. (QUINN and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Court affirmed decision of Municipal Electoral Board to invalidate nomination papers filed by new political party and its slate of candidates for municipal election, finding nomination papers invalid as the petition sheets identified "MVP Party" yet statements of candidacy were on forms with the heading "nonpartisan". As "nonpartisan" did not appear on petition sheets, and as petition sheets informed signers of name of party, candidates should have been allowed place on ballot. Doctrine of laches inapplicable, as Petitioners filed notice of appeal eight days after circuit court's decision, and motion for expedited appeal was granted; and no prejudice resulted from any delay, as even if Petitioners had filed notice of appeal day after circuit court decision, ballots would still have had to be reprinted. (GARCIA and McBRIDE, concurring.

Court properly granted preliminary injunction in favor of Defendants county, county board, and board members, in controversery over whether Circuit Clerk may use monies in "special funds" to pay personnel costs. County showed that it had a clearly ascertained right in need of protection, with no adequate remedy at law, and showed a likelihood of success on the merits. County raised a fair question about the Clerk's obligation to operate her office within budgetary appropriations, and a fair question that she is not paying enough of her office expenses out of the special funds. Plain language of statutes indicates that personnel costs, including compensation of data entry personnel, are properly paid from special funds, with Clerk having discretion as to allocation of funds to various tasks. (McLAREN and HUTCHINSON, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 3/1/11.) Candidate for alderman was found to be in debt to City for $600 in parking tickets, and was thus ineligible for candidacy under Section 3.1-10-5(b) of Municipal Code. That section contains no requirement that a candidate must have received sufficient notice of debt, and thus Board of Elections erred in allowing candidate's name to appear on ballot by reason of insufficient notice. (HOWSE and EPSTEIN, concurring.)

Plaintiffs filed declaratory judgment action seeking declaration that Blair Assault Weapons Ban, a Cook County ordinance, was unconstitutional. Upon reconsideration of its prior judgment, in light of recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago, court affirmed its dismissal of the remaining counts in Plaintiffs' complaint. Ordinance is sufficiently detailed and substantially related to an important government objective; it is a ban on a subcategory of dangerous and unusual weapons, specifically identified and beyond ordinary handguns used for self-defense. Ordinance is sufficiently tailored and not impermissibly valgue even though it is broadly drawn; it is limited in restriction to certain rapid-firing or high-capacity arms. Insufficient facts alleged to show that Ordinance violates equal protection. (QUINN and NEVILLE, concurring.)

The one-year statute of limitations in Section 8-101(a) of Tort Immunity Act does not apply to cause of action for damages per Section 1-4-7 of Municipal Code. Language in Section 2-101(e) of Tort Immunity Act which states that nothing in the Act affects the liability of a local public entity or employee based on Section 1-4-7 of Municipal Code obviates the application of this one-year statute of limitations to Plaintiff's wrongful-demolition action. Plaintiff's suit for wrongful demolition is thus not barred by the one-year statute of limitations of Section 8-101(a) of Tort Immunity Act. (CHAPMAN and GOLDENHERSH, concurring.)