Local Government Law

Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Chicago disorderly conduct ordinance that made it crime for individuals to fail to disburse from group when ordered to do so by police where at same time three or more other individuals in group were engaging in disorderly conduct. Although plaintiffs had been charged with violation of said ordinance, plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge facial constitutionality of said ordinance where record showed that plaintiffs had not actually violated said ordinance, and where police otherwise had no reason to arrest and charge plaintiffs with violation of instant ordinance.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in action alleging that plaintiff-City employee was terminated from his position on Bd. of Fire and Police Commission in retaliation for speaking to mayor about sexual harassment concerns raised by his daughter who was member of police force and/or for encouraging his daughter to file EEOC charge. Plaintiff's speech concerned only private matter, and plaintiff otherwise failed to inform mayor that daughter's concerns pertained to sexual harassment or that he had encouraged daughter to file EEOC charge. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim, alleging that plaintiff breached fiduciary duty under Bd. of Fire and Police Commissioners' statutes (BFPC) by hiring police officers recommended by mayor where plaintiff knew that said officers were not qualified. BFPC statutes do not provide for liability for BFPC commissioners such as plaintiff, and Dist. Ct. improperly inferred existence of fiduciary duty under BFPC statutes. Moreover, record failed to contain evidence of any quid pro quo arrangement between plaintiff and mayor to constitute conflict of interest..

Dist Ct. did not err in dismissing on lack of ripeness grounds, plaintiff's lawsuit seeking declaration that defendant-Village did not have proper authority to either purchase certain utility company assets through memorandum of understanding between parties or to condemn said assets, even though voters had previously passed referendum allowing defendant to pay up to certain amount for said assets. Plaintiff's lawsuit was not ripe where: (1) plaintiff failed to show that defendant had actually contemplated use of eminent domain powers to obtain said assets in five years since referendum had passed; and (2) plaintiff would be able to raise merits of instant lawsuit in any future condemnation proceeding. Ct further found that plaintiff could not rely on existence of MOU to support ability of Dist. Ct. to resolve instant dispute where MOU listed state circuit court in its forum selection clause.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendant-City breached option contract to allow plaintiffs to buy back property that defendant had initially purchased from plaintiffs in anticipation of defendant constructing flood control project where defendants eventually told plaintiff that they could not exercise said option where flood control project was abandoned by defendant and defendant had constructed highway on said land. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in reforming contract to give plaintiffs more time to exercise option since plaintiffs would not be able to use said land given construction of highway on said land. Thus, remand was required to determine value of land immediately prior to construction of highway and to compare said value with cost to repurchase land.