Real Estate Law

Court issued a tax deed for commercial property in Aurora to Petitioner, over objections of Respondent, who had leased one of the units at the property to Petitioner and his wife. Petitioner had no interest that would prevent issuance of tax deed to him. Lease did not obligate Petitioner to pay property taxes, and thus his status as a lessee did not prevent him from obtaining a tax deed. Petitioner submitted evidence of Respondent's anticipatory repudiation of contract to purchase, which were definite and unequivocal manifestations of its intent not to perform under the agreement.Judicial estoppel is not applicable, as Petitioner did not take factually inconsistent positions. (HUDSON and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

After bench trial, court properly entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff real estate brokerage firm on its quantum meruit claim that Defendant failed to compensate it for brokerage services it provided to Defendant in the purchase of commercial real estate. Defendant purchased off-market real estate based on information provided to him by Plaintiff's broker and for which Plaintiff was not compensated. Plaintiff's broker introduced property to Defendant and acted as his agent throughout negotiations until Defendant decided he would structure deal in a different manner through suggestions of seller, without Plaintiff's knowledge and permission.Plaintiff's recovery was limited to the reasonable amount by which trial court found Defendant was unjustly enriched at Plaintiff's expense.(McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)

Plaintiffs filed negligence suit against Village and developer of subdivision where their home, which they alleged sustained structural damage due to drainage problems. Court properly dismissed suit against developers, as Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under annexation agreement either as successor owners or as 3rd-party beneficiaries. Court properly granted summary judgment to Village, as it was immune from suit under Tort Immunity Act, as to actions in determining policy when acting in exercise of discretion. Remedial measures by Village work crews were discretionary in nature, and workers decided their actions were sufficient to fill in sinkhole and in other steps in repair process. (PUCINSKI and HYMAN, concurring.)

In order to fall within the narrow exception to the general rule that a nonparty has no standing to file a Section 2-1401 petition, the nonparty must be injured by the judgment at the time of its entry. A nonparty to a tax deed proceeding that has such an interest in the property that it would be entitled to redeem the property would fit an exception to the general rule that a nonparty may not file a Section 2-1401 petition. As other Petitioner no longer had any interest in the property when he filed his Section 2-1401 petition, the principle os standing preclude him from bringing the petition. (GOLDENHERSH and OVERSTREET, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed breach of contract action arising out of Defendant's error in publishing a notice with wrong hearing date for Plaintiff's application for a tax deed. Plaintiff alleged that error caused court to deny its tax deed application in a separate proceeding. Jury verdict for Defendant, finding that Plaintiff failed to perform all its obligations under the contract. Court properly denied Plaintiff's motion for directed verdict. Court properly gave Defendant's non-IPI instruction as to previous course of dealing, which created mutual obligations on the parties. (HALL and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Plaintiff attempted to enforce a note and guaranty executed by Defendants in connection with purchase of a horse farm. Court properly granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. The 5-year survival period for causes of action by or against a dissolved corporation is inapplicable and assignment of note and guaranty did not discharge the guarantors' obligations. Court properly found that, even if defense of usury was not waived, it would not be applicable to this case because of mortgage exception to the Interest Act. (McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring.)

After bench trial, court entered judgment for Plaintiff and found that fair cash value of commercial office space in question was $7.3 million. Plaintiff had disputed assessor's valuation of property at $10.4 million. Court's finding that valuations of Plaintiff's expert were more credible and persuasive than Defendant's expert was not against manifest weight of evidence. Defense expert's criticism of Plaintifrf's expert's discounted cash flow analysis was relevant to weight of testimony and analysis. Court was moved primarily by fact of arm's length sale of property during and just after end of relevant tax year, finding that fair market value of property was the amount of that sale.(BURKE and GORDON, concurring.)