Paliatka v. Bush
Court properly dismissed complaint with prejudice, as Plaintiff was unable to state a cause of action for an equitable mortgage, as Plaintiff stated that there was no written agreement subrogating him to the original mortgage on the property. Plaintiff does not meet requirements for contractual subrogation, as no evidence of an express agreement, and he did not record his lien. No debt, duty, or obligation is owed to Plaintiff, and thus he cannot state a cause of action for an equitable lien. (HOWSE and LAVIN, concurring.)
Public Act 100-659
Public Act 100-654
Squires-Cannon v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County
Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim plaintiffs-property owners’ action alleging that defendant-Forest Preserve’s passing of ordinance creating forest preserve district for lands that included plaintiffs’ estate violated 5th Amendment’s Takings Clause, since enactment of ordinance did not constitute regulatory taking and did not otherwise effect actual acquisition of subject estate. Moreover, defendant’s purchase and foreclosure on mortgage covering said estate did not constitute unconstitutional taking, since: (1) defendant was merely exercising its contractual right to obtain said estate, as opposed to exercising any governmental prerogative; and (2) terms of mortgage note allowed lender to assign note to anyone without plaintiffs’ consent. Dist. Ct. also did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment action against attorney arising out of plaintiffs’ claim that said attorney did not disclose his relationship with Forest Preserve during negotiations with plaintiffs for agreement on deed in lieu of foreclosure. Plaintiffs had failed to allege any plausible damage arising out of attorney’s alleged conduct, where plaintiffs’ had defaulted on mortgage note that was eventually assigned to Forest Preserve.
Public Act 100-616
(Unes, R-Peoria; Koehler, D-Peoria) amends the Service Member Residential Property Act. It provides that if a service member who has entered into a residential lease covered by this Act is killed in action or on active duty, then the immediate family or dependents of the service member may terminate the lease. Effective July 20, 2018.
Muirhead Hui L.L.C. v. Forest Preserve District of Kane County
In 2003, Plaintiffs sold some parcels of land to Defendant Forest Preserve District. Along with other persons, total land sold to District was 531.8 acres. Eventually, the deeds were rerecorded and the restrictive covenant language removed. Plaintiffs filed complaint against District, and court properly dismissed complaint, as Plaintiffs lack standing. Plaintiffs are not successors to the interest of the Illinois Department of Natural Resources and its agreement with the Forest Preserve District. (BURKE and SPENCE, concurring.)
Senate Bill 2958
(Althoff, R-Crystal Lake; Martwick, D-Chicago) provides that the notice of tax lien must also include the county or counties where the real property of the debtor to which the lien will attach is located. Provides that a tax lien that is filed in the registry must be attached to all of the existing and after-acquired real and personal property of the debtor. Passed both chambers.
Boucher v. 111 East Chestnut Condominium Assoc.
Owner of condo unit filed complaint alleging that condo board members and Association (HOA) violated the Condominium Property Act by fining him for expressing his opinions about condo management. Plaintiff adequately alleged that board members violated the Act by penalizing him for expressing his opinions. Plaintiff presented evidence that could support a finding that board members violated Act when denying his request for recording of disciplinary hearing, and that HOA and board members breached fiduciary duties in failing to disclose to Plaintiff the evidence against him. A plaintiff states a cause of action against HOA for violation of his right to free speech by alleging that association precluded him from expressing his political opinion or that HOA penalized him for expressing his opinions. (PUCINSKI, concurring; MASON, dissenting.)
Hussey v. Chase Manor Condominium Assoc.
An informal pathway behind a condo building, through and beyond a parking area to the rear entrance of the building is not a “sidewalk” under the Snow and Ice Removal Act’s immunity provision for removal of snow or ice from a “sidewalk”. A “sidewalk”, within meaning of the Act, is limited to the municipal right-of-way, the part of the public street reserved for pedestrian use that abuts private residential property. (BURKE and GORDON, concurring.)