Traffic/DUI

Court properly granted summary judgment for City in personal injury action from pedestrian who slipped and fell on large metal plate when crossing street in falling snow and heavy pedestrian traffic. Plaintiff was not an intended user of street outside of a marked crosswalk. City's intent that pedestrians use marked crosswalk was not altered by presence of snow, regardless of whether crosswalk lines were not visible because of snow. (PALMER and TAYLOR, concurring.)

Defendant was charged by indictment with driving while license suspended (DWLS), charged as Class 2 felony. State was allowed to amend indictment to allege driving during statutory summary suspension (SSS). Indictment was improperly modified by order reducing charge to misdemeanor, after Defendant argued that SSS had been entered when his license had already been revoked. For purposes of DWLS law, driving privileges that have been revoked are subject to SSS while revocation remains in effect. (JORGENSEN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of DUI. Court properly admitted results of lab report showing Defendant's blood alcohol level as a business records exception to hearsay rule. Statutory provision allowing introduction of medical records in prosecution of DUI cases in Section 11-501.4 of Illinois Vehicle Code survives enactment of Illinois Rules of Evidence, and is not affected or modified by those Rules. State met its burden of establishing probability that evidence (Defendant's blood which was drawn and tested) was not compromised, and Defendant produced no actual evidence of tampering, alteration, or substitution, and thus any alleged deficiencies in chain of custody went to weight and not admissibility of blood tested. (GORDON and McBRIDE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 10/2/13.) Defendant was charged with DUI and blocking a roadway. Court suppressed arrest on grounds of unlawful seizure and lack of probable cause. Defendant was not seized when officer briefly activated his emergency equipment and parked behind him after making U-turn, out of safety concerns. Seizure occurred only when the officer had observed evidence of his intoxication. Officer's conduct did not rise to level of seizure where he did not draw his weapon, did not touch Defendant, and did not use language or tone of voice to indicate Defendant must comply with his requests. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant's arrest for DUI was supported by probable cause, as facts were ample for a reasonably cautious person to believe that Defendant had committed DUI. Defendant admitted that he was drunk and that he had just been driving, and admissions were corroborated in numerous substantial respects Defendant was swaying, he had been in unexplained one-car accident, officer saw that vehicle was damaged. (SCHOSTOK and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of DUI after bench trial. Court properly found that Defendant, who failed three field sobriety tests, was in actual physical control of his parked vehicle when officers found him alone and asleep in driver's seat while engine running. Possession of ignition key is one of numerous factors court weighs, on a case-by-case basis, to determine actual physical control. Officer's testimony that vehicle was running supported reasonable inference that Defendant was capable of driving his vehicle.(HALL and REYES, concurring.)

In DUI trial, court erred by submitting non-IPI jury instruction which included calculations for conversion factor for blood serum alcohol content to whole blood alcohol content, because it did not comply with rules of evidence as to judicial notice. Instruction was testimonial as it included calculations for jury using formula that included a contested fact, the Defendant's actual blood serum level, multiplied by conversion factor.(CARTER and HOLDRIDGE, concurring.)