Traffic/DUI

Defendant was charged with aggravated DUI and aggravated driving while license revoked. Court properly granted Defendant's motion to quash arrest and to suppress evidence, as police officer lacked probable cause to stop Defendant's vehicle. Officer testified that he saw Defendant's tires twice "barely" cross the striped lane divider between two northbound lanes of traffic, for a matter of seconds, followed him for awhile, did not see any other traffic violations, and then pulled vehicle over. A momentary and minimal veering over a lane line does not necessarily mean a driver is driving in more than one lane of traffic. Officer's testimony failed to establish a reasonable belief that Defendant was actually driving in two lanes and was thus in violation of statute prohibiting improper lane usage. (O'BRIEN, concurring; SCHMIDT, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of felony driving on revoked license after bench trial. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, as counsel failed to file motion to suppress the revoked license which would likely have been granted. Police officer testified that he saw Defendant driving only for 20-25 seconds before he pulled over into "No Parking" zone, but Defendant and passenger remained in the car, and City of Chicago ordinance defines "No Parking" zones as requiring that vehicles not be left unoccupied there. Officer turned on his flashing lights when he pulled behind vehicle, and this was a display of force such that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave nor to refuse to produce license and insurance card. Thus, Defendant, who produced his state ID, leading officer to learn that his license was revoked, was subjected to unlawful seizure of his revoked license. (KARNEZIS and CONNORS, concurring.)

Defendant was arrested for DUI, after being stopped at a "sobriety checkpoint", and refused alcohol blood testing, resulting in statutory summary suspension (SSS) of his drivers license. Court properly denied his petition to rescind SSS. Officer noticed nothing unusual about Defendant's driving, but detected a "faint" odor coming from vehicle, and noticed he had "glossy" eyes; and Defendant admitted having consumed one beer. These circumstances were sufficient to create reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant was driving under the influence. (BOWMAN and O'MALLEY, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with DUI, after state trooper approached vehicle which had been parked on the shoulder of highway with headlights off, and odor of alcohol was present when driver rolled his window down to speak with officer. Officer testified that he activated his emergency lights, when stopping to see if assistance was needed, as it was dark and there was a lot of traffic. Objective facts of record fall within "community caretaking" exception to Fourth Amendment, rendering trooper's assumed seizure of Defendant reasonable. Once he detected odor of alcohol, officer had reasonable suspicion to further detain and investigate. (KILBRIDE, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with felony driving while license revoked. Police officer stopped Defendant at 7:13 p.m. on a Sunday after he ran license plate check, found that vehicle owner's license was revoked, and saw that photograph resembled driver, and that owner had a restricted driving permit (RDP) but could not tell terms of RDP. Officer was not required to have a reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant was not in compliance with the terms of his RDP, as that is not an element of the offense of driving while license revoked. Facts available to officer, including that Defendant was wearing a tank top, baseball cap, and sunglasses, and officer's knowledge that RDPs are typically issued for work or hardship, were sufficient to create the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to effect a Terry stop (FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and KARMEIER, concurring; BURKE, dissenting.)

Defendant was cited for DUI in 2002, and released on $20,000 recognizance bond; he failed to appear at court date and bond was ordered forfeited. Warrant was issued but never served; in 2007, Defendant filed Section 2-1401 petition to vacate bond forfeiture. Court set pretrial date upon Defendant's motion to reconsider denial of his petition. Court properly dismissed State's Section 2-1401 petition to vacate order setting pretrial date. Although bond forfeiture might be final as to the money judgment, no final criminal conviction had entered. Court derived its subject matter jurisdiction from the Illinois Constitution, and had authority to hear and rule on Defendant's petition. (O'MALLEY and HUDSON, concurring.)

Following bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of speeding. Trial court erred in permitting the officer who ticketed Defendant to testify that he measured Defendant's speed using a radar device, as radar device was used more than 500 feet from speed limit sign. Evidence was insufficient to find Defendant guilty of municipal ordinance by preponderance of the evidence, as officer did not supply an admissible estimate of Defendant's actual speed, but only that in his opinion Defendant was driving at a "high rate of speed." (BURKE, concurring; ZENOFF, dissenting.)

Defendant, whose license was summarily suspended after refusing Breathalyzer test, filed malicious prosecution action against arresting officer. Drivers' license SSS proceedings are summary civil proceedings, during which police reports can be relied upon in absence of the officers. No collateral estoppel preclusive effect, including determination of probable cause, should be given as the result of such proceedings. (FITZGERALD, FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with DUI and refused chemical testing; his license was suspended for 12 months per statutory summary suspension (SSS). Court denied State's request to introduce Defendant's testimony from SSS rescission hearing as part of its case in chief at trial. The constitution does not prohibit the State from introducing Defendant's civil SSS hearing testimony in his criminal DUI prosecution; and Defendant's testimony at rescission hearing was not considered compelled in violation of his constitutional rights, as the potential risk of losing driving privileges does not rise to the level of an "impermissible penalty" imposed by the government. If a Defendant chooses to testify at his SSS rescission hearing, he must do so knowing that his testimony may be used against him in the underlying criminal action. (MYERSCOUGH and STEIGMANN, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 8/27/10.) Defendant was convicted of aggravated DUI and reckless homicide; he hit another vehicle head-on in lane of oncoming traffic while travelling at a high rate of speed. Nurse, in presence of state trooper at while Defendant was at the hospital, obtained urine specimen and blood sample from Defendant, and tests showed levels of cocaine high enough to be fatal, and cannabis and numerous prescription medications in his system. Defense counsel was not ineffective by stipulating to the existence of the State's evidence, as counsel specifically stated that he was not stipulating that the evidence was sufficient to prove the Defendant's guilt; and counsel preserved objection to the admittance of blood and urine samples into evidence during the stipulated bench trial. Amendment to Administrative Code as to method for taking blood draws is procedural, not substantive, and court properly admitted results of blood and urine tests into evidence. (DONOVAN and SPOMER, concurring.)