Traffic/DUI

Plaintiff was ticketed, by lake association security officer, for speeding while driving on a road on private lake community grounds. Association was within its authority in establishing and enforcing speed limits on Association property, and security officers were not attempting to unlawfully assert police powers in issuing traffic citations. Officer had probable cause to believe that offense was committed, in clocking Plaintiff's speed at 34 mph in 25 mph private road; and probable cause is absolute bar to claim for false imprisonment. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

In a trial for violation of Section 6-303 of Vehicle Code, for Class 4 felony of driving while license suspended or revoked, allows court to determine whether Defendant misled authorities into reinstating his driving privileges by purposefully providing incorrect information or concealing information. Court improperly declared that Section 6-303 was unconstitutional, as it was not necessary to reach question of constitutionality of statute to decide question of case. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant, then age 16, was convicted of two counts of aggravated reckless driving, and sentenced to 24 months imprisonment. When driving over 100 mph on country road, she lost control and struck utility pole, and two passengers were killed. Concurrent jurisdiction statute, which vests prosecutors with discretion to charge certain crimes as adult or juvenile offenses, did not violate eighth amendment rights or proportionality clause of Illinois Constitution. Excessive speed, together with location and road condition, showed conscious disregard for her surroundings, sufficient for necessary mental state for conviction. Sentence, in middle of sentencing range, was not an abuse of discretion, given great risk of conduct and that two deaths occurred as a result. (WRIGHT and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 1/14/13.) Village police officer issued traffic citations to Defendant, including for DUI. Before trial, Village amended citations to strike out State of Illinois as prosecuting authority and replace it with Village, but did not amend citations to allege only violations of municipal code. Village did not acquire authority to prosecute Defendant for DUI under Vehicle Code, and State did not give its permission to allow Village to prosecute. DUI conviction is thus reversed due to lapse in prosecutorial authority. (LYTTON and McDADE, concurring.)

Error of the Secretary of State, as to improper length of suspension, is not a proper basis for rescission of statutory summary suspension. (ZENOFF, concurring; McLAREN, specially concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/10/12.) Vehicle Code requires an appropriate signal be used when a vehicle makes a turn, changes lanes, encroaches onto the other side of the street, and leaves the roadway. Moving within a single traffic lane, including moving as far right within the lane as possible, does not require a signal, and to have made traffic stop only on that basis would not be sufficient for probable cause, for purposes of ruling on a motion to suppress. (LYTTON, concurring; WRIGHT, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)