Traffic/DUI

Defendant was charged with DUI, and statutory summary suspension (SSS) of his license commenced. Two days later, Defendant was charged with driving on a suspended license, but SSS was rescinded six days later. For crime of driving on suspended license, rescission of SSS is of prospective effect only. Subsequent order of rescission of SSS does not render invalid charge of driving on suspended license. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Administrative hearing officer in city found Defendant liable for red light violation, based on red light camera video recording. City had statutory authority to enact its own ordinance automated traffic law enforcement system, to impose liability for violation of Vehicle Code or local provision, and for adjudicating violations. City had authority to create code hearing unit to hear traffic violation cases.(GORDON and PALMER, concurring.)

Court properly granted summary judgment for City in personal injury action from pedestrian who slipped and fell on large metal plate when crossing street in falling snow and heavy pedestrian traffic. Plaintiff was not an intended user of street outside of a marked crosswalk. City's intent that pedestrians use marked crosswalk was not altered by presence of snow, regardless of whether crosswalk lines were not visible because of snow. (PALMER and TAYLOR, concurring.)

Defendant was charged by indictment with driving while license suspended (DWLS), charged as Class 2 felony. State was allowed to amend indictment to allege driving during statutory summary suspension (SSS). Indictment was improperly modified by order reducing charge to misdemeanor, after Defendant argued that SSS had been entered when his license had already been revoked. For purposes of DWLS law, driving privileges that have been revoked are subject to SSS while revocation remains in effect. (JORGENSEN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of DUI. Court properly admitted results of lab report showing Defendant's blood alcohol level as a business records exception to hearsay rule. Statutory provision allowing introduction of medical records in prosecution of DUI cases in Section 11-501.4 of Illinois Vehicle Code survives enactment of Illinois Rules of Evidence, and is not affected or modified by those Rules. State met its burden of establishing probability that evidence (Defendant's blood which was drawn and tested) was not compromised, and Defendant produced no actual evidence of tampering, alteration, or substitution, and thus any alleged deficiencies in chain of custody went to weight and not admissibility of blood tested. (GORDON and McBRIDE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 10/2/13.) Defendant was charged with DUI and blocking a roadway. Court suppressed arrest on grounds of unlawful seizure and lack of probable cause. Defendant was not seized when officer briefly activated his emergency equipment and parked behind him after making U-turn, out of safety concerns. Seizure occurred only when the officer had observed evidence of his intoxication. Officer's conduct did not rise to level of seizure where he did not draw his weapon, did not touch Defendant, and did not use language or tone of voice to indicate Defendant must comply with his requests. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)