Workers’ Compensation Law

Workers' Compensation Commission erred in failing to determine whether claimant was entitled to permanent partial disability (PPD) benefit award based on wage differential calculation, rather than percentage of a person as a whole award. Employer stipulated that claimant could no longer meet physical demands of his usual and customary line of work as dockworker/truck driver. Although claimant did not pursue PPD benefits, record contains evidence relevant to claimant's entitlement to wage differential award. Claimant's request for PTD (permanent and total disability) benefrits should not be construed as election as to his rights to PPD benefits.(HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.)

Plaintiff employee was injured in work-related vehicle accident in which a third party was at fault. Circuit court correctly ruled, sua sponte, that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide controversy in declaratory judgment action filed asking court to decide whether Plaintiff could seek additional benefits under Workers' Compensation Act, following Plaintiff's settlement of a third-party tort claim that arose from workplace accident. Issues of Plaintiff's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits and Defendants' (City and its workers' compensation insurer) defenses to claim fall within exclusive jurisdiction of Workers' Compensation Commission. Circuit court's jurisdiction in this controversy is "appellate only", not concurrent.(SCHWARM and MOORE, concurring.)

Employee worked as water and sewer inspector for Village. Employee sustained elbow injury in 2006, during his work duty of replacing a water meter on parcel of property in Village. Commission's decision to deny employee TTD benefits after his voluntary retirement 6 months after accident is not against manifest weight of evidence. Sufficient evidence in record to support Commission's determination that employee failed to meet his burden of providing his entitlement to PTD benefits based on "odd lot" theory. Employee failed to establish prejudice in Commission's failure to answer questions he submitted purusant to Section 19(e) of Workers' Compensation Act. (HOLDRIDGE, HUDSON, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

When a traveling employee is exposed to a certain risk while working, he is presumed to have been exposed to a greater degree than the general public. Employee, who was a plumbing inspector for city, was exposed to risk of traversing a curb to a greater degree than a member of general public by virtue of status as a traveling employee at time of accident. Injury employee suffered when tripping over curb was sustained in course of his employment and arose out of his employment. (HOLDRIDGE, HUDSON, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 2/25/15.) Employee, a car hauler who delivers new cars to car dealerships, was preparing to begin his regular commute to his employer's premises a time of his injury. He was required to driver to Belvidere facility first, load 18-wheeler truck with cars, and then drive truck to various dealerships. Thus, when driving to Belvidere facility, he was not making brief and unnecessary stop, but was making a regular commute from his home to a fixed jobsite as a necessary precondition to any later work-related travel. Commission's finding that employee's injury did not arise out of or in course of his employment was not against manifest weight of evidence. (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 1/30/15.) Employee, who speaks Polish but not English, suffered work-related accident when he fell 11 feet from rooftop, and sustained injuries including traumatic brain injury and post-concussion syndrome. Commission found employee permanently and totally disabled, which was supported by rehab counselor's testimony that stable labor market did not exist for employee. Commission properly denied employer's motion to suspend benefits; employee reasonably chose to follow advice of his treating physician rather than that of IME physician. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

Circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to resolve disputed based on a referral agreement apportioning attorney fees earned in claim filed under Workers' Compensation Act. Workers' Compensation Act does not provide Industrial Commission with authority to hear and determine attorney fee dispute based on referral agreements between the parties. Act does not explicitly divest circuit courts of jurisdiction to consider claims in fee dispute by enacting comprehensive administrative scheme. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)