Workers’ Compensation Law

(Court opinion corrected 5/6/16.) Section 13-217 of Code of Civil Procedure, which allows a party to refile action within 1 year after action is dismissed for want of prosecution (regardless of whether statute of limitations has expired during pendency of original action) does not apply to workers' compensation claims that are dismissed for want of prosecution. When Workers' Compensation Commission dismisses a workers' compensation claim for want of prosecution, claimant has 60 days from receipt of dismissal order to file a petition for reinstatement. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.)

Claimant filed application for workers' compensation benefits for foot injuries sustained during work. Claimant developed blister on bottom of his left foot, after having to repeatedly push clutch down forcefully. After Claimant lanced blister using sterilized needle, he developed infection in foot which required several foot surgeries and partial amputation of one toe. Even if Claimant's lancing of blister was immediate cause of infection, the infection would not have occurred "but for" existence of work-related blister.  Thus, his employment remains a cause of his current condition of ill-being.(HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.)

The 30-month period for filing Section 19(h) petition ran from date of Workers' Compensation Commission's original decision, and was not affected by subsequent vacatur and reinstatement of that decision. Right to file application for review does not depend on whether award made is enforceable at time application is filed, except where there has been a final determination of court quashing the award.  There was no final determination of court quashing original award, Thus, Claimant's Section 19(h) petition was untimely as it was not filed within 30 months of original award. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.) 

An employer is not required to raise its Kotecki setoff limit or workers' compensation lien as an affirmative defense or before trial. As it was undisupted that Plaintiff was an injured employee receiving compensation under Workers Compensation Act from employer, there was no need for employer, who was third-party Defendant, to place issue before jury by pleading an affirmative defense, and court could address issue by posttrial motion.(O'BRIEN and McDADE, concurring.)

Plaintiff ambulance service company has its regular place of business in Indiana, but its drivers also make trips into Illinois to pick up patients and take them to Indiana for treatment. Plaintiff's employee, while in Illinois to pick up a patient, was injured in a car accident, and filed workers' compansation claims in Indiana and Illinois. Section 4(a)(3) of Workers' Compensation Act does not require Plaintiff to purchase separate workers' compensation insurance in Illinois to insure its entire liability, but requires that employer acquire mandated insurance from a carrier authorized, licensed or permitted to do insurance business in Illinois, and that insurance covers all employees and the entire compensation liability. Policy endorsement's exclusion is inapplicable, as Plaintiff had no other workers' compensation insurance coverage in Illinois and was not self-insured in Illinois, and as Illinois does not require that Plaintiff maintain a "separate" insurance policy for its liability under the Act.(REYES and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

City street light maintenance electrician employee filed for workers' compensation benefits for injuries to his left arm. Claimant acknowledged previous injury to his left shoulder (rotator cuff) which resulted in settled claim with employer for 30% loss of use of left arm. Commission awarded claimant benefits for 15.57 weeks, which was for 37.5% of loss of use of left arm minus a credit for 30% loss of use of same arm as a result of prior settlement. Medical records from prior injury indicate that surgery was limited to area near elbow, supporting Commission's finding of prior injury to arm. Commission properly awarded employer a credit per Section 8(e)(17) of Workers' Compensation Act, as prior settlement was under Section 8(e) of the Act, for partial loss of use of left arm. (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

A Chicago fire department paramedic trainee who was injured while participating in a training program may not sue the city and fire academy training staff for damages, after having obtained workers' compensation benefits for his injuries.  Plaintiff alleged that defendants intentionally injured him during paramedic training by forcing him to do rigorous physical exercise with minimal water breaks, resulting in dehydration and acute kidney failure. Once an employee has collected compensation on basis that his or her injuries were compensable under Workers' Compensation Act, the employee cannot then allege that those injuries fall outside the Act's provisions, such as by alleging that injuries were intentional torts. (PIERCE and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Plaintiff suffered injuries in motor vehicle accident while working as a truck driver for Defendants, and filed workers' compensation claim.  Commission affirmed arbitrator's decision awarding Plaintiff medical expenses and TTD benefits. Court properly dismissed Plaintiff's Section 19(g) application as premature, because a portion of the award was on judicial review before circuit court.  Court properly denied Defendants' motion for sanctions.  As Rule 137 is penal in nature, it is strictly construed.(McBRIDE and HOWSE, concurring.)

Claimant filed workers' compensation claim for low back injury he allegedly sustained while working for transportation company. Claimant owned his own truck and delivered loads for employer.  Claimant injured his low back in collision when he was driving his truck and a trailer belonging to employer on I-55 when he was rear-ended by 3 other vehicles.  Commission properly considered all relevant facts and circumstances and found that claimant was not an employee of employer, but was independent contractor.  Commission found that employer had very little right to control claimant's work, and this fact, with other factors, weighed against finding employment relationship. Although terms of "Contractor Service Agreement" expired and parties did not properly renew it, nothing changed and parties continued to act as if terms remained in effect.  (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)