Workers’ Compensation Law

The 9% judgment interest rate set forth in section 2-1303 of Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to a Workers' Compensation Commission award prior to the award being reduced to judgment by a circuit court pursuant to section 19(g) of Workers Compensation Act. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring).

(Court opinion corrected 2/7/18.) Court erred in denying employee's petition to intervene in action filed by her employer against Defendants as employee's subrogee pursuant to Section 5(b) of Workers' Compensation Act.Plaintiff had filed suit against Defendants after expiration of 2-year statute of limitations, and after her employer had timely filed its suit for damages as subrogee. Court's dismissal of employee's suit as time-barred does not act to bar, on res judicata grounds, her intervention in employer's timely filed case.(COBBS and FITZGERALD SMITH, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 11/14/17.)Plaintiff filed workers' compensation claim and a common law claim related to the same accident against the employer and a 3rd-party defendant. Parties entered into global settlement agreement in the civil action, which purported to settle both workers' compensation claim and the civil action. Arbitrator approved parties' settlement agreement and ordered Plaintiff to pay attorney fees to the 3 attorneys who had represented him at various times during Commission proceedings. Workers' Compensation Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes as to attorney fees arising out of the representation of a claimant in a workers' compensation case. Court properly dismissed Plaintiff's petition for judicial review for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, based on Plaintiff's failure to file an appeal bond under Section 19(f)(2) of Workers' Compensation Act. That bond requirement is not limited to employers, and is not limited to only compensation awards. (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, HARRIS, and MOORE, concurring.)

Claimant sought workers' compensation benefits for injury to her right shoulder. Arbitrator awarded TTD, PPD, and medical expenses. Respondent filed timely motion to recall arbitrator's decision to correct a clerical error. Arbitrator issued a corrected decision. Workers' Compensation Commission reversed arbitrator's decision, finding that claimant failed to prove that her injury arose out of and in course of her employment. Circuit court confirmed Commission's decision. Respondent employer failed to properly perfect review of arbitrator's decision by seeking review of arbitrator's original decision rather than the corrected decision. Because Commission issued a corrected decision, the original decision was not a final, appealable decision. Respondent employer never filed a petition requesting review of arbitrator's corrected decision within the statutorily-required period. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HARRIS, and MOORE, concurring.)

Claimant filed workers' compensation claim for injuries sustained when she fell on wet pavement at premises of her employer, a high school, while walking to her car on her way to lunch. Workers' Compensation Commission reversed arbitrator's decision awarding claimant TTD, PPD for 10% loss of person as a whole, and medical expenses. Accident is not compensable, as dangers created by rainfall are dangers to which all members of public are exposed on a regular basis. No evidence that employer exercised any control over route claimant took to her car, and no evidence that her job duties contributed to fall or enhanced risk of slipping on wet pavement. No evidence of any defects, uneven surfaces, or puddles on pavement's surface. Commission properly rejected claim under a neutral risk analysis.(HOFFMAN, HUDSON, HARRIS, and MOORE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, in 1996, of unlawful use of a weapon (UUW). The UUW statute under which Defendant was convicted is nearly identical to 2008 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute and 2010 UUW statute which Illinois Supreme Court has held are unconstitutional as violating the second amendment because they are overly broad. The 1996 UUW statute is facially unconstitutional and conviction is reversed. (LAVIN and COBBS, concurring.)

Claimant worked in employer's candy factory for 27 years. Claimant injured his back at work, and eight months later, soon after claimant returned to work, he reinjured his lower back. Claimant also served as a church pastor for 16 years, and was paid by church, at same time he was employed in candy factory. Commission properly excluded his earnings as a pastor from his average weekly wage calculation for purposes of determining his wage differential benefit. Claimant failed to prove that employer knew that he received payment for work as a pastor, so no requirement that wages earned as a pastor must be included as wages earned from employer under section 10. (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, HARRIS, and MOORE, concurring.)

Plaintiffs filed four putative class-action lawsuits against Defendants seeking redress for Defendants’ alleged failure to comply with requirements contained in the Workers’ Compensation Act. Defendants filed motions to dismiss each suit for failure to state claims, which Court granted with prejudice.  Plaintiffs had the burden of sufficiently pleading that Defendants and the employers they insured intentionally entered into the standard contract for the direct, and not merely incidental, benefit of Plaintiffs. Because they failed to do so, their claims that they were intended third-party beneficiaries were properly dismissed. Additionally, Court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims that that Defendants breached an implied in-fact contract, because there was no contract since consideration cannot flow from an act performed pursuant to preexisting legal duty.

Claimant, a  transportation operator, filed for workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained when chainmail strap on crane snapped loose and caused multiple injuries to his face, teeth, and chest.  Commission's decision to deny TTD benefits after claimant's termination, for failure to call in or report for work, was not against manifest weight of evidence.  Ample evidence support Commission's finding that, at time of termination, claimant's work-related injuries had stabilized, and that his injuries had no effect on his employment. (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, HARRIS, and MOORE, concurring.)