Workers’ Compensation Law

Exclusive remedy provisions of Workers' Compensation Act and Workers' Occupational Diseases Act bars an employee's action when the employee's injury or disease first manifests after the expiration of certain time limitations under those acts. Section 6(c) of Workers' Occupational Diseases Act acts as a statute of repose, and creates an absolute bar on right to bring a claim.(GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring; FREEMAN and KILBRIDE, dissenting.)

Employee, who worked as a mechanical assembler basic, filed worker's compensation claim for injuries to his lumbar spine while lifting and pulling equipment at work. Eleven months later, claimant filed second claim alleging injury to his "back man as a whole" resulting from lifting, bending, and pulling at work on date eleven days after date of injury alleged in first claim. Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed and adopted arbitrator's decision that in first case, claimant had established accident occurred on that date, arose out of and in course of his employment, and his current condition of ill-being in low back was causally related to work accident. Commission's determination of compensable work-related injury was not against manifest weight of evidence.Remanded for determination of propriety of including overtime hours in calculation of claimant's wage. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and STEWART, concurring.)

Claimant employee injured knee while working as a welder. Workers' Compensation Commission reversed arbitrator and found that claimant failed to prove he sustained workplace accident that arose out of his employment. Claimant established entitlement to benefits under neutral risk principles. Commission should not award benefits for injuries caused by everyday activities, even if employee was ordered to perform them as part of his job duties, unless employee's job required him to perform those activities more frequently than members of general public or in manner that increased risk. This is a "neutral risk" analysis. (HOFFMAN and HUDSON, concurring; STEWART, specially concurring.)

Court properly company's claim alleging fraud and seeking to recover workers' compensation benefits paid to its employee. Plaintiff had previously filed motion for determination of fraud which was heard and denied by a Workers' Compensation Commission arbitrator. Arbitrator properly exercised Commission's jurisdiction in ruling on fraud claims as they involved factual issues directly related to determination of employee's workers' compensation benefits. Thus, trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff company's claims. (SCHMIDT, specially concurring; McDADE, dissenting.)

Employee working as ironworker on construction site fell and was injured, and was rendered a quadriplegic. Employee filed workers' compensation claim against employer, and later filed negligence suit against general contractor, which filed third-party complaint for contribution against employer, alleging that employer was negligent in failing to ensure safety of its employees. Court within its discretion in finding good faith and in approving settlement between employee and employer, and in dismissing with prejudice general contractor's third-party contribution claim against employer. Workers' Compensation Act does not require employer to pay statutory 25% attorney fees for suspended future medical payments. (CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Court properly granted summary judgment for hospital, as there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was hospital's borrowed employee. Plaintiff's premises liability was barred b y exclusive remedy provision of Workers' Compensation Act, as she was hospital's borrowed employee at time of injury. Undisputed material facts show that hospital directed and controlled Plaintiff's work and that she consented to borrowed-employee relationship with hospital. Existence of agreement between hospital and temporary healthcare staffing agency, whereby staffing agency was responsible for workers' compensation claims and agreed to hold hospital harmless from such claims, did not relieve hospital from liability under Act and protection of Act's exclusive remedy provision. (CATES and WELCH, concurring.)

Plaintiff insurer filed complaint to rescind workers' compensation policy it issued to construction company, citing misrepresentations as to number of persons employed. Court properly dismissed Defendant's motion to reconsider his Section 2-1401 petition to vacate default judgment. As a result of default, Defendant admitted allegation that named person was an employee, as a default admits facts alleged against a defendant in complaint to be true. Even if trial court had concurrent jurisdiction with Workers' Compensation Commission, it would not have been error for court to retain jurisdiction. (KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)

Widow filed claim for benefits under Workers' Occupational Diseases Act, alleging that husband was disabled and died as a result of diseases arising out of his employment as a coal miner for 38 years. Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed and adopted arbitrator's award of death benefits and burial expenses. Estate contended that $89,865 paid by employer was not full amount due and owing per Commission's award, and filed motion to enforce judgment in circuit court under Section 19(g) of Workers' Compensation Act. Employer was not entitled to offset amount of federal claim against workers' compensation benefits under Section 19(g). As alleged settlement agreement was not presented to Commission, in Section 19(g) proceedings, court could not consider the agreement and could only review Commission's award. (CATES and WELCH, concurring.)

Workers’ Compensation Commission approved and adopted arbitrator’s decision finding employee permanently partially disabled and temporarily totally disabled, and circuit court and appellate court affirmed Commission’s decision. During appellate review, employee petitioned to increase arbitration award, claiming her condition had worsened. Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider Section 19(g) application, despite pending section 19(h) proceedings, and appellate court has jurisdiction to review denial of application. Trial court properly denied Claimant’s request for interest under Section 2-1303. Employer promptly paid in full. When employer tendered full payment, claimant was no longer entitled to judgment under Section 19(g), and without a judgment, claimant was not entitled to additional interest under Section 2-1303 of Code of Civil Procedure. (JORGENSEN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Claimant, a hosting engineer, sustained injuries to right shoulder and cervical spine from fall. Commission properly found date of injury, rather than date of arbitration hearing 5 ½ years later, controlled maximum rate applicable to claimant’s wage-differential award. Limits on compensation in Section 8(b)(4) of Workers Compensation Act, including maximum rates applicable to wage-differential awards, apply with reference to date of injury and not some later point in time. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and STEWART, concurring.)