Workers’ Compensation Law

Court denied widow's motion for lump-sum payout of benefits awarded for her husband's death in work-related accident when the crop-duster plan he was piloting crashed.  Respondent employer voluntarily elected to satisfy part of its obligation prior to entry of formal order, and Commission factored those prior overpayments of benefits into its final order.  Claimant failed to show that a lump-sum payout was warranted. Evidence showed that Claimant was suffering no economic hardship and had saved most of Respondent's periodic payments, and no evidence that lump-sum payout would be in Respondent's best interests. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HARRIS, and MOORE, concurring.)

Widow filed application to enforce arbitration award of death benefits under Section 19(g) of Workers' Compensation Act. As employer's obligation to widow was payable in installments, each of its deficient payments constituted a new cause of action with its own independent statute of limitations. Thus, court properly applied statute of limitations to bar only those claims relating to deficient payments occurring prior to date which was 5 years prior to date widow filed her application to enforce award. If anything is properly due under final award at time application for judgment is made, trial court should enter judgment as provided in Section 19(g) of the Act. As employer did not move to correct computation of award nor petition for its review, it may not now contest its validity in context of Section 19(g) proceeding.(KNECHT and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Plaintiffs, who were employees of temporary employment agency, were being transported to a worksite by their supervisor when motor vehicle collision occurred. Plaintiffs received workers' compensation benefits through temporary employment agency, but commenced action against their supervisor and the company where he was transporting them. Company where Plaintiffs were assigned had right to direct and control manner of their work, and had the right to discharge Plaintiffs from its facility, and was thus Plaintiffs' borrowing employer. Plaintiffs are estopped from denying that their injuries fell outside Workers' Compensation Act. Record supports inference that injuries occurred within scope of their employment, and thus court properly granted summery judgment for Defendamts. (PUCINSKI and COBBS, concurring.)

Claimant, a manager at a fast-food restaurant, filed for worker's compensation benefits for injuries to her right hand and thumb suffered while wiping down a table at work. Injury resulted from risk distinctly associated with her employment, as claimant often assisted in busing tables and cleaning tables to keep customer flow moving. Commission's finding that claimant's current condition of ill-being was causally related to accident was not against manifest weight of evidence. Award of TTD and PPD benefits was not against manifest weight of evidence. (HOFFMAN and STEWART, concurring; HOLDRIDGE and HUDSON, specially concurring.)

Auto assembly line worker filed workers' compensation claim for back injury caused by "excessive twisting and bending on job." Risk associated with act of bending down to pick up fallen bolts was an employment-related risk, as bolts commonly fell out of articulating arm and onto floor, and if they were not promptly retrieved, platform would jam resulting in entire assembly line shutting down. Manifest weight of evidence shows that employee's health was not so deteriorated that any normal daily activity would be "an overexertion". Thus, Commission's finding that injury was not compensable on basis of preexisting back condition was against manifest weight of evidence. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and STEWART, concurring.) 

 Middle school science teacher filed claim for workers' compensation benefits for accidental injury he sustained while participating in a student/teacher basketball game in school gym after school. (Teacher went up for jump shot, and student ran between his legs, causing him to spin and fall on his left arm.) Evidence presented at arbitration hearing showed that teacher was not a basketball player and did not want to participate, but principal repeatedly pressured him to do so, and teacher was concerned that his performance review and prospect for being hired the next year might be negatively impacted unless he participated in games; and teacher considered attendance and participation in after-school activities with students a part of his job. Thus, teacher was not engaged in a "voluntary recreational program" under Section 11 of Workers' Compensation Act, and injury arose out of and in course of his employment.(HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.)

Circuit court did not have jurisdiction to review decision of Workers' Compensation Commission where claimant's written request for summons was file-stamped after the 20-day filing period in Section 19(f)(1) of Workers' Occupational Diseases Act, and claimant failed to file proof of mailing the written request for summons in circuit court within 20 days after he received Commission's decision. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

Claimant, age 42, was employed as a "line haul" truck driver when he sustained workplace accident, when a dolly weighing several thousand pounds ran over both of his feet while he was assisting another driver. Court confirmed Commission's decision, affirming (other than correcting a calculation error) arbitrator's decision awarding benefits, including permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for 30% loss of right foot and 8% loss of left foot. Section 8.1b of Workers' Compensation Act does not specify the weight that Workers' Compensation Commission must give to the physician's report. Commission is obligated to weigh all five factors listed within Section 8.1b(b) of the Act and make a factual finding as to level of worker's permanent partial disability, with no single factor being the sole determinant of disability.(HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.)

Claimant filed worker's compensation claim for injury to his right wrist, sustained when the rolling chair he was sitting in at work, while filling out forms, went out from underneath him as he reached to retrieve a dropped pen. Act of reaching for dropped pen while sitting in chair was not one he was instructed to perform or had a duty to perform, and was not incidental to his assigned duties. Risk of injury at issue was not one distinctly associated with his employment. (HOFFMAN and HUDSON, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring; STEWART, dissenting.)

When attorneys for a worker covered by Workers' Compensation Act bring a successful action against a 3rd-party to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the worker in the course of his employment, thus enabling the worker's employer to obtain reimbursement of compensation benefits it is obligated to pay under the Act, the Act requires the employer to pay 25% of the gross amount it obtains in reimbursement as attorney fees, absent other agreement. The gross amount of reimbursement subject to attorney fees under the Act includes the amount of benefits the employer will be relieved from paying in the future because of this recovery in the 3rd-party action, which calculation should include the value of future medical care.(GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)