Workers’ Compensation Law

Village fire department lieutenant/paramedic filed workers' compensation claim for PTSD allegedly caused by work-related incident. Physician testified that, within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty, the claimant's PTSD was caused by trauma of incident when  witnessed a firefighter on Claimant's crew immediately after he suffered work-related death. Employer's actions after fire indicate that it believed that crew suffered sudden, severe, emotional shock of greater dimensions than emotional strain and tension all employees experience from worry, anxiety, pressure and overwork. Claimant's psychological injuries stemmed from single, traumatic event and he is entitled to workers compensation benefits. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 8/10/16.) Court properly confirmed decision of Workers' Compensation Commission denying Plaintiff police officer's claim for benefits for injuries sustained in motor vehicle accident during his drive from home to training session. Officer's injuries took place during normal commuting, and he was not acting within scope of his employment at time of accident. Traveling employee doctrine is not extended to include any claimant involved in accident on the way to their normal workplace, not performing any duties incidental to their employment, where employee's regular work shift was different that day.(HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

 Claimant filed for workers compensation benefits for injury to lower that he allegedly sustained in 1999 accident. Arbitrator ordered employer to pay TTD, TPD and maintenance benefits. Commission affirmed arbitrator's decision, but vacated TPD/maintenance benefits and awarding wage differential. Claimant sought judicial review of Commission's decision. Section 8(d)(1) purpose is to compensate a claimant for diminished earning capacity caused by work-related injury. The fact that claimant subsequently suffered unrelated and more disabling work injury to neck in 2002 did not alter fact that 1999 back injury reduced his earning capacity. Commission's decision fails to adequately compensate claimant for his first economic injury. Nothing prohibits awarding both PTD and wage differential benefits simultaneously and indefinitely under these circumstances. (HOFFMAN, HUDSON, HARRIS, and STEWART, concurring.)

Claimant, a lineman, filed claim for workers' compensation benefits for back injury. Claimant's chiropractic records show that claimant had a significant preexisting condition involving same area of the body, and involving same modes of treatment. A claimant may obtain compensation under the Workers Compensation Act even when he suffers from a preexisting condition of ill-being; recovery depends on claimant's ability to establish that his work-related accident aggravated or accelerated his preexisting condition. Causation in preexisting injury cases may be established without medical opinion evidence and through circumstantial evidence, i.e., a chain of events. Record contains sufficient evidence to show that claimant's work accident aggravated his preexisting back condition of ill-being. Section 8.1b does not make submission of a PPD impairment report a prerequisite to an award of PPD benefits by the Commission.(HOLDRIDGE, HUDSON, and STEWART, concurring; HOFFMAN, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Plaintiff filed suit for injuries he suffered while assisting in roof repairs on a commercial building. Plaintiff filed workers compensation claim against his employer, but not against general contractor (Defendant here). Plaintiff never asserted, in his workers compensation claim, that he was injured while acting as employee of general contractor, other than in caption of settlement contract. Court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendant, as genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was a borrowed employee in service of Defendant at time of injury.  (ROCHFORD and DELORT, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 5/6/16.) Section 13-217 of Code of Civil Procedure, which allows a party to refile action within 1 year after action is dismissed for want of prosecution (regardless of whether statute of limitations has expired during pendency of original action) does not apply to workers' compensation claims that are dismissed for want of prosecution. When Workers' Compensation Commission dismisses a workers' compensation claim for want of prosecution, claimant has 60 days from receipt of dismissal order to file a petition for reinstatement. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.)

Claimant filed application for workers' compensation benefits for foot injuries sustained during work. Claimant developed blister on bottom of his left foot, after having to repeatedly push clutch down forcefully. After Claimant lanced blister using sterilized needle, he developed infection in foot which required several foot surgeries and partial amputation of one toe. Even if Claimant's lancing of blister was immediate cause of infection, the infection would not have occurred "but for" existence of work-related blister.  Thus, his employment remains a cause of his current condition of ill-being.(HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.)

The 30-month period for filing Section 19(h) petition ran from date of Workers' Compensation Commission's original decision, and was not affected by subsequent vacatur and reinstatement of that decision. Right to file application for review does not depend on whether award made is enforceable at time application is filed, except where there has been a final determination of court quashing the award.  There was no final determination of court quashing original award, Thus, Claimant's Section 19(h) petition was untimely as it was not filed within 30 months of original award. (HOLDRIDGE, HOFFMAN, HUDSON, and HARRIS, concurring.) 

An employer is not required to raise its Kotecki setoff limit or workers' compensation lien as an affirmative defense or before trial. As it was undisupted that Plaintiff was an injured employee receiving compensation under Workers Compensation Act from employer, there was no need for employer, who was third-party Defendant, to place issue before jury by pleading an affirmative defense, and court could address issue by posttrial motion.(O'BRIEN and McDADE, concurring.)