Supreme Court Quick Takes

Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the civil cases Wells Fargo Bank v. McCluskey, Hartney Fuel Oil Company v. Hamer, The Board of Education of Roxana Community Unit School District No. 1 v. The Pollution Control Board, Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., Rogers v. Imeri and the criminal cases People v. Radojcic and People v. Pikes.

Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Friday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the civil cases Skokie Castings, Inc. v. Illinois Insurance Guarnty Fund, Performance Marketing Association, Inc. v. Hamer, The Board of Education of Peoria School District No. 150 v. The Peoria Federation of Support Staff, Relf v. Shatayeva and Prazen v. Shoop.

Skokie Castings, Inc. v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC

The Illinois Supreme Court finds no distinction between primary and excess workers’ compensation policies in applying the workers’ compensation exception to the statutory cap of the Illinois Guaranty Fund.  The court ruled in favor of an employer obligated to pay lifetime benefits to a seriously injured employee, where the employer’s excess insurer became insolvent.

Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the criminal cases People v. Johnson and In re Shelby R.

People v. Johnson

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

At issue was whether Section 4-2002.1(a) of the Counties Code allows for imposition of a $50 State’s Attorney fee for hearing a 2-1401 petition. The statute refers only to imposition of the fee for habeas corpus proceedings.

The Court rejected the argument that “habeas corpus” was meant to refer, generically, to any collateral proceedings, noting that habeas corpus has a specific meaning. Considering the plain language of the statute as the best indication of legislative intent, the Court concluded that the reference to “habeas corpus” was meant to encompass the various types of habeas corpus proceedings (e.g., habeas corpus ad prosequendum, habeas corpus ad respondendum, habeas corpus ad testificandum), and nothing more. Inclusion of any other collateral proceedings would have to come from the
legislature.

While this decision is not particularly broad-reaching, it does demonstrate the Court’s adherence to long-standing principles of statutory construction, beginning with looking first to the plain language of the statute.  Where the plain language is clear, the Court will go no further in interpreting a statute’s meaning.

Gruszeczka v. The Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC

As the Illinois Supreme Court moves the state toward electronic filing, here the court implicitly acknowledged the continuing relevance of the “mailbox rule.” The issue arose in the context of obtaining circuit court review of a decision of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission. The supreme court interpreted section 19(f)(1) of the statute and held that mailing the requisite documents commences circuit court review and satisfies the strict statutory compliance needed to vest subject matter jurisdiction in the circuit court. See Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 2008). Thus, mailing the documents within 20 days, rather than obtaining file-stamped documents by the clerk within that time frame, “commenced” the action under the statute.