Speedy Trial

U.S. v. Blount

Federal 7th Circuit Court
U.S. v. Blount
Criminal Court
Speedy Trial
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 22-2470
Decision Date: 
February 26, 2024
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Defendant was not entitled to dismissal of his indictment on drug and gun charges on speedy trial grounds, even though he demanded speedy trial in 2019, but was not given trial until July of 2021 and then only bench trial as defendant had removed his jury demand by that time. While defendant was supposed to have been given jury trial in March of 2020, General Order 20-0012 postponed all trials by that time due to COVID-19 pandemic, and all jury trials were postponed under said Order until March 29, 2021. Moreover, record showed that Dist. Ct. postponed defendant’s trial pursuant to that Order without making any independent findings with respect to defendant’s case. Defendant cannot prevail in instant case, where his counsel never made motion to dismiss defendant’s indictment based on speedy trial grounds. Also, any motion to dismiss would be without merit, where Dist. Ct. may rely on institutional finding such as General Order 20-0012 to justify instant delay.

U.S. v. Gunter

Federal 7th Circuit Court
U.S. v. Gunter
Criminal Court
Speedy Trial
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 22-1546
Decision Date: 
August 11, 2023
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment on drug conspiracy charge, even though defendant maintained that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial where he experienced 23-month delay between his arrest and trial date. While defendant conceded that many of said delays were caused by him or his co-defendant, defendant argued that last four-month delay prior to his trial, which was caused by death of co-defendant’s counsel, denied him his speedy trial rights, where Dist. Ct. denied his motion to sever his trial from co-defendant’s trial, so as to allow defendant to proceed to trial without experiencing last delay. Dist. Ct. could properly deny motion to dismiss, where: (1) basis of defendant’s motion to sever was not on speedy trial grounds, but was on claim that co-defendant had made confession that implicated defendant in instant drug conspiracy charge; and (2) government had previously resolved issue by redacting defendant’s identity from co-defendant’s confession. As such, defendant had failed to properly raise speedy trial issue in Dist. Ct. Moreover, defendant failed to show existence of any prejudice arising out of instant delay in bringing his case to trial.

U.S. v. Johnson

Federal 7th Circuit Court
U.S. v. Johnson
Criminal Court
Speedy Trial
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 21-2417
Decision Date: 
April 24, 2023
Federal District: 
E.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his federal drug and firearm charges on speedy trial grounds. Instant trial took place within 70-day period set forth in Speedy Trial Act, and said trial did not violate any constitutional right to speedy trial. Moreover, plaintiff could not attribute to his federal case over year long delay after he was arrested on similar state-court charges, where defendant failed to establish any collusion between state and federal officials to deny defendant his speedy trial right. Also, Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s contention that Dist. Ct. denied his right to testify on his own behalf at his trial, where defendant received late notice of existence of video of his proffer, and where Dist. Ct. allowed prosecution to use proffer for impeachment purposes if defendant decided to testify. Ct. found that defendant had choice to testify if he wanted to, and record showed that defendant made choice not to testify after he had viewed video proffer. Too, while government witness improperly made reference to defendant’s admission to one charged offense that was contained in proffer, any error was harmless, given overwhelming nature of defendant’s guilt on said offense.

People v. Johnson

People v. Johnson
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Speedy Trial
Citation
Case Number: 
2023 IL App (4th) 210662
Decision Date: 
Friday, March 3, 2023
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
Sangamon Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
DOHERTY

Defendant was convicted of aggravated domestic battery, domestic battery, and aggravated battery following a jury trial. On appeal, defendant argued that his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated due to procedures implemented by the circuit court following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Defendant also argued that the admonishments he was given when he elected to represent himself were insufficient and that the trial court erred in refusing to tender a self-defense instruction to the jury. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the delays in the case as well as the tolling of the speedy trial period were in compliance with the supreme court’s orders, that defendant was properly admonished, and that the evidence did not support the requested instruction. (TURNER and HARRIS, concurring)

People v. Marcum

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
People v. Marcum
Criminal Court
Speedy Trial
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
January 25, 2023
Docket Number: 
No. 128687
District: 
4th Dist.

This case presents question as to whether, under plain error analysis, State violated defendant’s statutory right to speedy trial, where State filed new and additional aggravated domestic battery charges that were subject to compulsory joinder with initial aggravated batter charge 9 months later and outside of applicable 120-day speedy trial term. Defendant raised instant statutory speedy trial issue for first time in reply brief filed with Appellate Court, when defendant asserted that instant statutory speedy trial violation can constitute second prong plain error. However, Appellate Court held that instant speedy trial issue was not properly preserved, and that defendant’s claim was forfeited, where it was not timely raised, as required under 725 ILCS 5/114-1(b). It further noted that defendant’s treatment of issue was underdeveloped and did not establish either that he was denied fair trial or that any error affected integrity of judicial system.

People v. Davila

People v. Davila
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Sufficiency of Evidence
Speedy Trial
Citation
Case Number: 
2022 IL App (1st) 190882
Decision Date: 
Thursday, March 31, 2022
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
2d Div./Cook Co.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
LAVIN

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 80 years in prison. On appeal, he argued that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because his conviction rested on a single eyewitness who initially misidentified him. Defendant also argued that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that was more prejudicial than probative and that the State violated his right to a speedy trial. The appellate court rejected defendant’s claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, finding that the testimony against him was not unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory. The court also found defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated despite a lengthy pretrial custody. However, it agreed with defendant that video evidence containing statements by a police officer that bolstered the credibility of the eyewitness was more prejudicial than probative and reversed and remanded for a new trial. (HOWES and COBBS, concurring)

People v. Mayfield

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
People v. Mayfield
Criminal Court
Speedy Trial
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
March 30, 2022
Docket Number: 
No. 128092
District: 
2nd Dist.

This case present question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment on speedy-trial grounds, even though his case was not brought to trial within 120-day speedy-trial term. Record showed that defendant’s trial was continued pursuant to administrative order entered by circuit court, which had implemented Illinois Supreme Court order tolling running of speedy-trial term in response to COVID-19 pandemic. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s conviction on charge of domestic battery, found that Illinois Supreme Court had authority to allow for tolling of speedy-trial term in response to extraordinary circumstances associated with COVID-19 that existed at time when said tolling orders were entered.

People v. Giffin

People v. Giffin
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Speedy Trial
Citation
Case Number: 
2022 IL App (1st) 190499
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, March 29, 2022
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
2d Div./Cook Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
FITZGERALD SMITH

Defendant was found guilty of being an armed habitual criminal and unlawful use of a weapon and sentenced to eight years. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s demand for a speedy trial over defense counsel’s objections and that he was denied a fair trial as a result of hearsay statements that were improperly admitted into evidence. The appellate court affirmed, finding that it was not an error for the trial court to grant defendant’s demand for a speedy trial even when defense counsel represented a need for additional time to prepare for trial so long as the trial court ensured the defendant understood the consequences of his request and where the record showed defendant was well represented at trial. The appellate court further held the complained-of testimony was properly admitted. (LAVIN and COBBS, concurring)

People v. Cross

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
People v. Cross
Criminal Court
Speedy Trial
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
January 26, 2022
Docket Number: 
No. 127907
District: 
4th Dist.

This case presents question as to whether trial court violated defendant’s speedy trial rights, where: (1) defendant filed one month prior to start of scheduled trial supplemental discovery disclosure that asserted alibi affirmative defense to which government had objected; (2) in response to said objection, trial court held that time between filing date of supplemental discovery disclosure to unchanged scheduled trial date would be delay attributable to defendant; and (3) defendant subsequently claimed that he was not tried within 120 days after his arrest, excluding certain delays. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s murder conviction, found that delay could be attributed to defendant without considering any actual movement of trial date. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that trial court erred in attributing to him delay in speedy trial term as sanction for discovery violation under Rule 415(g)(i), where there was no actual delay in trial. (Partial dissent filed.)

People v. Redmon

People v. Redmon
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Sexual Abuse
Speedy Trial
Citation
Case Number: 
2022 IL App (3d) 190167
Decision Date: 
Thursday, January 6, 2022
District: 
3d Dist.
Holding: 
REVERSED, partially remanded for new trial.
Justice: 
DAUGHERITY

Defendant was indicted on six charges relating to the alleged sexual abuse of minors, including sexual assault and permitting the sexual abuse of a child. The appellate court found the language of section 11-9.1A(f) of the Criminal Code, which establishes the offense of permitting the sexual abuse of a child, was clear and unambiguous and reversed defendant’s conviction on that count outright because the person alleged to have committed the sexual abuse was not charged, as was required by the plain language of the statute. The court also found with regard to another count that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel did not file a motion to dismiss when the trial took place more than 120 days after the defendant was arrested and taken into custody. The court noted that the count at issue was added after the defendant’s arrest, but the motion would have been successful because the charge was subject to the compulsory joinder rule. Finally, the court found that defendant was denied her due process right to a fair trial on one of the remaining counts, reversed that conviction, and remanded for a new trial on that count only. (HAUPTMAN and MCDADE, concurring)