Speedy Trial

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charge, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment based on violation of Speedy Trial Act, where defendant alleged that 6-month continuance of trial date should have counted against 70-day statutory deadline for bringing his case to trial. Although Dist. Ct. made “ends of justice” finding to justify instant 6-month delay, said delay should have been counted so as to establish Speedy Trial Act violation, where: (1) Dist. Ct. failed to articulate at time of continuance factors it used when granting said continuance; (2) Dist. Ct.’s eventual explanation that delay was justified due to complexity of case, and fact that defendant’s case was joined with others who had not requested speedy trial either was not supported by record or was insufficient to warrant continuance; and (3) transcript of continuance hearing strongly suggested that actual reason for continuance was crowded nature of court calendar, which could not support ends of justice continuance.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds his indictment on unlawful possession of firearm charges, even though 16 months had elapsed between time federal complaint and detainer had been filed and date indictment had been issued. Filing of federal complaint charging defendant with instant felony and issuance of detainer did not trigger speedy-trial clock since (for felony charges) said clock is triggered only by filing formal charging document such as indictment or information. Moreover, instant delay was caused by defendant’s detention by state authorities, who had charged him with state crime and who had “first dibs” at prosecuting defendant, and defendant had otherwise failed to ask for federal trial during his state confinement.

Ct. of Appeals denied defendant’s mandamus petition seeking dismissal of his indictment on drug charge since Dist. Ct. lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over him because he had never been in U.S., and since speedy trial clause of 6th Amendment barred his prosecution due to govt.’s failure to extradite him from either England or Nigeria. While Dist. Ct. currently has no jurisdiction over defendant, instant indictment has no expiration date, such that if defendant ever came to U.S., he could be put on trial for said charge. Moreover, defendant’s speedy trial claim is premature since issues regarding duration of delay, defendant’s responsibility for said delay and harm to defendant because of delay could not be determined until Dist. Ct. proceedings had been complete. Ct. further observed that since defendant always had ability to come to U.S. to face instant criminal charge, he could not reasonably assert that govt.’s failure to extradite him required dismissal of instant charge.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his murder conviction on ground that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise constitutional Speedy Trial issue, where govt. took 20 months to bring its case to trial. Defendant was responsible for 11 months of said delay, and although defendant requested speedy trial at his arraignment, he also sought numerous extensions of time. Moreover, defendant failed to establish any prejudice arising out of instant delay, where defendant was already incarcerated on separate offense, and where he did not claim that delay hindered his ability to prepare for his defense. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that trial court improperly gave accountability instruction to jury, after finding that defendant was on notice that he could be found guilty of murder on accountability theory, and that instruction was appropriate where: (1) defendant was seen with victim shortly before murder; (2) defendant possessed same caliber of gun used in murder; and (3) defendant’s identification cards were found near victim’s body.

In prosecution on marijuana conspiracy charges, Dist. Ct. did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to speedy trial, even though Dist. Ct. granted govt.’s motion for one-month delay in trial to investigate charge that defendant had intimidated witness scheduled to testify at his upcoming trial. Instant one-month delay was not presumptively prejudicial, and instant delay was justified where evidence of defendant’s potential intimidation was only recently discovered, and where such evidence had potential to establish defendant’s consciousness of guilt. Fact that govt. used extra month to gather other evidence against defendant and to interview witnesses in effort to better prepare for trial did not require different result.

In prosecution on bank fraud and embezzlement charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss said charges under Speedy Trial Act, even though trial did not start until 18 months after defendant’s arraignment. Record showed that various continuances were properly excludable under “ends of justice” exclusion, even though Dist. Ct. did not contemporaneously note said exclusion at time continuances had been granted, where Dist. Ct. made required findings by time defendant’s motion to dismiss had been denied. Remand, though, was required for new sentencing hearing where Dist. Ct. had failed to make required factual findings to support imposition of obstruction of justice enhancement based on perception that defendant had given material false testimony at trial.