Speedy Trial

For speedy-trial purposes, delays attributable to Defendant on original charges are attributable to Defendant on newly filed charges only if charges were essentially the same and thus subject to compulsory joinder. Defendant had timely notice of new felony-murder charge and cannot reasonably argue surprise when his own counsel had suggested, thus charges were not "new and additional" for speedy-trial analysis. Given totality of circumstances, 60-year maximum sentence was reasonable, and based in part on deterrence, as Defendant was armed with firearm and used force to enter victim's apartment. (McCULLOUGH and COOK, concurring.)

State dismissed charges of obstructing a police officer by nolle prosequi, and then waited 285 days to re-charge Defendant. Due process is the only relevant consideration during period of time between dismissal by nolle prosequi and filing of new charge. Thus, only a due process analysis applied to delays in case. Two prongs of substantial prejudice and intentional tactical maneuvering by State must be established for delay to violate due process. Court is to consider whether Defendant was denied her speedy-trial rights by passage of time in two prosecutions. Nearly 29 months which elapsed between commencement of first prosecution and date when Defendant first moved to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds is presumptively prejudicial delay sufficient to trigger application of remaining speedy-trial factors. (JORGENSEN and McLAREN, concurring.)

As original DUI(a)(5) charge was filed via uniform traffic citation and complaint form, compulsory-joinder rule does not apply as between that charge and subsequent DUI(a)(2) charge. Thus, speedy-trial period from original DUI(a)(5) charge does not apply to subsequent DUI(a)(2) charge, and State did not violate speedy-trial term as to subsequent DUI(a)(2) charge. (HOLDRIDGE, concurring; SCHMIDT, specially concurring.)

Defendant waived her prior speedy trial demands when she failed to appear in courtor communicate with her counsel at two subsequent hearings. Thus, as speedy trial term had not expired, court erred in granting Defendant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. A delay occasioned by a defendant, if for health reasons, hospitalization, or other physical incapacity, merely tolls speedy trial term, as of date when court is presented with documentation of illness or physical incapacity, and resumes when incapacity is removed. (LAVIN and STERBA, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of DUI under Village ordinance. Village did not bring Defendant to trial within 160-day time speedy-trial period, and thus conviction is vacated. Defendant's recognizance bond meant that he was to be released immediately, and he was thus released from custody on that day, when speedy-trial demand was filed (and demand was thus not prematurely filed) and when speedy-trial term began. Assistant State's Attorney, by stepping up at initial court hearings when Village attorney was not present, was representing Village's interests such that service on ASA was sufficient to stand as service on Village attorney. Village failed to object to either of Defendant's two absences from hearings, both of which were excused by court, and thus Defendant's failure to appear on date when his counsel informed court that he was ill and unable to attend did not waive speedy-trial demand. (McLAREN and BURKE, concurring.)

Court properly dismissed five of six counts of indictment. Cannabis charge and new gun-related offenses were required to be prosecuted in a single prosecution, as charges were based on same act of constructive possession of cannabis and handguns, which police recovered following Defendant's detention. Speedy trial provision barred State from prosecuting later-filed, gun-related charges once the 160-day period to file new and additional charges had elapsed. (McBRIDE and R. GORDON, concurring.)