Speedy Trial

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his 2012 indictment on drug and firearm charges on grounds that prosecution violated Speedy Trial Act, even though his trial did not start until September of 2015. While defendant argued that delays in transporting him to facility to evaluate his competency or in generating report concerning his competency counted toward applicable 70-day period for bringing case to trial, none of said delays counted toward said period, where: (1) some delays occurred during timeframe where co-defendants had obtained excludable continuances; and (2) other delays occurred during timeframe when defendant’s competency to stand trial was being evaluated. Also, defendant failed to establish any 6^th Amendment speedy trial violation, where: (1) delays caused by his transportation to mental health facility and generation of court report resulted in nothing more than bureaucratic negligence and occurred partially during time when defendant’s competency was being evaluated; (2) defendant failed to assert any speedy trial right until after delays at issue had occurred; and (3) defendant had failed to offer any specific evidence of prejudice arising out of said delays, and instant pretrial delay was primarily caused by factors outside govt. control.

In prosecution on theft charges arising out of defendant’s theft of cars, his alteration of VIN numbers on said cars and subsequent sale of said cars, record failed to support defendant’s claim that his speedy trial rights were violated under Speedy Trial Act and 6^th Amendment, even though record showed that 79 days had elapsed between his arrest and indictment and 1,076 days had elapsed between his initial appearance and start of trial. Only 13 days had elapsed on defendant’s pre-indictment Speedy Trial Act clock, where Dist. Ct. granted two ends-of-justice continuances; and (2) both continuances were justified where time was used by both parties to negotiate resolution of matter. Moreover, less than 70 Speedy Trial Act days had elapsed after defendant made his initial appearance, where record showed that defendant had received 10 ends-of-justice continuances that were justified on grounds that defendant needed time to conduct discovery, explore plea agreement negotiations, conduct his own psychological examination and to allow substitute counsel to prepare for trial. Further, no speedy trial violation under 6^th Amendment occurred since defendant was primarily responsible for instant delay. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in either granting govt.’s motion to dismiss 19 out of 25 counts in instant indictment, or finding that evidence that defendant's theft of 10 vehicles and alteration of their VIN numbers that were not included in charged offense constituted relevant conduct for sentencing purposes.

In prosecution on criminal contempt charge arising out of defendant’s misrepresentations on T.V. infomercials about his weight loss book that, according to govt., violated terms of prior Dist. Ct. order, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his case under Speedy Trial Act (Act) under circumstances where: (1) 214 non-excluded days had elapsed from govt. agreement to prosecute first show cause order that contained penalty cap of no more than six months; and (2) Dist. Ct. then withdrew initial show cause order and issued second show cause order that contained no penalty limit, which ultimately resulted in guilty verdict and 10-year sentence. Act did not apply to first charge since maximum penalty of six months was akin to Class B misdemeanor that is not subject to Act. Moreover, while Act applied to second contempt charge, there was no violation, since trial occurred within 70 non-excludable days from govt.‘s agreement to prosecute second show cause order, and since applicable 70-day period never started on first show cause order.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition alleging that instant 42-month delay in bringing his murder charge to trial violated his 6^th Amendment right to speedy trial. Record showed that 90% of instant delay was attributable to continuance requests made by defendant’s counsel, and defendant failed to show that instant delay actually impaired his defense.