Speedy Trial

Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of DUI of any amount of drugs, after parties stipulated officer found Defendant in physical control of the vehicle and chemical tests showed Defendant had THC in his system at time of arrest. Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to move to dismiss charges on speedy-trial grounds. The right to assistance of counsel, whether appointed or not, necessarily includes the right to effe3ctive counsel. The charges for which Defendant sought to apply the compulsory-joinder rule were brought by the arresting officer through a uniform citation and complaint. Thus, the additional 114-day delay (the time between the original charge and the supplanting charges) was not attributable to the State, and the compulsory-joinder rule did not apply. Counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to make an objection that his right to speedy trial was violated, as such objection would have been meritless, and any motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds premised on the compulsory-joinder rule would have been otherwise futile.  (THEIS, M. BURKE, and OVERSTREET, concurring; A. BURKE and NEVILLE, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1 count of aggravated domestic battery and 2 counts of domestic battery. No violation of right to speedy trial, as Defendant failed to assert his right to a speedy trial on any occasion after once stating that he wished to demand trial. Less than 2 months later, Defendant completely repudiated any demand, and never again demanded trial.  There is ample evidence in record to support convictions. Defendant's 2003 felony case is properly deemed an element of the Class 2 offense of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon. The underlying felony serves as an element describing the stand-alone Class 2 felony offense. As a predicate, Defendant committed a Class 1 felony drug offense, and that qualified each of the later 2004 and 2009 felony cases to be prosecuted and sentenced as Class 2 felony offenses. Court did not err in sentencing Defendant as a Class X offender. (HUDSON and BRENNAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of sexual exploitation of a child and 7 counts of child pornography. Original indictment provided Defendant with sufficient notice of the supplementary charges included in the superseding indictment. Thus, the child pornography charges were not "new and additional" for purposes of a speedy trial analysis. Thus, Defendant's speedy trial right was not violated as to the child pornography charges. (HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of criminal sexual assault. Court did not abuse its discretion in granting State's section 103-5(c) motion for a continuance based on its findings that State exercised due diligence in attempting to obtain material DNA testing. Court did not abuse its discretion in granting State's motion in limine and admitting Facebook records as self-authenticating documents under Illinois Rule of Evidence 902(11). State submitted written certification of a qualified person from Facebook, providing that records were made and kept by Facebook in course of its regularly conducted activity and as part of its regular business practice. Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting content of the Facebook messages to victim which was properly authenticated by circumstantial evidence showing that Defendant was the author.(JORGENSEN and BRIDGES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor domestic battery. State originally charged Defendant with 2 counts domestic battery based on physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature. A third count, added later, charged Defendant with domestic battery based upon "bodily harm." Counsel was ineffective for failing to bring a motion to dismiss the third count. The same speedy trial clock applicable to counts I and II was applicable to count III. Defendant was brought to trial of count III well outside of the 160-day statutory period. (HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of home invasion and unlawful restraint, on charges filed in 2009. When State, on 9/21/09, nol-prossed Defendant's 2008 charge of criminal damage to property, State was obligated to bring the case to trial within 120 days. However, Defendant was released from custody on 12/11/2009, at which point the 120-day speedy-trial period of section 103-5(e) no longer applied. Defendant demanded a trial within 160 days, pursuant to section 103-5(b), and on day of trial he moved to dismiss on basis that the 160-day period had lapsed. As Day 160 was a Sunday, the State was entitled to bring the case to trial on the next day that court was in session. No violation of right to speedy trial.(BIRKETT and HUTCHINSON, concurring.) 

Defendant was convicted of various offenses. Defendant was reconfined in a DOC facility for violating his MSR and stipulated to that fact prior to trial. Thus, at that time Defendant was no longer serving a period of parole or MSR but instead was committed to DOC for allegedly violating MSR. Commitment includes reconfinement of the accused. A defendant is subject to the speedy-trial statute that applies at the time he makes his speedy-trial demand. DOC transferred custody of Defendant to Whiteside County on 12/2/11, and Defendant did not make a speedy-trial demand until 12/6/11. The 120-day statute applied starting on 12/2/11, absent a demand while Defendant was in the custody of the DOC. Had Defendant made his demand prior to 12/2/11, he would have been subject to the 160-day provision of the Detainer Act given his reconfinement to a DOC facility. As Defendant's speedy-trial rights were not violated, court did not err in dismissing his postconviction petition, as appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the argument. (CARTER and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/12/20.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of battery. Defendant filed motion for new trial, asserting that he did not receive a speedy trial. Court found, based on its own recollection and its interpretation of various docket entries, that Defendant agreed to continuance generally and did not object to the continuance and acquiesced in the setting of a mutually agreeable trial date. Given the lack of a transcript of hearing when, per court order, "motion for continuance by agreement", an agreed statement of facts, or a bystander's report, Defendant cannot meet his burden to show otherwise.(HUDSON and BRENNAN, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with aggravated battery of a correctional institution employee. Court erred in dismissing, on speedy-trial grounds, count II of State's indictment. The original charge alleged that Defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to officer by biting her, and thus Defendant should have anticipated that State would also charge that battery was insulting or provoking. Count II of indictment was not a new and additional charge, and thus the continuances attributable to Defendant on the original battery charge were also attributable to her on the subsequent charge, and State did not violate Defendant's speedy-trial rights as to count II. Court erred in granting in part Defendant's motion in limine to exclude video evidence of the alleged battery. In video, officer's immediate exclamation "Ow!" was an excited utterance; and then another officer asked her, "Did she bite you?" and officer answered "Yes!", in the same agitated tone. As officer lacked the opportunity to fabricate her answer, this answer was also admissible as an excited utterance. (ZENOFF and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2nd degree murder in stabbing death, and was sentenced to 18 years. The 1st-degree murder charge was not a new and additional charge, and it thus relates back to the original 2nd degree murder charge. Any delays attributable to Defendant on initial charge are also attributable to him on subsequent charge. As no speedy-trial violation occurred, trial counsel's failure to raise a speedy-trial claim was neither deficient nor prejudicial. (KARMEIER, FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)