Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his federal drug and firearm charges on speedy trial grounds. Instant trial took place within 70-day period set forth in Speedy Trial Act, and said trial did not violate any constitutional right to speedy trial. Moreover, plaintiff could not attribute to his federal case over year long delay after he was arrested on similar state-court charges, where defendant failed to establish any collusion between state and federal officials to deny defendant his speedy trial right. Also, Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s contention that Dist. Ct. denied his right to testify on his own behalf at his trial, where defendant received late notice of existence of video of his proffer, and where Dist. Ct. allowed prosecution to use proffer for impeachment purposes if defendant decided to testify. Ct. found that defendant had choice to testify if he wanted to, and record showed that defendant made choice not to testify after he had viewed video proffer. Too, while government witness improperly made reference to defendant’s admission to one charged offense that was contained in proffer, any error was harmless, given overwhelming nature of defendant’s guilt on said offense.

Dist. Ct. did not err in initially granting defendant’s motion to represent himself at his trial on drug and firearm charges and in subsequently finding that said waiver was valid, under circumstances where defendant only presented frivolous jurisdictional arguments and did not meaningfully participate in his trial. Record showed that two different judges conducted thorough Faretta colloquies that covered defendant’s age, high school education, mental health, prior legal experience that included three felony convictions and disadvantages of self-representation. Fact that defendant participated only minimally at trial and presented frivolous “sovereign-citizen” jurisdictional defense did not require different result, since Sixth Amendment protects right of defendants to “go down in flames if they wish.” Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that Dist. Ct. should have rescinded his waiver of counsel when defendant refused to participate in his trial.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs seized from defendant’s condominium located in Georgia, under circumstances where condominium owner granted police consent to search said condominium, and where defendant obtained lease for condominium through use of false name, which was in violation of Georgia law. Defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy when he obtained lease for condominium, and defendant’s leasehold interest in condominium prevented condominium owner from granting police consent to search condominium. Fact that defendant obtained lease through violation of Georgia law did not lessen his expectation of privacy in condominium.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 63-month term of incarceration plus $1,528,425.31 restitution order, after defendant had pleaded guilty to two counts of wire fraud that stemmed from defendant’s embezzlement of funds from her employer. Defendant argued that Dist. Ct. violated Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 32(i)(1)(A) and (C) by failing to ensure that defendant and her counsel had read and discussed amended presentence report prior to imposing said sentence. Defendant acknowledged that she and her counsel had opportunity to review and make objections to original presentence report and failed to identify on appeal any objection to revised presentence report that could have been made to revise presentence report or to lower her sentence. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to appear with her at final determination hearing regarding imposition of final restitution amount, since defendant could establish no prejudice, where Dist. Ct. was merely imposing stipulated restitution amount at said hearing.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s application for reduced sentence under compassionate release provisions of 18 USC section 3582(c)(1)(A). At heart of defendant’s application was his contention was that his unconstitutionally-imposed pre-Booker mandatory life sentence contributed to extraordinary and compelling reason to grant his request for reduced sentence. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that non-retroactive statutory sentencing change cannot be transformed into one that is retroactive via request for compassionate release. It also held that Dist. Ct. could properly find in alternative that section 3553(a) factors weighed against defendant’s release some 20 years after his convictions, where said release would fail to reflect seriousness of defendant’s convictions or promote respect for law.