Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to below-Guidelines, 40-month term of incarceration on charge of distributing fentanyl, under circumstances where Dist. Ct. found that defendant actually was aware that drugs he sold contained said drug, which served as sentencing enhancement under section 2D1.1(b)(13) of USSG. While defendant argued that record lacked facts to support such finding, any error was harmless, where Dist. Ct. made clear that it would have rendered same sentence, regardless of defendant’s knowledge that fentanyl was in drugs he sold.
Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 30 years in prison. The sole issue on appeal was whether defendant’s waiver of trial counsel and election to proceed pro se substantially complied with SCR 401(a). The appellate court held that it did not because the record could not establish that defendant’s decision was made with full awareness of both his rights and the consequences of his decision to abandon those rights. (HOFFMAN and ROCHFORD, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for resentencing under First Step Act (Act), with respect to his prior drug convictions, but denying any resentencing treatment with respect to his firearm convictions, which were not covered by said Act. While Dist. Ct. has discretion to reduce aggregate sentence, even if part of said sentence rests on offenses that are neither covered by Act nor grouped with covered conviction(s), Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in failing to reduce sentence for defendant’s firearm convictions, which included causing death of two individuals and carrying of forearm in relation to drug trafficking crime. Record showed that during defendant’s original sentencing hearing, his firearms’ convictions were distinct and disaggregated from his sentencing for his drug convictions. Moreover, only sentence that was aggregated during defendant's original sentencing hearing was his drug convictions, which, under this record, was only sentence that could be examined for resentencing under Act.
Defendant was found guilty of one count of being an armed habitual criminal and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order supplemental discovery and by failing to strike a witness’ testimony. Defendant also argued that the trial court imposed an improper double sentencing enhancement. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant forfeited his claims relating to additional discovery because he failed to seek a continuance of the trial, forfeited his claims regarding allegedly improper testimony because he did not object when it was offered at trial, and that defendant’s prior UUWF convictions, which were predicate offenses for the AHC conviction, could be considered during sentencing in the context of defendant’s criminal history and were not an improper enhancement. (HARRIS and LANNERD, concurring)
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm and sentenced to 45 years in prison. Defendant appealed from the dismissal of his successive petition for post-conviction relief in which he advanced a claim of actual innocence. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that defendant’s petition made a substantial showing of actual innocence that entitled him to a third-stage evidentiary hearing and noting that questions regarding the credibility of witnesses were not properly resolved at the second stage of proceedings. (C.A. WALKER and TAILOR, concurring)
Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing defendant’s habeas petition, after finding that defendant had failed to exhaust his state court remedies under circumstances, where defendant had filed his post conviction petition in 2003, but it still remained pending in 2019 when he filed instant habeas petition and invoked 28 USC 2254(b)(1) by alleging that Illinois’s post conviction relief process had proven to be ineffective for him. Defendant’s post-conviction petition still remained pending in 2023, and record did not support Dist. Ct.’s finding that defendant was responsible for all but seven months of instant delay, where record showed that State was responsible for three-year delay in turning over tapes to defendant. Moreover, while defendant was responsible for some portions of instant delay, state docket showed general lack of action or urgency on part of State and trial court. Ct. further observed that State’s serious deficient management of defendant’s post conviction claim rendered instant post conviction relief process ineffective, so as to allow defendant to file instant habeas petition.
Defendant was sentenced to 80 years for first-degree murder and appealed from the first-stage dismissal of his post-conviction petition in which he alleged that his sentence was unconstitutional because he was 22 years old at the time of the offense and has intellectual disabilities. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant’s sentence did not violate the proportionate penalties clause because it was discretionary and not mandatory and the trial court took into consideration the necessary aggravating and mitigating factors. As a result, the trial court did not err in dismissing the defendant's post-conviction petition at the first state because his argument did not have an arguable basis in law or in fact. (REYES and BURKE, concurring)
Defendant appealed from his conviction for murder and armed robbery, arguing on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting other-crimes evidence, that his sentence of 60 years was unconstitutional, and that the trial court erred in finding that he lacked rehabilitative potential. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the admission of other crimes evidence, while improper, was harmless, that the trial court properly considered the mitigating and aggravating factors in sentencing, and that defendant’s sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. (HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, concurring)
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine and filed a motion to suppress the evidence against her based on a lack of probable cause for the search of her vehicle in conjunction with a traffic stop. The trial court granted the motion and the State appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that probable cause existed for a search of the vehicle based on the positive alert of a canine and that this analysis had not changed due to the legalization of cannabis, one of just five narcotic substances the dog was trained to alert to. (TURNER and ZENOFF, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his conviction on bank robbery charges, where defendant asserted that state prosecutors denied him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, where: (1) police officers placed defendant in lineup hours after court commissioner found existence probable cause for his arrest, set bail and filled out “CR-215 form;” (2) defendant did not have counsel at lineup; (3) state prosecutors did not file criminal complaint against defendant until three days after lineup; and (4) state prosecutors used ensuing eye-witness identification of defendant at lineup in his trial. While Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at time of lineup because defendant was not present at probable cause hearing, Ct. of Appeals found that defendant’s right to counsel had attached by time of lineup because said hearing represented start of adversarial proceedings against defendant, and because at time of hearing there were indicators of government’s commitment to prosecute defendant, where county commissioner appeared in court and filled out CR-215 form, which contained probable cause statement submitted by police, judicial determination of same and setting of bail amount. Fact that defendant was not present at probable cause hearing was irrelevant. (Dissent filed.)
