Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of endangering the life or health of a child causing death and one count of involuntary manslaughter in the death of his step-daughter who died as a result of an overdose of antipsychotic medication and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Defendant argued on appeal that the guilty verdicts for manslaughter and child endangerment were legally inconsistent because the offenses have inconsistent mental states, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting excessive other-crimes evidence, and the State failed to prove that defendant was the cause of his step-daughter’s death. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the guilty verdicts were legally inconsistent. (JORGENSEN and SCHOSTOK, concurring)

Respondent appealed from the circuit court’s judgment that he was a sexually violent person and committing him to institutional care under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. On appeal, respondent argued that the petition violated his right to a speedy trial, that the petition violated his right to be free from double jeopardy, that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations and res judicata, and that the evidence was not sufficient. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the petition was timely filed, that defendant was not subjected to double jeopardy or deprived of his right to a speedy trial, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he was a sexually violent person. (MIKVA and TAILOR, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm and was sentenced to 84 years in prison. Defendant pursued multiple arguments on appeal. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that while the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions, the trial court should have suppressed his inculpatory statements to detectives because he clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent and that invocation was not honored. (ODEN JOHNSON and TAILOR, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to a total of 100 years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentence was unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, finding that the trial court improperly imposed a “trial tax” and did not properly consider defendant’s intellectual disability and rehabilitative potential. (MIKVA and C.A.WALKER, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-judgment relief under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendant argued on appeal that his due process rights were violated when the trial court dismissed his petition without giving him an opportunity to respond and when the trial court recharacterized his petition as a petition for post-conviction relief without admonishing him or giving him the opportunity to withdraw his petition. The appellate court vacated and remanded for further proceedings finding that the trial court either improperly recharacterized the petition without providing defendant the required protections or did not intend to recharacterize the petition but incorrectly referred to it as a post-conviction petition. (C.A. WALKER, concurring and TAILOR, dissenting)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery. On appeal, defendant argued that the circuit court erred when it denied his petition for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition asserting that his arrest violated the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied under the facts of the case, that defendant would not be entitled to suppression of any evidence even if the court found his arrest to be illegal and, as a result, defendant could not establish prejudice as is required to file a successive petition. (HOWSE, concurring and COBBS, specially concurring)

Defendant appealed from the circuit court’s denial of his successive post-conviction petition, arguing that he presented affidavits supporting a colorable claim of actual innocence. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the affidavits did not place the trial evidence in a different light or undermine the court’s confidence in the guilty finding where there was overwhelming evidence presented at trial to support defendant’s accountability for kidnapping for ransom. (LAMPKIN and HOFFMAN, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of driving while his license was revoked. The issue before the court on appeal was whether the trial court denied defendant’s right to a fair trial when it appointed standby counsel to conduct defendant’s trial and denied her request for a continuance after defendant elected to proceed pro se and then refused to participate in the trial. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court was within its discretion in terminating defendant’s right to represent himself or when it elevated counsel from standby counsel to counsel of record when defendant did not appear for his trial. The appellate court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied counsel’s motion for a continuance as she had sufficient time to prepare for the trial, taking into consideration the lack of complexity of the charge and the limited number of witnesses. (SCHOSTOK and KENNEDY, concurring)