Defendant appealed from his conviction for aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, arguing that the circuit court erred in failing to suppress evidence because there was not probable cause to arrest him. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the evidence established probable cause to arrest the defendant because a reasonably cautious person would have believed defendant was operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol where he showed poor driving, admitted to drinking, had slurred speech, and poor dexterity. (HOLDRIDGE and DAUGHERITY, concurring)
Defendant appealed from the second-stage dismissal of his post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in plea negotiations and at trial. Defendant claimed that counsel never met with him privately and misinformed him about the State’s evidence, leading him to reject a 20-year plea offer and to instead receive a 55-year sentence after a jury trial for first-degree murder. The appellate court reversed, finding defendant alleged a substantial showing of a constitutional violation relating to his claim because of counsel’s alleged failure to privately consult with him and inform him of the State’s evidence and affirmed the remaining issues. (MIKVA and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring)
Defendant appealed from an order of the circuit court denying him leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, arguing that he had good cause to file a successive petition based on a troubled upbringing that would have demonstrated that his 80-year sentence violated the eighth amendment to the U.S. Constitution because he was 20 years old at the time the crime was committed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that his claim had been foreclosed by the supreme court’s decision in People v. Dorsey. (CUNNINGHAM and CONNORS, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in summarily denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his guilty plea to two counts of attempted first-degree intentional homicide on grounds that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during his guilty plea hearing, and that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into guilty plea. Defendant procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by failing to raise issue with Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Moreover, defendant’s claim that he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty was frivolous, where: (1) defendant did not claim that Wisconsin Court of Appeals’s denial of said claim was contrary to or involved unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; (2) defendant did not explain why state-court determination that his guilty plea was voluntary and knowing was unreasonable; and (3) state-court could make determination that defendant’s intellectual limitations did not prevent him from understanding his plea or nature of his criminal charges. Also, Dist. Ct. could summarily dismiss habeas corpus petition without need to examine transcripts or for government to file response.
Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on charges of attempting to entice minor to engage in sexual activity and attempting to use interstate facilities to transmit information about minor, where said charges arose out of defendant’s internet responses to posted advertisement on Craig’s List by police officer posing as 15-year-old girl “looking to make $ for favors.” Record showed that defendant participated in over 70 exchanges with officer over 4-day period, during which defendant told officer that she was pretty, and asked officer about her sexual history, her living situation, her sexual positions and her favorite sexual activity. Defendant was eventually arrested near location where he had arranged for in-person meeting with officer. Evidence showed existence of defendant’s attempt to entice through use of internet individual whom he believed was 15-year-old girl to engage on sexual activity, as well as defendant’s actual belief that individual was 15-year-old girl, where, after he received photograph of girl from officer, defendant expressed concern that he did not want to go to jail because she was young. Also, jury could reject defendant’s claim of entrapment, since: (1) fact that government initiated conversation with defendant was insufficient to show improper inducement; and (2) jury could properly have found that defendant was pre-disposed to commit charged offenses given nature and extent his more than 70 exchanges with officer over 4-day period, and given fact that defendant had initiated some conversations with officer, even though he believed at that time that officer was 15-year-old girl.
Respondent, who has been committed to institutional care as a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act since 2008, appealed from orders entered by the trial court denying his motion to appoint a psychologist as his expert and finding no probable cause to believe that respondent is no longer a sexually violent person. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err where the respondent did not establish that the appointment of the expert was crucial to his defense and where respondent had not established that had made sufficient progress toward rehabilitation under the Act. (LAMPKIN and ROCHFORD, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing above-guidelines, 120-month term of incarceration on RICO conspiracy charge arising out of his drug-related activities on behalf of gang, even though Dist. Ct. applied attempted murder, as opposed to aggravated assault guidelines. Dist. Ct. could properly use attempted murder guidelines in view of defendant’s involvement in incident, where defendant shot at rival gang member over dispute regarding drug territory, but hit instead innocent bystander, and where Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant had harbored intent to kill rival gang member. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly reject defendant’s argument that he was entitled to two-level reduction in offense level to reflect his minor participation in conspiracy, where: (1) Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant had important role in conspiracy given his willingness to kill others to protect drug territory; and (2) others in conspiracy actually played minor roles in conspiracy as mere drug dealers with no evidence of violence. Also, Dist. Ct. gave adequate explanation for imposing above-guideline sentence that noted defendant’s admission to being felon in possession of firearm on multiple occasions and his inability to follow law, as well as fact that applicable guidelines were too low because they did not account for certain aggravating factors.
In prosecution on conspiracy to commit sex trafficking and sex trafficking charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial after prosecution indicated during trial that it would not call witness in bodycam video played to jury, where witness stated in video that defendant was prostituting young woman. While defendant argued that denial of mistrial request was inappropriate because he was denied his right to confront said witness, no right to confrontation occurred, where witness’s statements in video were not testimonial in nature, where statements to police officer were made in connection to police responding to ongoing emergency involving fight in motel parking lot and sex trafficking that was occurring at motel. Moreover, any error in proceeding with trial was harmless, where government’s case against defendant was strong, and where witness’s statements were cumulative to defendant’s admission that he was prostituting several women and had no bearing on defendant’s defense that he did so without use of force or coercion.
In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying as untimely defendant’s motion to suppress seizure of drugs found in ceiling cavity of defendant’s back porch pursuant to search warrant, where defendant filed said motion one year after his conviction and argued for first time that search exceeded scope of warrant, where police were to search for firearms and ammunition. Moreover, instant seizure was otherwise lawful, where: (1) ammunition that was subject of warrant could have been found in ceiling cavity or sock; and (2) incriminating nature of sock was immediately apparent because officers had pro0bable cause to believe that sock contained contraband or was linked to criminal activity. Ct. of Appeals also rejected defendant’s argument that: (1) Dist. Ct. erred in subjecting him to 10-year statutory minimum sentence under section 841(b)(1)(A)(vi), because furanylfentanyl found in sock is not analogue of fentanyl; and (2) Dist. Ct. erred in finding that defendant’s prior Illinois drug felony convictions fell within career-offender guideline’s definition of controlled substance offense under section 4B1.2(b) of USSG.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant as armed career offender under Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to 20-year term of incarceration on drug and firearm charges, where armed career offender finding was based, in part, on two Wisconsin drug trafficking convictions. Defendant argued that said convictions did not qualify as “serious drug offenses” under ACCA because, under categorical approach, said state offenses made it crime to deal in two substances, i.e., narcotic analogs of cocaine and esters and salts of esters of cocaine, that federal law did not reach. However, record showed that substances identified by defendant as being not covered under federal law did not and could not possibly exist. As such, there was no actual “overbreath” between state and federal drug offenses that would disqualify defendant from armed career offender treatment. Ct. further found that under ACCA, categorical mismatch cannot be based on truly impossible conduct.
