Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and that he personally discharge the firearm that caused the victim’s death. He was sentenced to 60 years in prison. Defendant appealed arguing that (1) the trial court should not have admitted cell phone records into evidence as self-authenticating business records because accompanying certifications did not allege that they were made under oath, that defendant did not receive a fair trial when, (2) while being tried jointly with a co-defendant, the State elicited non-testifying co-defendant statements that implicate the defendant, (3) the trial court erred when it did not appoint new counsel where defendant alleged his counsel had an actual conflict of interest because he previously represented the victim; (4) the trial court conducted an inadequate Krankel inquiry into defendant’s conflict-of-interest claim; and (5) defendant’s trial court had an actual conflict of interest when he adopted defendant’s pro se filing alleging that counsel did not explain the conflict of interest to him so he never knowingly waived it but then failed to argue the claim at the motion hearing. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the conviction and sentence entered by the trial court. (CAVANAGH and ZENOFF, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated battery and sentenced to 24 months’ probation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict her of either count of aggravated battery and that the trial court conducted an inadequate inquiry of jurors pursuant to SCR 431(b). The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support one of the counts of aggravated battery but it was insufficient as to the other count because there was no evidence that the defendant made physical contact. The appellate court further found that the trial court failed to comply with SCR 431(b), but that the evidence was not closely balanced so the defendant was not entitled to the relief requested. (CAVANAGH, concurring and STEIGMANN, dissenting)

Respondent appealed the trial court’s adjudication of him as a sexually violent person arguing that the trial court should have granted his motion to strike portions of the State’s expert testimony, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a sexually violent person, and that several conditions imposed by the court relating to his conditional release program were unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders denying respondent’s motion to strike and finding that he was a sexually dangerous person but reversed the court’s order approving DHS’s plan for conditional release. The appellate court remanded to the trial court to enter a release plan that allowed for reasonable internet access. (MITCHAELL, concurring and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring in part and dissenting in part)

Defendant appealed from the second stage dismissal of his post-conviction petition alleging that his post-conviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance. The appellate court agreed and reversed, finding that post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not arguing that the defendant’s trial counsel was per se ineffective because he was not properly licensed to practice law at the time of defendant’s trial and sentencing and, as a result, post-conviction counsel failed to adequately present the cognizable claim that defendant was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel who did not raise the issue on direct appeal. (DELORT and CONNORS, concurring)

Defendant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court reversed and vacated defendant’s sentence, finding that after the officer’s initial search of the defendant’s vehicle found no contraband “the probable cause scale was essentially zeroed out” and that, as a result, the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found during a subsequent search of the same vehicle because there was no probable cause for the search. (ROCHFORD and MARTIN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery and sentenced to a concurrent term of 60 years for murder and 20 years for armed robbery. On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed his conviction for murder and vacated his conviction for armed robbery. Defendant subsequently asserted actual innocence on the basis that a witness provided false testimony to a grand jury and filed several motions under section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking an order compelling the witness to provide a DNA sample for further forensic testimony, which were denied by the trial court. The appellate court affirmed, finding that while the requested DNA sample was unavailable through other means, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the other “good cause” factors weighed against compelling the witness to provide the sample. (ELLIS and BURKE, concurring)