Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing below-Guidelines, 28-year sentence on drug conspiracy charge, even though defendant argued that he should have only received mandatory minimum ten-year sentence because Mexican authorities tortured him before turning him over to U.S. authorities. Relevant guidelines called for life sentence, and Dist. Ct. provided sufficient explanation for imposing instant sentence after considering factors under section 3553(a) and accepting or rejecting arguments from both parties. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that Dist. Ct. used either his own or defendant’s ethnicity in determining instant sentence. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that Dist. Ct. improperly relied on extraneous article about number of Mexican military personnel killed in war on drugs, where defendant did not object to Dist. Ct.’s reference to said article, and where defendant failed to show how said reference did adversely affected selection of sentence. Too, Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that Dist. Ct. should have recused himself under 28 USC section 455(a) for biased reasons, where: (1) defendant failed to object to any allegedly biased statements regarding defendant’s claims of torture; and (2) defendant failed to demonstrate that any alleged improper statements affected Dist. Ct.’s selection of instant sentence.

In prosecution on series of sex-trafficking charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting testimony of expert witness regarding behavior of victims of sex trafficking. Expert never met instant victim, and expert’s testimony was limited to discussion of behavior of sex trafficking victims in general and why said victims may not be able to be completely forthcoming when questioned by law enforcement and medical personnel. Also, expert’s testimony would benefit jury’s understanding of behavior of victims of sex trafficking, and defendant otherwise failed to show that expert’s testimony exceeded scope of permissible testimony under Rule 702, or that expert’s testimony improperly bolstered victim’s testimony. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress seizure of his cell phone under circumstances, where: (1) police visited his girlfriend’s home and asked her if she would provide defendant’s phone; and (2) girlfriend gave phone to police, who subsequently obtained and received warrant to search phone. Girlfriend was able to consent to seizure of phone, where she had phone for over one month, and defendant did not otherwise restrict her control over phone. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress results of search of his Facebook and iCloud accounts, even though defendant asserted that victim made inconsistent statements in warrant application. Dist. Ct. could properly deny defendant’s request for Franks hearing, where other evidence in warrant application corroborated victim’s statements and established probable cause to search defendant’s Facebook and iCloud accounts.

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing $95,075 in restitution to three victims at issue in interstate sex trafficking charge to which defendant had pleaded guilty. Record showed that on date of sentencing hearing, Dist. Ct. scheduled future hearing to resolve parties’ dispute on restitution figure, and eventual restitution order was entered beyond 90-day period for doing so. Dist. Ct. did not err in putting off resolution of restitution issue until after sentencing hearing, where presentence report indicated presence of dispute over restitution figure that had not been resolved as of date of sentencing hearing. Also, record did not support defendant’s claim that victims had knowingly declined restitution. Fact that record lacked complete accounting of victim’s losses did not require remand, where presentence report contained sufficient materials to make reasoned restitution award. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that instant restitution order was entered without benefit of counsel, where: (1) although counsel had filed motion to withdraw, counsel had previously submitted pleadings that challenged government’s proposed restitution award; (2) Dist. Ct. had considered counsel's pleadings; and (3) ultimate restitution order was more than $100,000 less than government’s initial restitution request. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in entering restitution order outside of defendant’s presence.